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I.

INTRODUCTION

There are many reasons why a case may be considered "good law." A
case may be considered "good law" because its reasoning and holding are
consistent with standards set by contemporary doctrine. A case may be
considered "good law" because of the utility of the values it serves or the
frequency of its use. A case may be considered "good law" because of
judicial acquiescence, or because it has not been reevaluated in light of
evolving standards. The perception that a case is "good law" increases the
longevity of a case which, upon reevaluation, may be of little
contemporary value. This Article reevaluates the seminal stream of
commerce case, Gray v. American Radiator & StandardSanitary Corp., in
light of contemporary personal jurisdiction jurisprudence to determine if it
is still "good law." 1 The study of Gray's lifecycle as a case will
demonstrate how its version of stream of commerce jurisdiction poisoned
the well for the development of a cogent jurisdictional theory.
Gray's stream of commerce theory 2 empowered a single state
courtroom to bring within its jurisdictional reach virtually every participant
'176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill.
1961).
Although the phrase "stream of commerce" is attributed to Gray, the Gray opinion actually
never used that phrase. See generally, id.Instead, the opinion used the phrase "in the ordinary
course of commerce." Id. at 766; see Electro Med. Equip. Ltd. v. Hamilton Med. AG, No.
99-579, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18483, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 1999) ("The first notable
appearance of the stream of commerce theory was the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Gray
v. American Radiator."); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 742 F. Supp. 717, 721
(D.P.R. 1990) ("In Gray, where the principles of the 'stream of commerce' theory first
appeared ....).
2
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in a commercial chain of distribution. 3 The result ignited the field of
product liability litigation. 4 Not surprisingly, Gray's influence soon
exceeded the scope of its product liability origins.5 The stream of
commerce theory became the genus for every species of long-arm
jurisdiction-tort, 6 contract, 7 domestic relations,8 fraud, 9 antitrust,' °
3See Kim Dayton, Personal Jurisdictionand The Stream of Commerce, 7 REV. LITIG.
239,
260, 260 n.69 (1988) (stating stream of commerce jurisdiction "created the incentive" for product
liability plaintiffs to sue all the defendants in a chain of distribution). The article further stated
"[Slubstantive [products liability] tort law... contemplates that all entities within the
distribution chain should be liable to a consumer who is injured by a defective product." Id. at
274. Stream of commerce jurisdiction seeks to render all such entities amenable to jurisdiction in
the same action. Id. at 274; William M. Richman, UnderstandingPersonalJurisdiction, 25
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 624 (1993) (adapted from WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF LAW, (2d ed. 1993)) (stating stream of commerce jurisdiction
ensures that the "manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of defective goods... be amenable to
jurisdiction
wherever those goods are distributed, either directly or indirectly .... ").
4
See Dayton, supra note 3, at 259-62 (tracing the relationship between the development of
product liability theory and stream of commerce jurisdiction); Richman, supra note 3, at 624
("The [stream of commerce] theory allowed the expansion of jurisdictional doctrine to match the
expansion of interstate and international commerce."); Mollie A. Murphy, PersonalJurisdiction
and the Stream of Commerce Theory: A Reappraisaland a Revised Approach, 77 KY. L.J. 243,
259 (1988-89) ("[T]he [stream of commerce] theory provided a basis for satisfying the increasing
jurisdictional needs created by sophisticated distribution systems .... ); Electro Med. Equip.
Ltd., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18483, at *17 (stating that "the stream of commerce theory 'evolved
to sustain jurisdiction in products liability cases' (quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer,
762 F.2d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 1985))).
5
See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Applicability, to Actions not Based on Products Liability, of
State Statutes or Rules of Court Predicating in Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign
Manufacturers or Distributorsupon Use of their Goods Within State, 20 A.L.R.3d 957, 957-59
(1968) (discussing the application of the stream of commerce theory to actions not based on
product liability).
6
See generally, e.g., Florendo v. Pan Hemisphere Transp., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 16 (N.D. Ill.
1976); Lindley v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. I11.1967); Keckler v. Brookwood
Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. 11. 1965).
7
See generally, e.g., Jay v. Troxel Mfg. Co., No. 83-C4796, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20024
(N.D. I11.Jan. 27, 1984); Gen. Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Hensarling, No. 80-C5956, 1980 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 15578 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1980); Chicago Silver Exch. v. United Refinery, 394 F. Supp.
1332 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Rovin Sales Co. v. Socialist Republic of Rom., 403 F. Supp. 1298 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Cohan v. Mun. Leasing Sys., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 1022 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Tatham-Laird
& Kudner, Inc. v. Johnny's Am. Inn, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 28 (N.D. I11.1974); Magnaflux Corp. v.
Foerster, 223 F. Supp. 552 (N.D. I11. 1963); Stansell v. Int'l Fellowship, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 149
(I11.App. Ct. 1974).
8
See generally, e.g., Haymond v. Haymond, 377 N.E.2d 563 (I11.App. Ct. 1978).
9
See generally, e.g., Markarian v. Garoogian, 767 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Il. 1991); Club
Assistance Program, Inc. v. Zukerman, 594 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Alford v. Alford, No.
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intellectual property, 1 libel,' 2 defamation,13 unfair competition 4-to name a
few. And, Gray, the case, gained acceptance as the shorthand reference for

this new procedural convention. In the four decades since its inception,
Gray has been cited no fewer than 792 times1 5 in courtrooms throughout

the nation, and no less than six times in the United States Supreme Court
cases of Shaffer v. Heitner,16 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 17 and
Calder v. Jones." For decades, it seemed indisputable that Gray was
considered "good law." Then in 1987, the United States Supreme Court
issued Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,'9 in which the Court

failed to reach a principled consensus on how the minimum contacts
doctrine satisfied due process in the stream of commerce context.
This Article asserts that the Court's confusion in Asahi is traceable to
the origins of the stream of commerce theory in Gray. The Article argues
79-C4235, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10379 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 22, 1980); Bodine's, Inc. v. Sunny-O,
Inc., 494 F. Supp. 1279 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Ragold, Inc. v. Ferrero, U.S., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 117
(N.D. 111. 1980); Godwin Aircraft, Inc. v. Houston, 851 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992);
Schocket v. Classic Auto Sales, Inc., 817 P.2d 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
' 0See generally, e.g., Dayton, supra note 3, at 261, 261 n.73; Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co.
v. Kaplan, 429 F. Supp. 139 (N.D. 11. 1977); U.S. Dental Inst. v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists,
396 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Il.1975).
"See generally, e.g., Habitat Wallpaper & Blinds, Inc. v. K.T. Scott, Ltd. P'ship, 807 F.
Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (trademark infringement); Store Decor Div. of Jas Int'l, Inc. v. Stylex
Worldwide Indus., Ltd., 767 F. Supp. 181 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (copyright infringement); Acrison,
Inc. v. Control & Metering Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 1445 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (patent infringement);
Burwood Prod. Co. v. Marsel Mirror & Glass Prod., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(copyright infringement); Kogan v. Longstreet, 374 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. 111. 1974) (copyright
infringement); Waltham Watch Co. v. Hallmark Jewelers, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (trademark infringement).
12See generally, e.g., Can. M.T. Fruit, Inc. v. W. Growers Ass'n,
No. 81-C5623, 1982 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11939 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1982); Process Church of the Final Judgment v. Sanders,
338 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. 11. 1972); Novel v. Garrison, 294 F. Supp. 825 (N.D. I11.1969).
13See generally, e.g., Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38 F.3d
909 (7th Cir. 1994); Cohen v.
Charell, No. 82-C4408, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14656 (N.D. 11. Aug. 12, 1983).
4
See generally, e.g., Schering Corp. v. W.A. Butler Co., No. 83-C1820, 1984 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20216 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 1984).
15As of June 20, 2002, Gray has been cited by 621 citing decisions and
by 792 citing
references. 1 SHEPARD'S NORTHEASTERN REP. CITATIONS (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1999-2002 Supp.); 1 SHEPARD'S NORTHEASTERN REPORTER CITATIONS (Shepard's/McGrawHill, Inc., 1995-1999 Supp.); 7 SHEPARD'S NORTHEASTERN REPORTER CITATIONS
(Shepard's/McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1995).
'6433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
17444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
18465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
'9480 U.S. 102 (1987).
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that two developments created the schism between stream of commerce
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts doctrine. The first development
was Gray's statutory and due process analyses which, when taken together,
misconceived the constitutional justifications for stream of commerce
jurisdiction. The second development arose from doctrinal problems
within the minimum contacts doctrine itself, such as its increasing
emphasis on the fairness analysis and its decreasing emphasis on the
relationship of reciprocal benefits and obligations between the defendant
and the state. The coincidence of these two developments, one emerging
from a flawed case, the other emerging from a flawed jurisdictional
doctrine, resulted in the erroneous assumption that stream of commerce
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts doctrine were one. They are not.
Just as the theories of general relativity and quantum physics are mutually
exclusive yet apply to the same universe, 20 so are the stream of commerce
and minimum contacts theories mutually exclusive yet consistent with
procedural due process. Like string theory, this Article attempts to
separate, clarify and then unify both doctrines. 21
To prove this thesis, the Article examines Gray's historical
development in light of the evolving relationship between the minimum
contacts and stream of commerce doctrines. The Article argues that both
doctrines satisfy procedural due process although they do so for different
reasons because they serve different values. Accordingly, the Article
argues for the disentanglement of stream of commerce jurisdiction from
the minimum contacts doctrine and for recognition of the stream of
commerce doctrine as a sui generis form of jurisdiction.
II.

THE OPINION

Gray was not the kind of case that had a strong initial impact but lost
vitality over time. To the contrary, Gray was flawed from its inception yet
gained influence as the stream of commerce theory evolved. The opinion
itself was a concoction of transposed concepts: locus was confused with
cognizability; cognizability was confused with jurisdictional amenability;
jurisdictional amenability was confused with the "last act doctrine;" the
"last act doctrine" was confused with the "effects" test; the concept of a
"tort" was confused with the concept of "tortious conduct;" statutory
jurisdiction was confused with constitutional jurisdiction; inferences
2°STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 12 (Bantom Books 10th ed. 1996) (1988).
21
BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE: SUPERSTRINGS, HIDDEN DIMENSIONS, AND
THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE THEORY 117-31 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1999).
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lacking foundation gave rise to inferences of expectations, which gave rise
to inferences of benefits, which ultimately gave rise to a finding of
jurisdiction. As if to season the brew, the opinion tossed in bits of the
statute of limitations, the forum's interest, and the convenience of the
parties and witnesses.
Despite the analytical confusion, Gray was actually a very simple case.
In 1960, Titan Valve Manufacturing Company ("Titan") was an Ohio
manufacturer of safety valves. Titan shipped some of its valves to
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation ("American") of
Pennsylvania, which installed the valves into water heaters manufactured
in Pennsylvania. 22 American then shipped the water heaters to retailers
throughout the country.23 One of the water heaters was located in the
home of the plaintiff, Phyllis Gray, where the valve manufactured by Titan
allegedly failed, causing the water heater to explode and injure her. 24 Gray
brought suit against Titan and American in her home state of Illinois.25
22Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (Il1.
1961).
23

1d.

24

Id.

25

1d. In the course of analyzing the legal issues in Gray, I became curious about the question
of Titan's ultimate liability for manufacturing a defective hot water valve. In pursuit of my
curiosity, I asked one of my students, David Bickel, an experienced hot water tank installer, to
explain to me how Phyllis Gray's hot water heater could have exploded. With the aid of a
somewhat oxidized hot water valve, he provided the following explanation: The function of a hot
water tank is simple. A gas supply provides the fuel to heat the water. A maximum water
temperature is preset to prevent scalding. The gas enters through a thermostatic gas valve that
regulates the temperature to which the water will be heated. The thermostatic gas valve fumctions
like the burner control on a stove. However, this valve shuts off the gas supply when the water
reaches the set temperature, thus shutting off the burner. When hot water is used (or a faucet is
opened), the heated water exits the hot water tank through an outlet. As the hot water leaves, the
cold water enters the tank through an inlet, displacing the hot water. Thus, the hot water tank
always remains full. As the hot water leaves and the cold water enters, the temperature in the
tank drops, triggering the thermostatic gas valve to turn on and relight the burner. The process
starts again, and repeats depending on the amount of hot water used. The process will also begin
when hot water has been sitting in the tank and cools below the set temperature. If the gas going
to the burner does not shut off when the set temperature is reached, the pressure and the
temperature will quickly rise to unsafe levels resulting in a vat of steaming hot water that will
explode if the pressure is not released. Proper function of the thermostatic gas valve is essential
to avoid such an explosion.
Thermostatic gas valves rarely malfunction. In the rare event that such a valve does
malfunction and the gas does not shut off, a backup safety mechanism called the "temperature
pressure release valve" is built into all hot water tanks. This pressure relief valve has a spring
inside, preset to compress at a specific pressure setting. The overheated water in the tank pushes
against the underside of the valve, compressing the spring, opening the valve, and allowing the
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The complaint alleged that Titan negligently constructed the valve that
American had incorporated into the water heater,26 which, "in the ordinary
course of commerce," was sold to an Illinois consumer." Titan was served
with Illinois process in Ohio.28 Titan filed a special appearance and a
motion to quash service on the grounds that it sold its valves to American
outside of Illinois, had no agent physically present in Illinois, did no
business in Illinois, and had not committed a tortious act in Illinois. 29 Gray
argued that jurisdiction over Titan was proper under Chapter 110, section
17(1)(b) of the Illinois Long-Arm Statute, which provided that "[A]ny
person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who does any of
the acts hereinafter enumerated, therby submits .. .to the jurisdiction of

the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from ...the
commission of a tortious act in this State."30 The circuit court agreed with
Titan and dismissed the complaint. Since a constitutional issue was
involved, Gray appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.3t
The supreme court appeal raised both statutory and constitutional
*
32
issues.
The statutory issue required the court to construe section 17(l)(b)
water to escape. If the hot water tank is full when the gas valve malfunctions, the pressure relief

valve will open when its preset pressure setting is reached. The heated water will escape through
the valve and out the discharge line, quickly relieving the excessive pressure inside the tank. As
with normal operation, when the hot water exits, cold water enters at the same rate, further
cooling the tank's temperature. If the gas constantly remains on, this whole process repeats
itself, which should prevent an explosion. It is important to note that the pressure relief valve is
designed to open only when the temperature and pressure in the tank rise to unsafe levels.
The explosion of Phyllis Gray's hot water tank probably occurred because the gas valve
malfunctioned, keeping the burner lit and the water boiling. However, the pressure relief valve
on her tank must also have malfunctioned in order for the tank to blow up. For an explosion to
have occurred, both the gas valve and the pressure relief valve must have malfunctioned
simultaneously. Alternatively, Gray's hot water tank may have exploded because of improper
installation of the pressure relief valve. In sum, in order for Phyllis Gray's hot water tank to have
exploded, the thermostatic gas valve must have malfunctioned before Titan's pressure relief
valve needed to operate. Only if both valves failed could the tank explode.
26Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
271d. at 766. The opinion assumed that Gray was the Illinois consumer of the heater.
The
opinion
did not inquire whether Gray was a first, second, or successive owner of the heater.
28
Id.at 762.
29
1d.
30
1d. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, para. 17(1)(b) (1959) (current version at 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2003)).
3321d
id.
32Gray was

argued before the Illinois Supreme Court at the University of Chicago pursuant
to the Illinois Supreme Court's longstanding (but since discontinued) tradition of hearing
significant cases at the University of Illinois on Washington's Birthday and at the University of

HeinOnline -- 55 Baylor L. Rev. 510 2003

2003]

PADDLING UP THE WRONG STREAM

511

Chicago on Lincoln's Birthday. Phyllis Gray was represented by Leo S. Carlin, who at that time,
was the president of the American Trial Lawyers Association. Francis D. Morrissey, of Baker,
McKenzie & Hightower, represented American Radiator. Jay M. Smyser of Lord, Bissell &
Brook, represented Titan Valve. At the trial level, American cross claimed against Titan for
indemnification and Titan moved to dismiss Gray's complaint on the grounds that Titan had not
committed a tortious act in Illinois as required by § 17(l)(b). The court agreed and Titan
prevailed.
On appeal, Gray and American Radiator joined forces against Titan. In fact, American
financed Gray's appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court in part to protect American's cross claim
and in part because of Carlin's professional interest as a plaintiffs personal injury lawyer in
expanding the jurisdictional reach of the Illinois courts.
The lower court ruling left the appellants with two concerns. First, American recognized that
Mrs. Gray was an endearing salt-of-the-earth woman who would make a "dynamite witness."
However, they also expected that her scars would fade over time, thus giving American an
incentive to prolong the case. Second, the appellants recognized that the language of section
17(l)(b) requiring "the commission of a tortious act within the State" posed a problem in proving
statutory jurisdiction because Titan had committed no acts in Illinois. In order to prevail, the
appellants realized that they had to convince the court that the true legal issue was constitutional,
not statutory.
To achieve this shift in focus the appellants made both legal and policy arguments. First,
they relied on the 1957 case of Nelson v. Miller, in which the Illinois Supreme Court upheld
jurisdiction over a Wisconsin appliance retailer whose employee injured an Illinois customer's
hand while delivering a stove. 143 N.E.2d 673, 681-82 (Ill. 1957). The defendant challenged the
court's jurisdiction on the ground that section 17(1)(b) was unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at
676. The court disagreed, holding instead that § 17 was to be as broadly construed as the due
process clause permitted. Id. at 681-82. The facts of the Gray case, however, did not fit neatly
within the Nelson holding because Titan, unlike Nelson's Wisconsin defendant, had not done
anything in Illinois. To minimize this discrepancy, the appellants developed the following
syllogism: The tort of negligence does not become cognizable until the injury occurs; plaintiff's
injury occurred in Illinois; therefore, Titan committed a tortious act in Illinois.
The syllogism may have lacked mathematical exactitude but it gave the court the leverage it
needed to shift the focus of the argument from § 17(1)(b) to the broader constitutional bases of
jurisdiction. Second, the appellants argued that Gray should be bound by Nelson's constitutional
construction of § 17. Anything less, they argued, would put Illinois law out of touch with
post-World War II economic realities and deny injured Illinois residents recourse in their own
courts.
Jay Smyser, Titan's attorney, was a former clerk to Illinois Supreme Court Justice Schaeffer,
the author of the Nelson opinion. Notwithstanding the appearance of his former law clerk,
Justice Schaeffer remained concerned that Illinois's jurisdictional reach be capable of meeting
the demands of the post-World War 1I economic era. Frank Morrissey, arguing for American
Radiator, commenced his argument by stating, "Titan Valve is no stranger to the courts of
Illinois." In fact, Morrissey continued, Titan had been the defendant in numerous suits filed by
Illinois plaintiffs for injuries arising from its products. This fact, although not a record fact, was
not disputed by Titan and eventually became the basis for the court's finding that Titan had a
"substantial connection with [Illinois]." Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
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33
to determine whether Titan had committed a "tortious act" in Illinois.
The court acknowledged that if Titan engaged in wrongful conduct, such
conduct took place in Ohio, the place of manufacture, with "[o]nly the
consequences occur[ing] in Illinois. '34 These facts, however, did not
convince the court that Titan had not committed a "tortious act" in Illinois.
To construe the phrase "tortious act," the court relied on "the last act
doctrine" of Section 377 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws which
provided that the "place of a wrong" for resolving conflict of laws issues
was "where the last event [took] place which [was] necessary to render the
actor liable. 3 5 Using this definition of the "place of a wrong," the court
reasoned that Titan should be subject to Illinois's jurisdiction because the
injury, the last act necessary to render the actor liable, occurred there.3 6
Trying to redirect the locus of its allegedly tortious conduct to Ohio,
Titan argued that by specifying "tortious act" rather than "tort," section
17(1)(b) referred not to a fully cognizable tort, but rather to any wrongful
conduct tha- constituted an element of a prima facie tort claim. 37 The
court, finding no difference between a "tort" and a "tortious act," rejected
Titan's distinctions as "technicalities of definition. 3 8 In aid of its
In the aftermath of the Illinois Supreme Court argument, Titan declared bankruptcy. No
judgment was ever entered against Titan nor did it participate in the eventual settlement between
American Radiator and Gray. Professor Frank Morrissey, Presentation at The John Marshall
Law 33School (Mar. 6, 2000).
Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
34
!d.
35
1d. at 762-63 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934)).
36Id at 763.
37

1d.

38Id. The distinction between "tort" and "tortious act," and the use of the "last act doctrine"

to determine jurisdiction was previously raised in the 1957 case ofHellriegelv. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 157 F. Supp. 718, 720-21 (N.D. Il. 1957). In that case, the plaintiff sued the component
part manufacturer (Power Products Corp.), manufacturer (Newark Stove Co.), and
distributor/retailer (Sears Roebuck & Co.) for injuries sustained from an allegedly defective lawn
mower. Id. at 719. The court noted the Illinois Supreme Court's statement "that the words
'commission of a tortious act' cannot, in the context of [the long-arm] statute, 'mean the same
thing as commission of a tort."' Id. at 720 (quoting Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 680 (Ill.
1957)). Although the Hellriegel court did not elaborate on the distinction, it did cite to the
English Court of Appeal case of George Monro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chemical Corp., 1
K.B. 432, 438-40 (1944), which upheld the distinction between "tort" and "tortious act" where
the wrongful conduct (negligence in the manufacture of rat poison) took place outside of the
jurisdiction where the injury had occurred:
The opinion of Goddard, L.J., is of particular interest here. He rejected
the role that the words 'tort committed within the jurisdiction' must be
interpreted in the light of the old learning as to what constitutes an action on
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conclusion that Titan had committed a tortious act in Illinois, the court
noted that this construction was consistent with its prior ruling in Nelson v.
Miller39 that Section 17(1)(b) was to be construed to its constitutional
40
limits.
Having found statutory jurisdiction, the court next considered whether
the exercise of jurisdiction over Titan satisfied constitutional jurisdiction.4 '
The court acknowledged the record's failure to disclose "the volume of
Titan's business or the territory in which appliances incorporating its
valves [were] marketed, ' 42 or whether Titan had done "any other business
in Illinois, either directly or indirectly.4 3 Nonetheless, the court found that
Titan had established minimum contacts with Illinois based on the
"reasonable inference ' 4 that because this particular valve caused injury in
Illinois, Titan's other valves, "like those of other manufacturers," 45 had in
the "ordinary course of commerce" 46 "result[ed] in substantial use and
consumption in [Illinois].4 7 The court offered two justifications for this
finding. First, because of "the increasing specialization of commercial
activity and growing interdependence of business enterprises it [was]
seldom that a manufacturer [dealt] directly with consumers in other
States.4 8 Second, because "[a]dvanced means of distribution and other
commercial activity ...largely effaced the economic significance of State
lines," it would be unfair to allow a component part manufacturer to escape
jurisdictional amenability simply because it did not deal directly with the
consuming public.49 Based on these concerns, the court concluded that

the case, learning which has the tendency to place the tort where the damage
occurs.

Id. Interestingly, the Gray opinion dealt with neither Hellriegel nor George Monro, Ltd., and it is
unknown if either were raised by Titan in its motion to quash. See id.
'9143
N.E.2d 673, 680-82 (Ill. 1957).
40
Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
41
1d at 762-63.
42

1d. at

43

766.

1d. at 764.
4Id.at 766.
451d
46

1d
47Id. at 766; see Murphy, supra note 4, at 257 (observing that the jurisdictionally significant

act in Gray was the plaintiff's use of the defendant's product "in the ordinary course of
commerce").
48Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
49Id
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Titan "benefited, to a degree, from the protection which [Illinois] law has
given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves. 5 °
Thus, based on a record that lacked factual evidence of purposeful
activities directed toward the forum, or forum-related activities giving rise
to the cause of action, or continuous and systematic activities within the
forum related, or even unrelated, to the cause of action, the Gray court
asserted personal jurisdiction over Titan, whose only record contact with
Illinois was the presence of one valve that had been manufactured in Ohio,
incorporated into a water heater in Pennsylvania, and which, in the
"ordinary course of commerce," entered Illinois and caused injury
there.51 In so doing, Gray announced the proposition that the mere
placement of a product into a stream of commerce, without more, exposed
a component part manufacturer to the jurisdiction of any state where the
52
final product caused injury.
III. THE JURISDICTIONAL ERA
A. The NationalLevel
Gray was written in an era of expanding personal jurisdiction. 53 In
1945, the landmark case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington
announced the minimum contacts doctrine which set forth a litany of due
process requirements to be satisfied before a state court could exercise
personal jurisdiction over an absentee defendant:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, ifhe be not present
5Oid.
51

See Karl G. Sorg, World-Wide Volkswagen: Has the United States Supreme Court Taken
the Illinois Civil PracticeAct Section 17-1(b) Out of the Gray Zone?, 1980 S. ILL. U. L.J. 137,

140 52
(1980) (agreeing that the Gray court's analysis was unsupported by the record).

See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court

Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 88-96 (1980) (addressing the concept of presumptive
jurisdiction in terms of "jurisdictional causation" and arguing that unlike substantive strict
liability, jurisdictional strict liability is unconstitutional because it deprives a defendant of the
opportunity
to avoid amenability to jurisdiction).
53
See GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE

54-55 (2nd ed., reprint 2000) (stating that "[1945-1977] was the great, freewheeling period of
extraterritorial jurisdiction"); Martin B. Louis, The Grasp Of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally
Exceeds Its Reach: A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v.

Savchuk, 58 N.C. L. REV. 407, 407 (1980) (describing the period between 1945 and 1977 as "one
of unparalleled expansion for state judicial jurisdiction").
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within the territoryof the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."54
The immediate effect of the minimum contacts doctrine was the extension
ofjurisdiction over an increasing number of defendants by state courts. 55
The Supreme Court revisited the minimum contacts doctrine twelve
years later in McGee v. InternationalLife Insurance Co. 56 Based on a
California statute that subjected foreign insurance companies to suit in
California for insurance-based disputes with California residents,5 7 McGee
based jurisdiction on a single insurance contract between a California
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The State of Washington
sued International Shoe Co., a Missouri corporation, in Washington, for contributions due under
Washington's Unemployment Compensation Act. Washington served notice on International
Shoe by registered mail in Missouri and by serving one of its salesmen in Washington. The
defendant filed a special appearance and motion to quash, arguing that it was not incorporated in
the State of Washington, was not doing business within the state, had no agent within the state
upon whom service could be made, was not a statutory employer, and therefore, did not owe the
taxes. Id. at 311-14.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that the defendant's "regular and systematic"
business contacts within that state rendered it amenable to jurisdiction in Washington there since
it had employed between eleven and thirteen salesmen in Washington, compensated the sales
force with commissions based on sales totaling more than $31,000 a year, furnished the salesmen
with samples, and reimbursed them for the cost of renting display rooms. Id. at 313-14.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the United States Supreme Court, noted that a corporation's
presence in a foreign forum could be manifest only through the actions of its agents within that
forum and that such conduct could satisfy due process requirements. Id.at 316-17. The Court
further stated that the constitutionality ofjurisdiction depends "upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of
the due process clause to insure." Id at 319. Additionally, the Court reasoned that the privilege
of conducting business within a state gave rise to obligations by a defendant who received the
benefits and protections of the laws of that state. Id. Therefore, jurisdiction was proper as long
as the obligation (i.e., the tax) was connected to the corporation's activity within the state. Id.
55See Gregory Trautman, Personal Jurisdiction in the Post-World-Wide Volkswagen
Era-Usinga Market Analysis to Determine the Reach of Jurisdiction, 60 WASH. L. REV. 155,
164 (1984) (stating that jurisdiction should be based on the defendant's receipt of a benefit from
the foreign state rather than on the defendant's purposeful business activity in the foreign state).
"355 U.S. 220 (1957). The Court upheld California's jurisdiction over a Texas insurance
company because the insurance contract was delivered in California, premiums were mailed from
there, the insured was a resident of California at the time of death, and a state statute expressly
subjected foreign corporations to California's jurisdiction on suits involving disputes over
insurance contracts with state residents. Id. at 223-24.
57See id. at 221 (citing CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1618-1620 (West 1953)).
14326
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resident and a Texas insurance company.58 The Supreme Court recognized
that the defendant did not have "any office or agent in California.. . [and]
never solicited ...any insurance business in California apart from the
policy involved [there]., 59 Nonetheless, the Court ruled that contracting to
insure a resident of a state that specifically regulated such transactions
rendered the insurer amenable to that state's jurisdiction. 60 McGee's
approach was subsequently dubbed "the single act doctrine" because it
authorized jurisdiction based on a single contact between the defendant and
the forum.6 1
One year after McGee, the Court refined the minimum contacts doctrine
by recasting it in terms of the nature of the act and the identity of the actor.
In Hanson v. Denckla, the Court stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some
relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy
the requirement of contact with the forum... [because] it
is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum 62
State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws.
By eliminating the jurisdictional significance of nondefendant conduct, the
Hanson Court attempted to rein in the increasing expansion of state
jurisdictional power.
Hanson notwithstanding, the permissive jurisdictional climate
continued until the 1980 decision of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson. 63 The World-Wide Volkswagen Court reevaluated the scope of
the International Shoe, McGee, Hanson trilogy and, again, recast the
minimum contacts doctrine. 64 The Court explained that contacts alone may
58

1d. at 223-24.

"Id.at 222.
6Id.
at 223-24.
61
For discussion of the "single act doctrine," see infra note 462.
62357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). The Supreme Court held a Delaware trustee was an
indispensable party over whom Florida could not assert personal jurisdiction because the trustee
had not engaged in purposeful conduct in Florida. Id. at 255-56.
63444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Court rejected Oklahoma's exercise of personal jurisdiction over
a New York automobile retailer and wholesale distributor whose only connection with Oklahoma
was that an automobile sold in New York to New York residents became involved in an accident
in Oklahoma. Id. at 295. The Court found that the claim arose from one isolated occurrence

fortuitously occurring in Oklahoma and was not foreseeable by the defendants. Id. at 295-99.
64Md. at 291-99.
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not be dispositive of the due process issue.65 Rather, even if minimum
contacts exist, the reasonableness, or lack thereof, of exercising jurisdiction
over a defendant was to be considered in light of other factors; such as the
plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief, the judicial system's
interest in the efficient resolution of disputes, the nation's interest in
maintaining the status of the states as co-equal sovereigns in a federal
system, and the states' interests in promoting shared social policies. 66 The
Court stated that the purpose of the minimum contacts doctrine was to
minimize jurisdictional surprise by providing a standard by which a
defendant could assess its amenability to suit in a foreign
forum.6 7 Consequently, the Court deemed as jurisdictionally insignificant
the fact that the product, a car, had the capability of entering a forum and
causing injury there. 68 Instead, the Court focused on the actual conduct of
the defendant vis-A-vis the forum and asked whether that conduct rendered
suit in that forum foreseeable by that defendant. 69 The Court concluded
that to be jurisdictionally significant, a "contact" had to be a purposeful act
of the defendant rather than the consequence of fortuitous circumstances
beyond the defendant's control.7 °
At the local level, however, the die had been cast as many state courts
and legislatures already had invested their long-arm statutes with the
ubiquity of the InternationalShoe, McGee, Hanson due process agenda.
B. The Local Level
1.

The Illinois Supreme Court

In the aftermath of InternationalShoe, in 1955 the Illinois legislature
amended its Civil Practice Act to include a long-arm statute.7 ' The
65

See id. at 292-94.
1d. at 292.

66
67

1d. at 297.

681d. at 297-99.
69

1d.
70

1d.

71

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 17 (1959) (current version at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209

(2003)).
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to
any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
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International Shoe, McGee, Hanson trilogy provided broad yet uncertain
authority for Illinois courts to construe this new legislation. In the 1957
case of Nelson v. Miller, the Illinois Supreme Court gave fall reign to the
Illinois long-arm statute by construing it to be co-extensive with due
process.72
Like Gray, Nelson was a simple case. The plaintiff was an Illinois
resident who purchased a stove from the defendant, a Wisconsin appliance
retailer.73 While delivering the stove in Illinois, defendant's employee
negligently severed plaintiffs finger.74 Plaintiff sued in Illinois and
defendant appeared specially to challenge jurisdiction on the grounds that
the new long-arm statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.75 In an
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate
situated in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located
within this State at the time of contracting.
Id. According to Wright & Miller, Illinois's long-arm statute, was "[tihe first truly
comprehensive long-arm statute." 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIviL 3D § 1068 (2d ed. 2002).
See generally also David P. Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended
Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533 (1963). According to Professor Currie, Illinois's
long-arm statute was the first of its kind although not the first long-arm statute per se. See id. at
537. Maryland and Vermont both passed long-arms in 1937. Id. Maryland's statute authorized
jurisdiction over "suits arising from contracts made or acts done within the State." Id. (citing Md.
Acts 1937, ch. 504, § 118, at 1057, now MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 92(d) (1957)). Vermont's
statute permitted jurisdiction over "suits arising from contracts to be performed or torts
committed 'in whole or in part"' in Vermont. Id. (citing Vt. Laws 1937, No. 40, now VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1958)). Both statutes were limited to suits by residents against foreign
corporations. Id. at n.23. The Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act, which provided for
jurisdiction over insurers of forum residents, was enacted in 1938 and adopted in Arkansas and
California. Id. (citing UNIF. UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT § 5, 9C U.L.A. 308 (1938)); e.g.,
ARK. STAT. §§ 66-244(a) (1957); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20 (1953)). In 1959, Wisconsin
enacted a long-arm statute similar to Illinois's long-arm statute. Id. (citing WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 262.05 (West Supp. 1963)); see also Beh v. Ostergard, 657 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D. N.M. 1987)
(noting that New Mexico's long-arm statute was based on Illinois's long-arm
statute); Wilmington Supply Co. v. Worth Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 777, 779-80
(D. Del. 1980) (noting that Delaware's long-arm statute was based on Illinois's long-arm statute);
David v. London Shirt Co., 259 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D. Or. 1966) (noting that Oregon's long-arm
statute was based after Illinois's long-arm statute).
" 143 N.E.2d 673, 679-80 (I11.1957).
"Id. at 675.
74Id.
75Id.
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analysis based more on convenience than contacts, the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld jurisdiction over the Wisconsin defendant:
While he was here, the employee and the defendant
enjoyed the benefit and protection of the laws of Illinois,
including the right to resort to our courts. In the course of
his stay here the employee performed acts that gave rise to
an injury. The law of Illinois will govern the substantive
rights and duties stemming from the incident. Witnesses,
other than the defendant's employee, are likely to be found
here, and not in Wisconsin. In such circumstances, it is not
unreasonable to require the defendant to make his defense
here.76
The opinion noted that the enactment of the long-arm statute eliminated
the need for Illinois courts to resort to the "implied consent" fiction that
based jurisdiction not on consent, but on the state's need to justify "making
reasonable provision for redress in local courts against nonresident
tortfeasors ....
Nelson may have been progressive for its time,78 but by contemporary
standards its constitutional analysis was primitive. First, by construing
Illinois's long-arm statute to be co-extensive with due process, Nelson
overrode specific statutory provisions that limited such jurisdiction to
business transactions, 79 tortious acts, 8 ° ownership, use or possession of real
property, 81 and contracting for insurance.8 2 Under Nelson's holding, these
categories became surplusage since each, logically, would be subsumed
within the broader due process language. 83
Second, the Nelson court collapsed the statutory analysis into the
constitutional analysis as if satisfaction of the former were a per se
satisfaction of the latter. 84 Contemporary jurisdictional analysis, however,
treats the two levels of analysis quite distinctly. The statutory analysis
76

1d. at 680.

"Id.
at 678.
78See Currie, supra note 71, at 538-44.
79
1LL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 17(1)(a) (1959) (current version at 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-209
(2003)).
81

1d. § 17(l)(b).
§ 17(1)(c).

811d.

82
1d.
83

§ 17(1)(d).
See Diane S. Kaplan & Donald L. Beschle, Survey of Illinois Law-Civil Procedure, 14 S.
ILL. 84
U. L.J. 699, 700-03 (1990).
See Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 675-81 (I11.
1957).
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asks: "Did this defendant engage in this act?" The constitutional analysis
asks: "Does the commission of this act by this defendant satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause?" Each level of
inquiry must be answered separately and affirmatively before a court can
exercise personal jurisdiction. Collapsing the statutory analysis into the
due process analysis suggested that due process could alter the nature of
the statutory offense or could subsume a statutory offense that would not
otherwise satisfy minimum contacts.
Third, Nelson argued that Illinois's new long-arm statute replaced the
"implied consent" fiction by providing statutory "justification" for
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 85 Under Nelson, this
"justification" imputed constitutional significance to the place of injury,
the applicability of local law, the convenience of the forum for trial, the
state's interest, and the location of witnesses.8 6 While not irrelevant, these
factors also are not jurisdictionally significant if the defendant has no other
constitutionally adequate contacts with the forum. When permitted to
displace the contacts analysis, however, these factors provide a ubiquitous
basis for jurisdiction that is far broader than the relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.
These analytical shortfalls did not affect the result in Nelson. However,
once adopted by Gray they laid the foundation for many of its analytical
flaws.
2.

Other Courts in Illinois

Despite the invitation, other courts in Illinois did not jump on the
Nelson bandwagon. Not one of the four cases following Nelson approved
the assertion of jurisdiction over defendants whose acts outside of Illinois
caused injury within Illinois. In Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., the
plaintiff filed a diversity action in the Northern District of Illinois alleging
personal injuries sustained from the negligent manufacture of a lawn
mower. 87 The court found that neither defendant manufacturer had
minimum contacts with Illinois because the power units had been
manufactured in Wisconsin, installed in Ohio, and delivered as the final
product to Sears in Ohio.88 The court was unimpressed that one defendant
came to Illinois several times a year to negotiate and execute contracts for
85

1d. at 681.
at 677-80.
87157 F. Supp. 718, 718-19 (N.D. I11.1957).
'61d.
88

1d.
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the sale of the lawn mowers because the cause of action arose from
negligent acts committed outside of Illinois, not from business transactions
occurring within Illinois. 89 The court, similarly unimpressed that the injury
occurred within Illinois, 90 stated that injury alone did not satisfy the
"tortious act" language of the long-arm statute as that construction would
be a return to an "action on the case, learning which has the tendency to
place the tort where the damage occurs." 91 Taking care to note the
distinction between a "tort" and a "tortious act," the court concluded that
the defendants' acts of negligent manufacture occurred
outside of Illinois,
92
with only "the damage" occurring within Illinois.
Nelson suffered a second rebuff in Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., the
Illinois Supreme Court's only personal jurisdiction opinion issued between
Nelson and Gray.93 Grobark is of special interest because it exposed the
schisms within that court over the stream of commerce concept and its
compatibility with United States Supreme Court personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence.
The Grobark complaint alleged that the New York defendant breached
an exclusive distributorship agreement with an Illinois plaintiff and then
misappropriated the plaintiffs customer list by giving it to the new
distributors.94 In an effort to conform Illinois's jurisdictional doctrine to
evolving constitutional standards, the court recited Supreme Court case law
from Pennoyer to Hanson and explained Nelson's compatibility with that
scheme. 95 In so doing, the court issued two admonitions: First, it criticized
the use of the forum nonconveniens analysis as a substitute for the
minimum contacts analysis.9 6 Second, it asserted that Hanson stood "for
the proposition that there are still important territorial limitations on a
State's power of in personam jurisdiction. 97 Then, relying heavily on
Hanson, the Grobark court refused to recognize the concept of stream of
89

1d. at 720-21.

90

9 1M.

1d. at 720.
1d. at 721.

92

9'158 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. 1959). In an action by Illinois adding machine distributors against a
New York adding machine manufacturer, the Illinois Supreme Court declined jurisdiction
because the manufacturer's sales were consummated in New York and its products were
delivered to an independent carrier in New York. Id. at 79-80.
941d. at 74-75. Jurisdiction was sought under the "transaction of any business" section of
Illinois's long-arm statute, ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110, para. 17(l)(a) (1955). Id. at 75.
95
Grobark, 158 N.E.2d at 75-79.
96
1d. at 78.
97

1d. at 79.
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commerce jurisdiction.98 Instead, the court characterized the defendant as
an individual seller who shipped machines to individual distributors over
whom it "did not at any time have the right to exercise any control... ;
the relationship between defendant and distributor being that of seller and
purchaser." 99 The court concluded that the defendant had not engaged
in
00
jurisdictionally significant conduct in Illinois and refused jurisdiction.'
Justice Davis wrote a dissent that was joined by Justice Schaefer,
Nelson's author.' ' The dissent argued that Hanson stood for an entirely
different proposition than the one raised in Grobark.10 2 It defended Nelson
for upholding the "foundations of jurisdiction," which "include the interest
that a State has in providing redress in its own courts against persons who
inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those within the
ambit of the State's legitimate protective policy.

,0 3

More importantly, the

dissent objected to the court's characterization of the parties as unrelated
individual buyers and sellers who lacked control over one another.' ° 4
Instead, the dissent argued that the plaintiff and defendant had been
voluntary participants in a long term, profitable, and mutually dependent
business relationship that specifically targeted Illinois for business
development. 10 5 It was this business relationship, the 0dissent
concluded,
6
forum."'
the
with
contact
qualifying
"the
that constituted
The disagreement between the majority and the dissent regarding
whether the commercial relationship between the defendant and the
distributors was mutually dependent and continuous, or unrelated,
autonomous and independent, went to the heart of the stream of commerce
concept. Thus, Grobark raised a question that the Illinois Supreme Court
justices had yet to resolve amongst themselves: In an era of increasing
economic interdependence and mutual benefits, how were relationships
among buyers, sellers, manufacturers and retailers to be characterized for
jurisdictional purposes?

98

See id.

99

Id.

'O'ld at 80-82 (Davis, J., dissenting).
21d at 81 (Davis, J., dissenting).
'°3Id.(Davis, J., dissenting) (citing Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Il1.1957)).
'041d.at 80 (Davis, J., dissenting).
'051d. (Davis, J., dissenting).
'°61d at 80-81 (Davis, J., dissenting).
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Trippe Manufacturing Co. v. Spencer Gifts, Inc. was the next case to
apply Illinois's long-arm statute. 107 The case involved a New Jersey
catalogue distributor accused of misappropriating an Illinois plaintiffs
product.' 0 8 The opinion did not cite to Nelson, perhaps assuming that it
had been overruled by Grobark. Instead, the court cited directly to
Grobark,whose defendant, it observed, had stronger jurisdictional contacts
with Illinois than the Trippe defendant, but still did not have sufficient
contacts to satisfy due process. 10 9 So finding, the Seventh Circuit declined
jurisdiction.'"°
Shortly after Trippe, the Seventh Circuit again applied Illinois's
long-arm statute in Insull v. New York, World-Telegram Corp."' The
plaintiff charged the defendants, newspaper owners and publishers, with
libel 1 2 in newspapers printed outside of Illinois but published and sold
within Illinois.' 1 3 The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under the "tortious
act" and "transacting of business" sections of the long-arm statute.' 14 The
plaintiff invoked the last act doctrine to support his argument that
jurisdiction was proper where "the last event necessary to make the
defendant liable in tort occurs."'" 5 While acknowledging that the injury
16
occurred in Illinois, the court relied on Grobark to decline jurisdiction.
Nelson was cited with a "Cf." for the proposition that none of the
defendants had been present in Illinois. 17
107270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959). In a suit by an Illinois corporation against a New
Jersey corporation engaged in a mail order business, the Seventh Circuit held the New Jersey
corporation conducted no business in Illinois other than the mailing of catalogues to Illinois
residents, and therefore, did not have minimum contacts with Illinois. Id. at 821-23.
"Id. at 821-22.
'091d.at 822-23.

U01d.
"273 F.2d 166, 167 (7th Cir. 1959). In a libel suit by an Illinois resident against nonIllinois corporate defendants engaged in the subscription newspaper business, the Seventh Circuit
held that the defendants conducted no business in Illinois other than mailing magazines to Illinois
residents,
and therefore, were not subject to Illinois's jurisdiction. Id. at 168-70.
2
1 Id at 167.
1131d. at

169.

"'Id. at 170-71; ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, paras. 17(l)(a), (b) (1957) (current version at 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209 (2003)).
"'Insull,
273 F.2d at 171.
116
1d at 170-71.
117 d at 171. The "Cf." signal "is used to introduce any authority which supports a
statement, conclusion, or opinion of law different from that in the text but sufficiently analogous
to lend some support to the text. 'Cf.' is never used to support a statement of fact." A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION 86 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 10th ed, 1959), reprinted in 1

HeinOnline -- 55 Baylor L. Rev. 523 2003

BAYLOR LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 55:2

Summary

3.

Nelson and Grobark revealed the disagreement in the Illinois Supreme
Court over the scope of the long-arm statute. Succeeding cases did not
follow Nelson's broad and empowering grant of jurisdictional authority,
but rather retreated from Nelson's expansive application of Illinois's
long-arm statute and, instead, followed Grobark's more cautionary
As the schism deepened, two issues surfaced that later
approach.
confronted the court head-on in Gray. The first issue was concrete and
specific: What was the proper construction and application of
section 17(1)(b) of the long-arm statute? The second issue was theoretical
and abstract: Should the court recognize a stream of commerce theory of
jurisdiction?
IV. RESPONSES TO GRAY
A. Followers
1. The United States Supreme Court
In its first three decades, Gray became an integral phrase in the personal
jurisdiction conversation. For the most part it gained uncritical
acceptance. Gray's influence reached its highest levels between 1977 and
1983 when it was invoked by the Supreme Court in a majority opinion,' 1 8 a
plurality opinion, 1 9 and a dissent, 20 with approval 12 1 and without
criticism.1 22 Although the Supreme Court never specifically articulated its
position on Gray, these citations were tributes to Gray's contribution to
jurisdictional jurisprudence. But what did they mean? What did the Court
find so enduring and endearing about Gray? It could not have been Gray's
statutory analysis because the Court was not bound by Illinois's
construction of its long-arm statute. The only remaining possibilities were
Gray's stream of commerce theory or its due process analysis.

THE BLUEBOOK: A SIXTY-FIVE YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds.,

1998).
118World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).

119Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 120 (1987).
120 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 307 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting);

Shaffer v.

Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
121
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298.
122Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1983); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 307 n.12
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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a. Shaffer v. Heitner
Justice Brennan cited Gray in a concurring and dissenting opinion in
Shaffer v. Heitner, the first Supreme Court case on personal jurisdiction
issued after Gray.123 Brennan argued in favor of allowing Delaware to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate directors based on
its significant state interest in providing a forum for disputes involving its
domestic corporations. 124 To support this position, Brennan cited Gray for
two closely related propositions: the "effects test" and the "physical
absence test. ,125 As to the former, Brennan observed that other states had
sought to "acquire jurisdiction over [a] nonresident tortfeasor[ ] whose
purely out-of-state activities produce[d] domestic consequences. E.g.,
Gray v. American Radiator& StandardSanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961). ' i 126 As to the latter, Brennan asserted that the
defendants' physical absence from the forum was "not decisive, for
jurisdiction can be based strictly on out-of-state acts having foreseeable
effects in the forum State. E.g.,... Gray v. American Radiator &
127
StandardSanitary Corp., supra."
Although both propositions were viable components of the
jurisdictional analysis, neither was uniquely remarkable nor uniquely
attributable to Gray. Why then did Brennan cite Gray as support for these
propositions? One possibility is that these propositions, like Gray, were
consistent with Brennan's own expansive view of jurisdiction.
Interestingly, Brennan did not cite Gray for its stream of commerce theory,
but rather for its broad due process analysis.128 Since Brennan expressed a
minority view, a second possibility is that the majority did not share his
opinion that the mere foreseeability of effects occurring within the forum
satisfied due process.
2

1 1Shaffer,

433 U.S. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).

Plaintiff brought a

derivative action against Greyhound and twenty-eight of its directors in Delaware and attempted
to serve notice pursuant to Delaware's sequestration statute by attaching the defendants' stock
that was statutorily located in Delaware. Id. at 189-92. The Court struck down the sequestration
statute on the grounds that it violated due process because ownership of stock in a Delaware
corporation was not sufficiently related to the claim to give defendants notice of the suit. Id. at
216-17. Instead, the Court held that attachment jurisdiction must satisfy minimum contacts
requirements to be constitutional. Id.
1d.at 222-23 (Brennan,J.,
dissenting and concurring).

125d. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
at 223 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
2
1 7Id. at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring).
126Id.

t2 8 1d
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b. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson
This theme recurs in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson where
both the majority 29 and Justice Brennan's dissent cite Gray. 3 , The Court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the presence of the car in the forum
31
was foreseeable and that such foreseeability supported jurisdiction.'
Instead, the Court stated:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis
is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way
into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that
he should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court
32
there. 1
The Court concluded by stating:
The forum State does not exceed its power[ ] under the
Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State. Cf Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N. E. 2d [sic] 761 (1961).'
According to the Uniform System of Citation of 1976, the signal "Cf."
meant that the "[c]ited authority supports a proposition different from [the
main proposition] but sufficiently analogous to lend support."' 34 Hence,
129444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980). The Court declined to assert jurisdiction over a New York

retailer and a distributor who sold a car to the plaintiff that was involved in an accident in
Oklahoma on the grounds that neither defendant purposefully directed any activity to the forum
and, thus, suit over them in Oklahoma for conduct committed elsewhere was unforeseeable. Id.
at 297-99.
1301d. at 307 n.12 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1

.Id.at 295-96.
1321d. at 297 (citing Kulko v. Cal. Superior Court ex rel. S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 97-98 (1978)).

131d at 297-98.
134A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 7 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 12th ed.
1976), reprinted in THE BLUEBOOK: A SIXTY-FIVE YEAR RETROSPECTIVE (Columbia Law

Review Ass'n et al. eds., 1998). "Cf." means "compare." Id. The "true" meaning of
World-Wide's "Cf." citation to Gray has been the subject of considerable speculation among
courts and commentators. A brief sampling of the field follows: World-Wide Volkswagen s "Cf."
citation to Gray signaled its approval: Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir.
1983); DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 290-91 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibbons,
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the majority's "Cf." signal suggested that there was a difference between
Gray's rationale and the one the Court adopted but does explain the
difference.
This "difference" was addressed in Brennan's dissenting opinion in
World-Wide Volkswagen where he reminded the Court that the "essential
inquiry" in determining the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction was
whether the particular exercise of jurisdiction offended "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."1' 35 He criticized recent case
developments that gave too much weight to contacts between the forum
and the defendant and "too little weight to the strength of the forum State's
interest" without regard to "whether there would be any actual
inconvenience to the defendant."'1 36 Brennan argued instead that "the
significance of the contacts necessary to support jurisdiction would
diminish if some other consideration helped establish that jurisdiction
would be fair and reasonable. 1 37 Brennan concluded that "[b]ecause
lesser burdens reduce the unfairness to the
defendant, jurisdiction may be
13
justified despite less significant contacts., 1
In essence, Brennan proposed a proportionality test by which the
defendant's contacts could be displaced by "other consideration[s]" to
determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be fair and
J., dissenting); Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1980); Santiago v. BRS,
Inc., 528 F. Supp. 755, 758 (D.P.R. 1981); Yvonne Luketich Blauvelt, PersonalJurisdiction
After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 861
(1988); see Dayton, supra note 3, at 274; Richard K. Greenstein, The Nature of Legal
Argument: The PersonalJurisdiction Paradigm, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 855, 881 (1987); Erik T.
Moe, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce Doctrine, Barely
Alive But Still Kicking, 76 GEO. L.J. 203, 210 (1987);
Stephen E. Quesenberry, Civil
Procedure-Muddying The Steam of Commerce Theory--Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 191, 196 (1987); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara To Minimum
Contacts: Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. REV. 729, 791 (1988);
Trautman, supra note 55, at 160 n.36, 161 n.39. Other commentators find World-Wide's "Cf."
citation to Gray to be ambiguous: Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 94 n.78; Murphy, supra note 4, at
270, 270 n. 118. To add a bit more spice to the brew, Professor Seidelson wrote that World-Wide
Volkswagen's approving "Cf." signal to Gray was rejected in Asahi's plurality opinion. See
David E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court Conclusion and Two Rationales That Defy
Comprehension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOK. L.
REV. 563,
573 n.54 (1987).
135World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 300 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
1361d. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
"'Id. at 301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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reasonable to the plaintiff, the defendant, and/or the state in any particular
case. 39 Because contacts were "merely one way" of establishing fairness
and reasonableness, the entire minimum contacts
analysis could be
0
trumped by a fairness/reasonableness analysis.14
When Brennan's version of the minimum contacts doctrine is viewed in
light of his version of stream of commerce jurisdiction, the "differences"
between Brennan's position and the majority's position become apparent.
Unlike the majority's position, Brennan's stream of commerce theory did
not end with the last participant in the chain of distribution, but rather with
use by the consumer, because "[i]n each case the seller purposefully injects
the goods into the stream of commerce and those goods predictably are
used in the forum State."' 14 1 In support of this position, Brennan observed
that "[t]he manufacturer in the case cited by the Court, Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 761
(1961), had no more control over
which States its goods would reach than
42
case."1
this
in
petitioners
the
did
Purposefulness and predictability, then, arose as the points of departure
between Brennan's view of the stream of commerce and that of the
World-Wide Volkswagen majority. For Brennan, purposefulness of
conduct was satisfied by participation in a stream of commerce since, as
demonstrated by the Court's citation to Gray, the defendant in that case
had no control over the product's destination. 143 Predictability, according
to Brennan, meant the forecasting of reasonable possibilities or
consequences, i.e., the tort concept of foreseeability. 44 By that analysis,
the correlation between predictability and place of injury becomes direct
because it is reasonably possible that suit will arise in the place of
injury. The
World-Wide Volkswagen opinion, however, rejected the tort concept of
"foreseeable injury" in favor of the jurisdictional concept of "foreseeable
146
suit.'

145

Under World-Wide Volkswagen, "jurisdictional foreseeability"'

39

1 See id. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

14°1d (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4'Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
142d. at 307 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
143Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'See id. at 299-301 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1451d. at 297.
1461d

[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the mere likelihood
that a product will find its way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
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became the basis for evaluating the purposefulness of the defendant's
relationship, or lack thereof, with the forum. Thereafter, the
purposefulness inquiry shifted from: "Did the defendant engage in
activities that predictably could cause injury in the forum?" to "Did the
defendant engage in activities that could render suit in the forum
foreseeable?" Using this analysis, there is little correlation between
predictability and injury since the acts that give rise to jurisdiction need not
occur in the place of injury. Although these two points of departure recur
in later Supreme Court opinions authored by Brennan, their underpinnings
can be traced to his dissent in World-Wide Volkswagen.
c. Calder v. Jones
Gray enjoyed a cameo appearance in Calder v. Jones, but not for any
proposition asserted by the Court. 147 In Calder, actress Shirley Jones sued
the Florida-based publication, THE NATIONAL ENQUIRER, a reporter, and
an editor, in California state court for libel.1 48 The editor and reporter
challenged the court's jurisdiction, arguing that because all of their
activities took place in Florida, the mere foreseeability that the article
would circulate and have an effect in California was not sufficient to
satisfy minimum contacts.149 To illustrate their point, the defendants
analogized themselves to a welder crafting a boiler in Florida that later
exploded in California.1 50 Like the welder, they had no direct economic
stake in their employer's sales in California and no control over their
employer's marketing activities there, or anywhere.' 5' They cited Gray for
the proposition that "[c]ases which hold that jurisdiction will be proper
over the manufacturer.., should not be applied to the welder who has no
control over and derives no direct benefit from his employer's sales in that

conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.
Id. The term "jurisdictional foreseeability" was first used by Leonard G. Ratner, ProceduralDue
Process and Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: (a) Effective Litigation Values vs. The Territorial
Imperative (b) The Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 363, 420 (1980)
(criticizing the application of "jurisdictional foreseeability that resurrects the old implied consent
fiction" to domestic relations disputes).
147465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984).
48
1 1d. at 784.
1491d. at 789.
50

1 1d.

1511Id.
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distant State."'' 52 The Court rejected the analogy because it assumed the
welder's negligence was untargeted whereas the Calder defendants had
153
been charged with intentional conduct "expressly aimed at California."
The Court then enumerated those intentional
acts and sustained
54
California's jurisdiction over the defendants. 1
d. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court
The last and most recent Supreme Court citation to Gray appeared in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court.155 In Asahi, a California
resident was injured when a tire on his motorcycle exploded. 5 6 The
57
plaintiff sued Cheng Shin, the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tire.
Cheng Shin then impled Asahi, the Japanese manufacturer of the valve
assembly for the tire. Once the primary action settled, only the third-party
action between the Taiwanese and Japanese companies remained.'5 8 The
California Court of Appeal dismissed the third-party action on the grounds
that the exercise of jurisdiction over Asahi was unreasonable. 5 9
160
The California Supreme Court reversed, relying heavily on Gray.
The court noted that cases subsequent to World-Wide Volkswagen had
distinguished local retailers and distributors at the end of the distribution
system from manufacturers and distributors at the beginning of the
distribution system on the basis of intent to serve a particular market and
ability to control the product's ultimate destination.' 6 1 Based on its
understanding of Gray, however, the court did not think these distinctions
made a constitutional difference.
Instead, the court read World-Wide Volkswagen's citation to Gray as
support for two related propositions: (1) "that jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is constitutional where the defendant 'delivers its
products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be
purchased in the forum State;,, 62 and (2) that Gray's exercise of the
1521d. (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961)).
5
3

1 1d.

54

1d. at 790.
1'480 U.S. 102, 120 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

1Id.at 105.
5
1d. at 105-06.
58

' 1d. at 106.
59
1d. at 107-08.
160Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 702 P.2d 543, 548-49 (Cal. 1985), rev'd, 480

U.S. 102 (1987).
16lid. at 548 (citing Nelson v. Park Indus., Inc, 717 F.2d 1120, 1126-27
(7th Cir. 1983)).
162
1d. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298).
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stream of commerce jurisdiction over component part manufacturers was
condoned. 163 In effect, the court assumed that since World-Wide
Volkswagen had approved of Gray's exercise of jurisdiction over a
component part manufacturer, who was aware of, but lacked control over
its product's distribution system, that mere awareness of the distribution
system satisfied due process:
[A] critical fact is whether those defendants were aware of
that distribution system. If they were aware, they were
indirectly serving and deriving economic benefits from the
national retail market established by [the retailer], and they
should reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in any
forum 64
within that market where their product caused
injury.1
The rift in the relationship between the minimum contacts doctrine and
the stream of commerce theory came into sharp relief when Asahi was
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.' 65 The issue centered on
how jurisdiction over a component part manufacturer could satisfy due
process in the stream of commerce context. More specifically, the Court
split on the nature and function of the "purposeful availment" requirement
of World-Wide Volkswagen. 166
The competing camps have been
categorized as Brennan's, requiring "mere placement" of the product into
the stream of commerce, 167 and O'Connor's, requiring "placement plus"
some additional activity
evincing the defendant's purposeful availment of
68
benefit.
forum
some
O'Connor contended that the minimum contacts doctrine required a
"substantial connection" between the defendant and the forum that could
63

1 1d.

1641d. at 551 (citing ParkIndus., Inc., 717 F.2d at 1126) (emphasis added).
16 5
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The Asahi opinion was
written by Justice O'Connor and was organized as follows: Part I set forth the facts and
procedural history and was joined by all members of the Court. Part II.A. set forth O'Connor's
theory of the stream of commerce jurisdiction in the minimum contacts context and was joined
by Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia. Part II.B. set forth the Court's due process analysis, and was
joined by all the Justices except Scalia. Part III set forth the Court's conclusion, and was joined

by Rehnquist, Powell and Scalia. Justice Brennan wrote a partial concurrence that was joined by
Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Stevens also wrote a partial concurrence that
was joined by Justices White and Blackmun.
'6444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
167Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17.
1681d. at 112.
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not be satisfied merely by participating in a chain of distribution: "The
placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not
an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to
serve the market in the forum State.... ,,169 O'Connor added that the
defendant's awareness that the product would enter the forum did "not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State."'170 Since the Asahi
defendant did no more than place its product into a stream, O'Connor
17
concluded that the minimum contacts requirement had not been met. 1
Brennan's analysis of the relationship between minimum contacts and
the stream of commerce was less restrictive than O'Connor's. He asserted
that, "[a]s long as a participant in this process is aware that the final
product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit
there cannot come as a surprise."' 172 Brennan found "purposeful
availment" in the benefits inevitably received by a defendant's
participation in a stream of commerce. 73 Such benefits, according to
Brennan, accrued to the defendant "whether that participant directly
conduct[ed] business in the forum State, or engage[d] in additional conduct
directed toward that State."' 174 As confirmation of this proposition,
Brennan cited World- Wide Volkswagen's citation to Gray:
A well-known stream-of-commerce case in which the
Illinois Supreme Court applied the [stream of commerce]
theory to assert jurisdiction over a component-parts
manufacturer that sold no components directly in Illinois,
but did sell them to a manufacturer who incorporated them
into a final product that was sold in Illinois.... The Court
in World-Wide Volkswagen thus took great care to
distinguish 'between a case involving goods which reach a
distant State through a chain of distribution and a case
involving goods which reach the
same State because a
75
consumer... took them there.""1
69

1 1d. (citations omitted).

170id
71

1

1d.

at 113.

1721d. at 117.
1731d.

1741d

1751d. at 120 (citing World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 306 (1980)).
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Brennan's reliance on Gray is understandable since his "mere
placement" position, after all, was Gray's version of stream of commerce
jurisdiction. Perhaps Brennan assumed that World-Wide Volkswagen's
endorsement of Gray's use of the stream of commerce concept meant that
World-Wide Volkswagen also approved Gray's version of the stream of
commerce concept.
Thus, the question of what conduct satisfied due process in the
minimum contacts context was raised, but not resolved, since both Asahi
camps tallied only four votes each. 176 Despite the ambiguity, Asahi's
effect on Gray was profound. At the very least, it could no longer be
assumed that "mere placement" of a product into a stream of commerce
would insure jurisdiction over the manufacturer in the state where the
injury occurred. Even if "mere placement" was treated as a heavily
weighted contact, it still could be trumped by a countervailing burden on
the defendant, or the absence of an interest of the plaintiff or the forum.
The irony, of course, was that the proportionality test espoused by Brennan
in World-Wide Volkswagen was the most direct route to defeating his
"mere placement" position in Asahi.
2. Illinois State Courts
a. Overview
The International Shoe' 77-Nelson178-Gray179 trilogy imparted a broad
but uncertain license to Illinois's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. From
1961 to 2002, approximately eighty-six 180 Illinois cases cited Gray for the
181
following propositions: due process and/or minimum contacts issues;
76

1 See supra note 165.

177Int'l Shoe Co., v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
178Nelson v. Miller, 143 N.E.2d 673 (I11.1957).
179Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).
18
°See SHEPARD'S NORTHEASTERN REPORTER CITATIONS (2002) (listing Illinois court cites
to Gray,
176 N.E.2d 761 as of January 1, 2002).
18 1Dep't of Revenue v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 755, 760 (I11.1966); Hayden v.
Wheeler, 210 N.E.2d 495, 496 (111. 1965); People v. W. Tire Auto Stores, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 474,
477 (Ill. 1965); Koplin v. Saul Lerner Co., 194 N.E.2d 304, 306 (I11. 1963); Dombrowski v.
Larson Lodge, 630 N.E.2d 973, 977 (Il1. App. Ct. 1994); Alpert v. Bertsch, 601 N.E.2d 1031,
1035 (I11.App. Ct. 1992); Gen. Elec. Railcar Servs. Corp. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 567 N.E.2d
400, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., Ltd., 504 N.E.2d 942, 945 (111,
App. Ct. 1987); Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 429 N.E.2d 1301, 1306
(Il. App. Ct. 1981); Coca-Cola Co. v. A. Epstein & Sons Int'l, Inc., 411 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Il.
App. Ct. 1980); Hurletron Whittier, Inc. v. Barda, 402 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980); Bevins v. Comet Cas. Co., 390 N.E.2d 500, 504 (I11.App. Ct. 1979); United Air Lines,
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statutory construction of the "tortious act"
long-arm
construing
process;1 85
commerce

182 provision of Illinois's
84
statute; 83 general principles of statutory construction;
Illinois's long-arm statute to be coextensive with due
the last act doctrine; 186 the single act doctrine; 87 the stream of
90
89
theory;' 88 the statute of limitations;1 privity of contract;'

Inc. v. Conductron Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Il. App. Ct. 1979); Dalton v. Blanford, 383
N.E.2d 806, 809 (Il. App. Ct. 1978); Sears Bank & Trust Co. v. Luckman, 377 N.E.2d 1156,
1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Haymond v. Haymond, 377 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978); Stupar v. Bank of Westmont, 352 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Il. App. Ct. 1976); First Nat'l Bank v.
Screen Gems, Inc., 352 N.E.2d 285, 291 (11. App. Ct. 1976); Bania v. Royal Lahaina Hotel, 347
N.E.2d 106, 108 (Il1. App. Ct. 1975); Stansell v. Int'l Fellowship, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 149, 151 (11.
App. Ct. 1974); Hawes v. Hawes, 263 N.E.2d 625, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970); Lurie v. Rupe, 201
N.E.2d 158, 162 (Il. App. Ct. 1964).
182Yates v. Muir, 492 N.E.2d 1267, 1268 (Ill. 1986); Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 484 N.E.2d
1088, 1092 (11. 1985); Jones v. Searle Labs., 444 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1982); Connelly v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ill. 1979); Hayden, 210 N.E.2d at 496; Talbert & Mallon,
P.C. v. Stokes Towing Co., 572 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991) (Goldenhersh, J.,
dissenting); Longo v. AAA-Michigan, 569 N.E.2d 927, 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Wiles, 504
N.E.2d at 945; Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Frederick Mfg. Co., 440 N.E.2d 360, 362 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v. Leonard Storch Enters., Inc., 383 N.E.2d 1379, 1384 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978); Int'l Merch. Assocs., Inc. v. Lighting Sys. Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978); Wiedemann v. Cunard Line Ltd., 380 N.E.2d 932, 940 (II1. App. Ct.
1978); Boyer v. Boyer, 373 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Braband v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 367 N.E.2d 118, 121 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Stansell, 318 N.E.2d at 152; Bolfv. Wise, 255
N.E.2d 511, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
183735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209 (West Supp. 2002).
'Brown v. Burdick, 307 N.E.2d 409, 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); Poindexter v. Willis, 231
N.E.2d
1, 3 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967); Tidwell v. Smith, 205 N.E.2d 484, 486 (111.App. Ct. 1965).
185
Doolin v. K-S Telegage Co., 393 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Il. App. Ct. 1979); Boyer, 373 N.E.2d
at 444; Braband,367 N.E.2d at 121.
186Yates, 492 N.E.2d at 1268; Poplar Grove State Bank v. Powers, 578 N.E.2d
588, 596 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1991); Longo, 569 N.E.2d at 932; Arthur Young & Co. v. Bremer, 554 N.E.2d 671,
676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Zielinski v. A. Epstein & Sons Int'l, Inc., 534 N.E.2d 644, 646 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989); McLeod v. Harmon, 500 N.E.2d 724, 725 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Veeninga v. Alt,
444 N.E.2d 780, 782 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Lind v. Zekman, 395 N.E.2d 964, 966 (Ill. App. Ct.
1979); Guebard v. Jabaay, 381 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Roper v. Markle, 375
N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); E.J. Korvette v. Esko Roofing Co., 350 N.E.2d 10, 12 (Ill.
App. 8 Ct.
1976).
7
1 Kutner v. DeMassa, 421 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). For an explanation of the
last act
doctrine see infra note 462.
l8 8Connelly v. Uniroyal, 389 N.E.2d 155, 159 (IIl. 1979); Kadala v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 589
N.E.2d 802, 808 (11. App. Ct. 1992); Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., 504 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc., 508 N.E.2d 211, 213
(11. App. Ct. 1986); R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 473 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Il.
App. Ct. 1984); Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Frederick Mfg. Co., 440 N.E.2d 360, 362 (Ill. App. Ct.
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194
course of dealing;' 93 notice;
strict liability;' 91 general jurisdiction;'
witness availability,' 95 including Illinois's substantive law in the personal
196 and deciding personal jurisdiction
on a
jurisdiction analysis;
97
basis.1
case-by-case
These observations demonstrate that Gray has been cited as a generic
figure of speech for myriad propositions, some of which are not germane
to jurisdiction and most of which are not germane to Gray. The variability
of these citations suggests that while some Illinois courts struggled to
determine what Gray stood for, others deemed it a veritable magic wand to
sanction any jurisdictional proposition.

b. The Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court cited Gray in thirteen cases between 1963
and 2002.198 Personal Jurisdiction was not an issue in four of these
1982); Clements v. Barney's Sporting Goods Store, 406 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Il. App. Ct.
1980); Braband, 367 N.E.2d at 123; Bolfv. Wise, 255 N.E.2d 511, 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
'8 9Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305, 313 (Il1. 1970); Zielinski, 534 N.E.2d at
648; Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 425 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
19°Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1965).
' 9 t Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 162.
' 92
Braband,367 N.E.2d at 124 (Stamos, J., concurring).
193Huffman v. Inland Oil & Transp. Co., 424 N.E.2d 1209, 1213 (I11. App. Ct.
1981); Stephens v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 409 N.E.2d 423, 429 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Hurletron
Whittier, Inc. v. Barda, 402 N.E.2d 840, 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Ward v. Formex, Inc., 325
N.E.2d 812, 814 (I11.App. Ct. 1975).
194Dept. of Rev. v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 755, 760 (I11.1966); Huffinan, 424
N.E.2d at 1213; Bania v. Royal Lahaina Hotel, 347 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
' 95Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 159; Doolin v. K-S Telegage Co., 393 N.E.2d 556, 560 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1979);
Haymond v. Haymond, 377 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
196Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 162; Doolin, 393 N.E.2d at 561.
197Dombrowski v. Larson Lodge, 630 N.E.2d 973, 977 (I11. App. Ct. 1994); Johnston v.
United Presbyterian Church, Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (I11.App. Ct. 1981); Woodfield Ford,
Inc. v. Akins Ford Corp., 395 N.E.2d 1131, 1134 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); AAAA Creative, Inc. v.
Sovereign Holidays, Ltd., 395 N.E.2d 66, 68 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); Doolin, 393 N.E.2d at
561; Bevins v. Comet Cas. Co., 390 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Conductron Corp., 387 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (I11.App. Ct. 1979); Mergenthaler Linotype Co. v.
Leonard Storch Enters., Inc., 383 N.E.2d 1379, 1384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Int'l Merch. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Lighting Sys. Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Weidemann v. Cunard
Line Ltd., 380 N.E.2d 932, 938 (I11.App. Ct. 1978); Sears Bank & Trust Co. v. Luckman, 377
N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (I1l. App. Ct. 1978); Stansell v. Int'l Fellowship, Inc., 318 N.E.2d 149, 152
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
198
Yates v. Muir, 492 N.E.2d 1267, 1268 (I11. 1986); Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 484 N.E.2d
1088, 1092 (II1. 1985); Jones v. Searle Labs., 444 N.E.2d 157, 162 (Ill. 1982); Green v.
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cases. 199 Taking into account only those cases in which personal
jurisdiction was an issue, jurisdiction was upheld in all cases arising in the
1960's,20 upheld once 201 and denied once 20 2 in the two cases decided in the
1970's, and denied in every case decided in the 1980's.203 There have been
no Illinois Supreme Court citations to Gray since 1988.
(i) The Sixties
The first two cases that cited Gray did not involve personal jurisdiction
issues. In Koplin v. Saul Lerner & Co.,204 the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected a party's attempt to apply Gray's jurisdictional analysis to
determine if a constitutional question could be appealed directly from a
trial court to the Illinois Supreme Court. In Suvada v. White Motor Co.,
the issue was privity of contract, not jurisdiction, and Gray was cited only
because the liability of a component part manufacturer was involved.20 5
The next Illinois Supreme Court citation to Gray appeared in Hayden v.
Wheeler,20 6 which sustained jurisdiction over a nonresident decedent's
administrator based on Gray's statutory construction of § 17(b)(1). This
opinion reversed the appellate court decision, which had also cited Gray,
but for the opposite result. 20 7 Thereafter, Gray was cited twice as authority
for the minimum contacts doctrine.20 8
Except for Hayden's statutory construction cite, the Illinois Supreme
Court's reliance on Gray as authority for minimum contacts, notice, and
Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1206 (Ill. 1981); Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at
162; Boyer v. Boyer, 383 N.E.2d 223, 224 (I11.1978); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d
305, 313 (Ill. 1970); Dept. ofRev., 214 N.E.2d at 760; Hayden v. Wheeler, 210 N.E.2d 495, 496
(Ill. 1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (I11. 1965); People v. W. Tire
Auto Stores, Inc., 207 N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ill. 1965); Koplin v. Saul Lerner Co., 194 N.E.2d 304,
306 (Ill. 1963); Wiles v. Mortia Iron Works Co., 504 N.E.2d 942, 945 (I11.App. Ct. 1987).
199See Jones, 444 N.E.2d at 159; Williams, 261 N.E.2d at 313; Suvada, 210 N.E.2d at
185; 20Koplin,
194 N.E.2d at 306.
6
Dept. of Rev., 214 N.E.2d at 762; Hayden, 210 N.E.2d at 497; W. Tire Auto Stores, Inc.,
207 N.E.2d
at 477.
201
Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 160.
202Boyer, 383 N.E.2d at 226.
23Yates, 492 N.E.2d at 1267; Wimmer, 484 N.E.2d at 1088;
Green, 427 N.E.2d at
1203; Wiles, 504 N.E.2d at 942.
204194 N.E.2d 304, 306 (I11. 1963).
20'210 N.E.2d 182, 185 (Ill. 1963).
206210 N.E.2d 495,496 (111. 1965).
2074d.
20

8Dept. of Rev. v. Nat'l Bellas Hess, Inc., 214 N.E.2d 755, 760 (I11.1966); People v.
W.
Tire Auto Stores, 207 N.E.2d 474, 477 (Ill. 1965).
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the liability of a component part manufacturer was either off-point or
inapposite. The only unifying link among these otherwise disparate cases
was their reliance on Gray to sustain personal jurisdiction.
(ii) The Seventies
The Illinois Supreme Court's indiscriminate reliance on Gray continued
well into the next decade, during which time Gray was cited for the accrual
of the statute of limitations, °9 the statutory construction of a "tortious
act,, 210 constitutional limitations on the jurisdictional power of state
courts,21 ' the stream of commerce theory,2 12 due process,213 and the strict
liability of a component part manufacturer. 14 Unlike the sixties, however,
reliance on Gray did not always result in affirmance of jurisdiction.
In the 1978 case of Boyer v. Boyer,215 the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to extend Gray's "tortious act" construction to a father's failure to
make child support payments in Illinois. Instead, the court cited Gray for
the opposing proposition that due process imposed limitations on the
personal jurisdiction of state courts.21 6
Boyer's retreat from Gray's expanding jurisdictional reach was
reversed the following year in Connelly v. Uniroyal,Inc. 217 Connelly was
a pre-Asahi case in which a Belgium tire manufacturer and its parent
company were sued by an Illinois plaintiff who was driving his car in
Colorado when one of the tires malfunctioned. The tire, which bore the
name "Uniroyal," was manufactured by the defendant in Belgium, installed
on the car by General Motors in Belgium, and then shipped by General
Motors to the United Sates for distribution. 21 8 The plaintiff purchased the
car with the tire in Illinois. 21 9 The Belgium tire manufacturer contested
jurisdiction on the grounds that it neither had "transacted business" nor
committed a "tortious act" in Illinois. 220 However, the Illinois Supreme
209

Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 261 N.E.2d 305, 313 (Ill.
1970).
°Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 159 (I11.
1979); Boyer v. Boyer, 383 N.E.2d
1978).
223,2224
(I11.
1
'Boyer, 383 N.E.2d at 224.
2 12
Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 160.
2 13
1d
2 14 "
1d. at 162.
215383 N.E.2d at 223.
2'61d. at 224.
21

2 17

See generally 389 N.E.2d 155.
1d. at 157.
2 19
1d.
22 0
1d. at 157-58.
2 18
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Court, citing Gray,221 sustained jurisdiction because the Belgian defendant
had introduced its tires "into the stream of commerce in obvious
contemplation of their ultimate sale or use in other nations or states," and
because its tires came "into Illinois on a regular basis and in substantial
numbers." 222 The court's ruling was based solely on due process and its
assumption that participation in a stream of commerce satisfied minimum
contacts. However, participation in the former may not automatically
satisfy the latter, especially when the forum has a long-arm statute that
limits jurisdiction to specific conduct.
The Connelly court found it unnecessary to "reach the question whether
defendant committed a tortious act in Illinois,

'223

preferring instead to

"express no opinion concerning the correctness of the appellate court's
holding on that issue. 224 The appellate court cited Gray for the
proposition that a tortious act had been committed in Illinois because "the
phrase 'commission of a tortious act' as employed in the long-arm statue,
applies not only to an injury which occurs in Illinois, but also to all
elements and conduct which significantly relate to or have significant
causal connection with the injury suffered.,225 This construction of
"tortious act," had it been adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court, would
have turned Gray on its head since it attributed jurisdictional significance
to any place where any conduct related to the tort occurred.
A later section of Connelly also cited Gray for the issue of whether a
parent corporation could be held strictly liable for the negligence of its
subsidiary.2 26 Here the Illinois Supreme Court said, "[L]iability in tort for
a defective product extends to a seller, a contractor ...a supplier ...and

the manufacturer of a component part., 22 7 Gray, however, addressed the
issue of jurisdiction, not liability.
To summarize, the Illinois Supreme Court's citations to Gray in the
1970's were inconsistent, inappropriate, and sometimes wrong. Williams
v. Brown Manufacturing Co. cited Gray where there was no jurisdictional
221
222

1d. at 160 (citing Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961)).

1d

2231d
224d. at 161.
225Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 1189, 1193 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (citing Gray v. Am.
Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (I1. 1961)) (emphasis added).
226
Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 162.
2271d. (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182,
184 (111.1965) (citing Gray v.
Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961))) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added)).
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issue.2 28 Boyer v. Boyer cited Gray to support due process restrictions on
state court jurisdictional authority.2 9 Connelly correctly cited Gray for the
application of the stream of commerce theory to a component part
manufacturer, 230 but then incorrectly cited it as authority for imposing strict
liability on a component part manufacturer. 23' These cases suggest that in
the seventies, the Illinois Supreme Court did not have a firm fix on the
Gray principle and cited it instead as generic justification to expand or
contract jurisdiction, or whenever a component part manufacturer was a
defendant.
(iii)The Eighties
The Illinois Supreme Court's citations to Gray in the 1980's evidenced
a significant shift in that court's personal jurisdiction agenda: Jurisdiction
was denied in every case in which Gray was cited.
In Green v. Advance
Ross Electronics Corp.,233 an Illinois corporation sued its former president,
a Texas resident, as a counter-defendant for misappropriation, corporate
diversions, and breach of fiduciary duties occurring in Texas. 4 The
12261 N.E.2d 305, 313 (111.1970).
29383 N.E.2d 223, 224 (Ill. 1978).
230
Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1979).
23'1d at 162 (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182, 184 (111. 1965) (citing
Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 761)).
232See generally Yates v. Muir, 492 N.E.2d 1267 (111. 1986); Wimmer v. Koenigseder,
484
N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. 1985); Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203 (II1. 1981).
13'427 N.E.2d 1203. Roy Green Jr. (Jr.) and Roy Green Sr. (Sr.) were employed
in Texas by
Advance Ross Steel Corp., a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in
Illinois. Jr. was fired for distributing unauthorized severance pay to Sr. and brought suit in
Illinois for breach of contract against Advance Ross. When Advance Ross countersued against
Sr. to recover the money, Sr. filed a special appearance arguing that the Illinois courts did not
have personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 1205. Advance Ross argued that jurisdiction over Sr.
was proper because the Greens, Jr. and Sr., had engaged in tortious conduct in Texas but the
injury was felt in Illinois through the depletion of Advance Ross's bank accounts there. Id. at
1206. This scenario resembled Gray in that the only event to occur in Illinois was the injury.
Nonetheless, the appellate court rejected the analogy to Gray, holding instead, that the link
between Sr.'s "activities in Texas and the alleged economic injury in Illinois... [was] too
tenuous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction." Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp.,
408 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). The court concluded that "it would be an improper
expansion of the long-arm statute for an Illinois court to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant whose only connection with this state is that he works for a Texas-based corporation
which is incorporated in Illinois." Id. at 1012. The court went on to state, "We therefore hold
that Green, Sr.'s conduct in Texas, regardless of its potentially tortious nature, was not
'committed' in Illinois under section 17(l)(b)." Id
2 34
Green, 427 N.E.2d at 1205.
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plaintiff corporation argued that the Texas defendant had committed a
tortious act in Illinois by depleting corporate accounts held by an Illinois
bank.235 The analogy to Gray was clear: A tortious act had been committed
in Illinois because the last act necessary to complete the tort, i.e., the
economic injury, occurred in Illinois.236 The court rejected this analogy,
however, observing that "[t]he last event in Gray was in Illinois, where the
injury to the plaintiff occurred, for to be tortious the act alleged in Gray
had to cause injury. 237 In Green, however, the defendant's conduct
occurred in Texas, and only "the consequences of his misconduct were felt
in Illinois. 2 38 The court found these "consequences" to be "too remote"
from the situs of the defendant's conduct to support the conclusion that it
had committed a tortious act in Illinois.239 Instead, it concluded that
extending Gray's last act analysis to economic injury would open "the
gates of long-arm jurisdiction to every Illinois resident who incurs loss as
the result of the fraud of a nonresident, no matter how distant the
misconduct and circumstances of the loss are from Illinois. A less tenuous
and contrived connection between the tortious act and this State is
required. .24.
By refusing to extend Gray's last act analysis to economic injury, the
Green Court, as a matter of policy, attempted to hold the line on the
increasing expansion of the Gray rationale that was taking place in the
lower courts. As a matter of logic, however, the court's attempt to
distinguish the tortious act in Gray from the tortious act in Green is
difficult to accept. In both cases, each defendant's conduct occurred
outside of Illinois while each plaintiffs injuries occurred within Illinois.
Furthermore, the court did not explain why economic injury within the
forum was more "tenuous" or "remote" than physical injury within the
forum.
The court also refused to extend Gray's last act analysis in Yates v.
Muir where an Illinois plaintiff argued that an attorney's malpractice in
Kentucky constituted a tortious act in Illinois because the plaintiff suffered
the consequences there.241 In fact, the Yates court went so far as to recast
the last event in Gray as the "exploding of the water heater" 242 rather than
235
236Id.

id

at 1207.

23

71d

238id
3

2 9Id
240

1d.
241492 N.E.2d 1267, 1268 (I.

1986).

242

id.
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the plaintiffs injury. Nonetheless, by refusing to equate injury with
consequences the court was clearly trying to limit the reach of Gray's
tortious act construction qua the last act doctrine.
In Wimmer v. Koenigseder,243 a decedent's administrator brought a
Dram Shop action against Wisconsin tavern owners.
The Illinois
Appellate Court upheld jurisdiction 244 but the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed. z4 5 Both opinions cited Gray to support their contrary results.
The appellate court cited Gray for the proposition that under the last act
doctrine a tortious act had been committed in Illinois since the injury had
occurred there. 46 Conversely, the supreme court found that no tortious act
had occurred in Illinois because the defendants owed no legal duty to the
plaintiff.247 The court concluded that the last act doctrine could not support
jurisdiction for an injury occurring in Illinois that did not arise from
tortious conduct.248
The last Illinois case to cite Gray was Wiles v. Morita Iron Works
Co. 249 The plaintiff had been employed by Astro Packaging Co., of New

243484 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. 1985).
244Wimmer v. Koenigseder, 470 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), rev'd, 484 N.E.2d
1088245(I11.1985).
Wimmer, 484 N.E.2d at 1088.
46
1 Wimmer, 470 N.E.2d at 331.
24 7
Wimmer, 484 N.E.2d at 1092-93.
2481d

249530

N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1988). Wiles was a product liability action filed by an Illinois

plaintiff who was injured by a machine manufactured by a Japanese company. Id. at 1383. The
machine had been purchased by the plaintiff's employer who took delivery in Japan before
shipping the machine to Illinois. Id. The trial judge dismissed the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. See Wiles
v. Morita Iron Works Co., 504 N.E.2d 942 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), rev'd, 530 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill.
1988). The appellate court's opinion relied heavily on Gray, ruling that Morita either knew or
could have foreseen that its machine would end up in Illinois. Id. at 945. Moreover, the court
did not like the possibility that Morita could be insulated from Illinois's jurisdiction simply
because it delivered the machine to the employer in Japan. Id. at 947. The bottom line,
according to the appellate court, was that "Morita... voluntarily entered into a contract that
resulted in its product going to the forum state." Id. at 946. The court expressly adopted the
Gray rationale for both "tortious conduct" and the stream of commerce. Id at 947. Six days after
the Wiles opinion was issued the United States Supreme Court issued its Asahi opinion. Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
In the wake of Asahi, Wiles was appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court. Wiles v. Morita
Iron Works Co., 530 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1988). That court placed considerable emphasis on the
factual similarities between Wiles and Asahi, particularly the presence of the Japanese defendant.
Id. at 1386. The court examined the divergent rationales of Asahi in order to find a consensus
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Jersey and Illinois, which had purchased a machine in Japan from Morita
Iron Works Co., which it transported to its plant in Illinois where the
plaintiff was injured. 250 The appellate court upheld jurisdiction over
Morita, citing Gray to support its conclusion that Morita had transacted
business in Illinois by participating in a stream of commerce that brought
its product there.25'
The Illinois Supreme Court treated Wiles as its opportunity to align
Illinois's stream of commerce doctrine with recent developments in the
252
federal minimum contacts doctrine. It cited World-Wide Volkswagen,
Burger King,253 Hanson,254 Kulko 255 and Asahi.256 The court carefully

analyzed the two competing stream of commerce theories posed by Asahi
and found that under either its "broad" or "narrow" version, jurisdiction
could not lie over Morita in Illinois.2 57 When referring to Justice
Brennan's "broad" version of the stream of commerce theory, which
required only placement of a product into a chain of distribution, the court
cited Fifth and Ninth Circuit cases,258 not Gray. Instead, the court
distinguished Gray on its facts. It said, "In Gray, which involved a
among the justices but could not do so. Instead, relying on Justice Brennan's opinion, the court
stated:

The record in this case is totally devoid of any evidence that the defendant was
aware either during contract negotiations or at the time of delivery of the
products to Astro in Japan that Astro intended to transport... to Illinois, or
that Astro even had a plant in Illinois. Without any evidence of such
knowledge on the part of the defendant, on this basis alone we would have to
conclude, under either theory, that Asahi made no effort, directly or indirectly,
to serve the market for its product in Illinois.
Id.at 1389. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiffs reliance on Gray as "misplaced." Id.at
1390. The court stated that "while it would be reasonable to assume that Morita had availed
itself of the United States market, there is no showing in the record that Morita purposefully
directed its products into Illinois." Id.
250Wiles, 530 N.E.2d at 1383-84.
251Wiles, 504 N.E.2d at 945, rev'd, 530 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1988).
212Wiles, 530 N.E.2d at 1385, 1386, 1389, 1390, 1391 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
253
1d. at 1391 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiez, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).
254
Id.at 1385, 1390 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)).
255
1Id at 1385 (citing Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal. ex rel. S.F., 436 U.S. 84 (1978)).
256
Id. at 1386, 1387, 1388, 1389 (citing Asahi v. Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S.257
102 (1987)).
Id at 1389.
258
Id.at 1388 (citing Bean Dredging Corp. v. Dredge Tech. Corp., 744 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.
1984) and Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1983)).

HeinOnline -- 55 Baylor L. Rev. 542 2003

2003]

PADDLING UP THE WRONG STREAM

Wisconsin manufacturer, the court held that it was a fair inference from the
record that a manufacturer of a commercial product in a state bordering
Illinois had purposefully availed itself of the Illinois market ' 259 whereas, in
the instant case, "there [was] no showing in the record that Morita
260
purposefully directed its product into Illinois."
This analysis may raise a few eyebrows as well as a few questions.
First, the court's attempt to distinguish Gray on the facts misstated the
facts. The Gray defendants were from Ohio and Pennsylvania, neither of
which borders Illinois and neither of which is Wisconsin. Why did the
Illinois Supreme Court purport to distinguish Gray on the facts by
distorting the facts? Was the error merely a mistake, or a purposeful
attempt to marginalize Gray? Did the court really fail to see the
connection between Gray's formulation of stream of commerce
jurisdiction and Brennan's "broad" stream of commerce theory? Second,
Wiles has been regarded as Illinois's Asahi, in part because it cites Asahi
as precedent and bases its analysis on the stream of commerce theory and,
in part, because the defendant was a Japanese manufacturer.
Notwithstanding these similarities, Wiles more appropriately should have
been analyzed as a "unilateral acts" case because it involved a direct sale
from the manufacturer to the purchaser and did not involve a chain of
distribution, a middleman, or a component part manufacturer.
In sum, the Gray cites of the 1980's show consistent results but no
coherent fix on how Gray fit into the larger constitutional scheme. It is
curious that while in Wimmer, Wiles, Yates and Green the court restricted
the expansion of Gray, it still failed to commit to a principled or consistent
application of Gray. Even more interesting is that there have been no
additional Illinois Supreme Court cites to Gray since 1988, although the
26 1
lower Illinois courts continue to use, and sometimes, abuse it.
259

1d. at 1390 (emphasis added).

260

1d

261See, e.g., Cameron v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 695 N.E.2d 572, 580 (I11.
App. Ct.
1998) (Gray cited by concurrence for proposition that the distribution of a product with the
expectation that it will be used in Illinois is an act in furtherance of a conspiracy to cause injury
in Illinois); Bradbury v. St. Mary's Hosp., 652 N.E.2d 1228, 1230 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995) (citing
Gray for application of the "last act doctrine" to a venue analysis); Dombrowski v. Larson
Lodge, 630 N.E.2d 973, 977 (I11.
App. Ct. 1994) (citing Gray as general support for the minimum
contacts doctrine); Alpert v. Bertsch, 601 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (citing Gray to
support jurisdiction in a forum where the defendant invoked the benefits and protections of its
laws); Poplar Grove State Bank v. Powers, 578 N.E.2d 588, 596 (I1l. App. Ct. 1991) (rejecting
plaintiff's reliance on Gray to support jurisdiction in Illinois because economic injury was felt
there); Talbert & Mallon, P.C. v. Stokes Towing Co., 572 N.E.2d 1214, 1218 (I11.
App. Ct.
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The Seventh Circuit

On the federal level, Asahi's failure to resolve the issue of how stream
of commerce jurisdiction satisfied either the minimum contacts doctrine or
procedural due process

262

left the Seventh Circuit without clear guidance

on the constitutional issue. Lacking such guidance, the Seventh Circuit
was constrained by the Illinois Supreme Court's statutory construction of
its long-arm statute but was not similarly constrained by its due process
analysis since Erie263 does not bind federal courts to a state's analysis of
federal constitutional law.
In the immediate post-Gray sixties and seventies, the Seventh Circuit
gave wide berth to Illinois's jurisdictional developments. 264 When Green
retracted Illinois's jurisdictional reach by refusing to extend Gray's last
act analysis to economic losses felt in Illinois but caused outside of

1991) (Gray cited by dissent to support jurisdiction in a "tort" case that was characterized as a
"contract" case by the majority which denied jurisdiction); Longo v. AAA-Michigan, 569
N.E.2d 927, 932-33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (rejecting plaintiff's reliance on Gray to support
jurisdiction in Illinois because economic injury was felt there); Arthur Young & Co. v. Bremer,
554 N.E.2d 671, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Gray for application of the "last act doctrine" to
determine the situs of a tort); Gen. Elec. Railcar Servs. Corp. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 567
N.E.2d 400, 404-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (citing Gray for the proposition that jurisdiction is proper
in a state whose laws provide benefits and protections to the defendant).
262
See supra text accompanying notes 155-176; see also Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks, 963
F.2d 941, 946 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that Asahi "casts some doubt on the future viability of the
stream of commerce theory"); William M. Richman, UnderstandingPersonal Jurisdiction,25
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 625 (1993) adapted from WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICTS OF LAW, (2d ed. 1993) (stating stream of commerce jurisdiction
ensures that the "manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of defective goods ... be amenable to
jurisdiction wherever those goods are distributed, either directly or indirectly .... ); Russell J.
Weintraub, Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 55, 66
(1988); Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent ofJurisdictionalPrivity,
54 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 437-39 (1993).
26'Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1994), commanded federal courts, when exercising diversity jurisdiction, to apply state
rather than federal law when deciding issues of state substantive law. See also GENE R. SHREVE
& PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.7 (2d ed., reprint 2000)
(1994).
264See, e.g., Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 946; John Walker and Sons, Ltd. v. DeMert &
Dougherty, Inc., 821 F.2d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Gray for the "benefits and protections"
test); Telco Leasing, Inc. v. Marshall County Hosp., 586 F.2d 49, 50 (7th Cir. 1978) (citing Gray
for the "benefits and protections" test); O'Hare Int'l. Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1176
(7th Cir. 1971) (citing Gray for the "benefits and protections" test); Consol. Labs., 384 F.2d at
800-01 (citing Gray for the "benefits and protections" test).

HeinOnline -- 55 Baylor L. Rev. 544 2003

PADDLING UP THE WRONG STREAM

2003]

Illinois, 265 the Seventh Circuit followed. 266 When Asahi cast a pall over the
stream of commerce doctrine, the Seventh Circuit took note but reaffirmed
its allegiance to Gray's version of the doctrine.2 67
a. The Seventh Circuit's Treatment of Gray's Statutory
Analysis
Two Seventh Circuit opinions issued in the 1970's cited Gray for
application of the last act doctrine to determine the situs of a tort.
Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Appartewerke ruled that the tort of inducement to
infringe a patent occurred in Illinois because the patent holder had suffered
injury there.268 One year later, McBreen v. Beech Aircraft Corp. accepted
as "well established that for purposes of the Illinois 'long-arm'
statute a
269
occurs.,
injury
the
where
place
the
in
tort is committed
In the eighties, the Seventh Circuit took its cues from Green and began
to restrict application of the last act doctrine. In Young v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., the court rejected a shareholder's claim that the
defendants had committed a tortious act in Illinois because the "impact" of
their fiduciary breaches were felt there.27 ° In Turnock v. Cope, a plaintiff
invoked the last act doctrine to claim economic injury in Illinois caused by
the commercial torts of three Michigan defendants. 271 The Seventh Circuit
rejected this argument, citing a series of recent Illinois decisions that held
272
fast to Green's refusal to extend the last act doctrine to economic losses.
Then, in 1990, the Seventh Circuit decided Heritage House Restaurants
v. Continental Funding Group, Inc., 273 which sharply contradicted its
265Green v. Advance Ross Elecs. Corp., 427 N.E.2d 1203, 1207-08 (Ill. 1981) (stating that to

so hold would "open the gates of long-arm jurisdiction to every Illinois resident who incurs loss
as the result of the fraud of a nonresident... [t]o permit no-holds-barred long-arm jurisdiction of
that type, even if contemplated by a State statute, would not pass muster under the due process

requirements.").
266See, e.g., Turnock,

816 F.2d at 334-35; Young, 790 F.2d at 570-71.
See Dehmlow, 963 F.2d at 946 (citing Mason v. Lli Luigi & Franco Dal Maschio, 832 F.2d
383, 386 (7th Cir. 1987), endorsing the stream of commerce theory and reaffirming the Seventh
Circuit's "belief in the continued validity of Gray .... ) (citations omitted); Vioski v. Calaveras
Asbestos, Ltd., 929 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussed infra notes 279-294); Heritage House
Rests.,
Inc. v. Cont'l Funding Group, Inc., 906 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1990).
26
8Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1142-43 (7th Cir. 1975).
269543 F.2d 26, 28 (7th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
270790 F.2d 567, 571-72 (7th Cir. 1986).
27'816 F.2d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 1987). The complaint alleged conspiracy,
conversion of
funds, interference with employment and unjust enrichment.
267

272Id. at 335. See citations therein.

273906 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1990).
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rulings in Turnock and Honeywell. In Heritage, the plaintiffs sought
jurisdiction over a New York financial institution for economic losses
suffered in Illinois.2 74 The district court, basing its ruling on the last act
doctrine as applied in Green and Gray, found that the situs of the tort was
either New York (the place from which the defendant gave investment
advice) or Arkansas (the location of the investment) but not Illinois, even
though the plaintiffs suffered financial losses there. 27' The Seventh Circuit
reversed,27 6 finding that the defendant had demonstrated an "intent to affect
an Illinois interest' 277 by making telephone calls to an Illinois plaintiff who
subsequently suffered economic losses there.278
The following year Judge Easterbrook authored Vioski v. Calaveras
Asbestos, Ltd., which did not defer to Heritage.279 Vioski held that an
asbestos supplier had not submitted to Illinois's jurisdiction when its
California customer relocated its plant to Illinois where the plaintiff was
employed and subsequently contracted asbestosis. 280 The plaintiff argued
that the asbestos supplier's failure to warn of the dangerous nature of its
product constituted a "tortious act" in Illinois. 28' Judge Easterbrook
replied that Illinois's "tortious act" provision applied only to acts of the
defendant that actually occurred in Illinois.28 2 Since the defendant neither
delivered nor anticipated its product's ultimate use in Illinois, the court
283
refused to "push this warning obligation farther up the chain of supply
and, accordingly, denied jurisdiction. Instead, Judge Easterbrook
explained "that if Calaveras launched a ballistic missile from California
into Illinois, the Supreme Court of Illinois would characterize this as a
284
tortious act 'in' Illinois, the place of the actual and intended injury."
The court also noted that jurisdiction would exist under Gray if the
274

1d. at 278-81.
1d. at 281.

275

276

2 771d.

at 284.

1d. at 282.
27 8
d. (citing FMC Corp. v. Varonos, 892 F.2d 1308, 1313 (7th Cir. 1990), where the court

held that a district court in Illinois had jurisdiction over a defendant who sent telexes and
telecopies of allegedly fraudulent monthly reports to Illinois, and Club Assistance Program, Inc.
v. Zukerman, 594 F. Supp. 341, 345-46 (N.D. I11.
1984), where defendant allegedly sent money
and made telephone calls which contained misrepresentations to Illinois); see also id. at 282 n.8.
279929 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1991).
28
Id.at 352-53.
28
1 Id.at 353.
82
1d at 352-53.
2831d. at 352.

"4d at 353.
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defendant had "sold its product anticipating that the asbestos would come
Illiois.
,,285 However, since this defendant's conduct was less direct
to Illinois....
and more attenuated than either example, the court declined to uphold
jurisdiction in Illinois.2 86
Vioski is interesting for several reasons. It was the first Seventh Circuit
case to break rank with that court's historical deference to Gray. It cited
Gray with a "Cf." for the principal that jurisdiction may be exercised only
over a defendant who anticipated its product's entry into a specific
market.287 It refused to apply Gray's last act construction of "tortious act"
to a supplier whose only contact with Illinois was that its product caused
injury there.288 By refusing to imbue every injury occurring in Illinois with
jurisdictional significance, the Seventh Circuit treated § 17(l)(b) as a
principle of limitation rather than of expansion.289
Although Judge Easterbrook's analysis was clever, it was also
inappropriate. The Erie doctrine required the Seventh Circuit to defer to
Illinois's construction of its long-arm statute.29 ° Per Gray, the Illinois
Supreme Court construed the phrase "tortious act" to include out-of-state
conduct having in-state consequences. Accordingly, Easterbrook should
have given the same construction to the "tortious act" issue in Vioski that
the Illinois Supreme Court would have given it. Instead, Easterbrook
relied on Yates v. Muir,29 1 in which the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
jurisdiction over a Kentucky attorney who performed legal services in
Kentucky for an Illinois resident.292 Yates, however, was not analogous to
Vioski. Yates was a malpractice case that fell well within an established
line of Illinois cases that reject jurisdiction over professional service
providers who perform services outside of Illinois for Illinois
residents.2 93 Vioski was a product liability case in which the plaintiff was
2851d
2 6
8 1d
2871d
2881d. at 352.
2891d. The Seventh Circuit continued to limit Gray in Rice v. Nova Biomedical Corp., 38
F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 1994), where Chief Judge Posner rejected application of Gray's last act
analysis to determine the applicable substantive law in a multi-state defamation case. Id. at 916.
29 0
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding federal courts presiding over a
diversity case must apply the substantive laws of the state in which they are sitting).
'9'492
N.E.2d 1267 (I11.
1986).
292
Vioski, 929 F.2d at 353.
29 3

Yates, 492 N.E.2d at 1269 (citing Veeninga v. Alt, 444 N.E.2d 780 (Ill. App. Ct.

1982)); see generally also Ballard v. Rawlins, 428 N.E.2d 532 (I11.
App. Ct. 1981); Muffo v.
Forsyth, 345 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
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injured by a product used in Illinois.2 94 Hence, Yates did not provide either
the factual basis or the doctrinal shift in Illinois's long-arm jurisdiction that
to justify Easterbrook's reconstruction of Illinois's "tortious act" doctrine.
With the exceptions of Heritage, McBreen, and Vioski, the Seventh
Circuit largely adhered to Illinois's expansion and contraction of
§ 17(1)(b). Ironically, both McBreen and Heritage would have been
consistent with these developments had they been decided later and earlier,
respectively. McBreen, although out of step with other seventies cases,
presaged Vioski's limitation on commercial tort claim theories that
attempted to masquerade as stream of commerce claims. Heritage,
decided in the nineties, was a quirky throwback to the pre-Green cases of
the seventies that had applied Gray's last act analysis with abandon.
Furthermore, Heritage, like most of the other Seventh Circuit cases,
involved a commercial tort rather than a product tort and, hence, did not fit
neatly into Gray's stream of commerce paradigm. Vioski may have
reflected the disdain of the Seventh Circuit, or at least Easterbrook, for
Illinois's jurisdictional jurisprudence, but it did not properly follow Erie's
command to federal diversity courts to defer to state judicial common law.
b. The Seventh Circuit'sPre-Asahi Treatment of Gray's
ConstitutionalAnalysis
The early Seventh Circuit cases embraced Gray's due process analysis
with vigor but without discrimination. 295 Such cases as Hutter Northern
Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce,296 Honeywell Inc. v. Metz
Apparatewerke,297 and Nelson by Carson v. Park Industries, Inc.,298
presaged Brennan's position in Asahi with their broad transactional
treatment of the stream of commerce doctrine. Each case based its
jurisdictional analysis on the relationship between the transaction and the
forum rather than the relationship between the defendant and the forum.
Each case substituted the question, "Was this defendant's conduct
sufficiently related to Illinois to satisfy due process?" for the question,
"Was this transaction sufficiently related to Illinois to satisfy due
process?" Each case found placement of the product into a transactional
network to be a jurisdictionally significant act.
294

Vioski, 929 F.2d at 352.
See generally O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1971).
296403 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1968).
29'509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
298717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983).
295
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In Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, the
Seventh Circuit extended Gray's due process analysis to a libel action that
based jurisdiction on the "transacting business" provision of Illinois's
long-arm statute. 299 Hutter cited Gray for the proposition that the
constitutional relationship between the defendant and the forum was
satisfied if the "'act or transaction itself ha[d] a substantial connection
with the forum state.,

30 0

The "transaction" that Gray referred to was the

defendant's participation in a network of manufacturers and distributors
that comprised a stream of commerce. 30 ' The "transaction" that Hutter
30 2
referred to was the mailing of information from Wisconsin to Illinois.

Hence, Hutter's so-called "transaction" was really the unilateral act of the
defendant that required no other participants. In contrast, Gray's
"transaction" referred to a network of many actors where the success of
each was dependant on the success of all. By superimposing Gray's
transactional stream of commerce analysis onto the "transacting business"
provision of Illinois's long-arm statue, the Seventh Circuit was doing more
than mixing metaphors. It was following the cues of its Illinois state
counterparts by adapting a Gray-based analysis to fit any jurisdictional
issue.
In Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, the Seventh Circuit upheld
Illinois's jurisdiction over a patent infringer who allegedly placed the
infringing product into a stream of commerce "under such circumstances
that it should reasonably have anticipated that injury through infringement
would occur [in Illinois]."3 °3 Citing Gray, the court concluded that
participation in a stream of commerce should not permit a manufacturer
"to insulate himself from the long arm of the courts by using an
or by professing ignorance of the ultimate destination of his
intermediary
04
products.

3

In Nelson v. Park Industries, Inc., the plaintiff brought a product
liability claim for injuries sustained when her flannel shirt caught fire.30 5
Among others, she sued the retailer's Hong Kong purchasing agent and the

299403
3

F.2d at 486.

°Id. at 484-85 (quoting Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761,
764 (111. 1961)) (emphasis added).
3 1
° Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
3 2
° Hutter, 403 F.2d at 481.
303509 F.2d 1137, 1144 (7th Cir. 1975).
3
O4id
305717 F.2d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1983).
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Hong Kong shirt manufacturer.3 0 6 Both defendants challenged
Illinois's jurisdiction on the grounds that they lacked control over the
distribution of the shirts.3 °7 The court rejected this argument, citing Gray
for the proposition that neither control nor management of the distribution
system were necessary to satisfy stream of commerce jurisdiction 30 8 as
long as the defendant had placed the product into the stream and was
"aware" of the distribution system.30 9
c. The Seventh Circuit'sPost-Asahi Treatment of Gray's
ConstitutionalAnalysis
The Seventh Circuit's enthusiasm for Gray's stream of commerce
theory waned once it attempted to reconcile Gray with Asahi. In Mason v.
F. LLI Luigi andFranco Dal Maschio Fu G.B.,310 the court applied Gray's
stream of commerce theory to an Italian manufacturer whose machine
allegedly injured an Illinois employee. 31' The court distinguished Asahi
because the Italian manufacturer had custom built the machine for an
Illinois company and provided training for its use there.312 Citing Gray,
the court held that the defendant had "elected to sell its product for
ultimate use in Illinois and therefore its 'association with
this State
3 13
[Illinois] is sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction.'
The Seventh Circuit again tried to reconcile Gray with Asahi in
Dehmlow v. Austin Fireworks.3 14 In Dehmlow, the plaintiff was injured by

fireworks that were manufactured in Kansas and later exploded in Illinois
by a Wisconsin fireworks display company.31 5 The court upheld
Illinois's jurisdiction over the Kansas manufacturer because it advertised
nationally and knew that its product was being purchased for use in
Illinois.316 The court asserted its continuing endorsement of Gray and the
stream of commerce doctrine,31 7 although it recognized that the plurality
3

"Id.at 1122-23.

3 7

1d. at 1124.
° 1d.at 1126 n.6.
3
°9d. at 1126.
310832 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1987).
311
1d. at 384-85.
3 8

312

1d. at 386.

33d.at 386-87. The court observed that four Justices had cited Gray with approval in Asahi.

Id. at 386 n.4.
314963 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1992).
311d. at 942-44.
3 16

1d

3 17

1d. at 946.
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opinions in Asahi may have cast some doubt upon the "future viability" of
that doctrine.31 8 Nonetheless, the court found that the defendant's
knowledge of the firework's ultimate use in Illinois would satisfy even
O'Connor's "more stringent minimum contacts test. 31 9 The court also
found that the defendant's additional activities in Illinois such as sales,
displays, and training sessions for other clients, supported jurisdiction
because they demonstrated the defendant's "concerted attempt to serve the
market for fireworks in Illinois., 320 A concurring opinion added that the
defendant's knowledge of the product's ultimate use in Illinois was
sufficient to support stream of commerce jurisdiction 32 1 and that the
majority's reliance on the defendant's additional but unrelated
were not
Illinois activities was inappropriate because such activities
"contemporaneous or antecedent to the incident at issue. 3 22
Dehmlow is a good example of the multiple levels of confusion wrought
by Asahi's indecision. For example, did the Dehmlow majority correctly
include the defendant's unrelated business activities in Illinois to support
stream of commerce jurisdiction? If so, can unrelated business activities in
the forum transform a weak case of minimum contacts into a more certain
case of stream of commerce jurisdiction? If not, then the only reason to
consider the defendant's unrelated forum activities is to establish general
jurisdiction. But, if general jurisdiction exists, there is no need to establish
specific jurisdiction.32 3 The majority opinion reached this impasse by
conflating specific and general jurisdiction as if they were interchangeable.
Does Asahi support that proposition?
On the other hand, the concurrence argued that the defendant's
knowledge of the product's intended market satisfied the purposeful
availment requirement. Does Asahi support that proposition? What if the
defendant knew that the product was to be delivered for use in Illinois but
when something changed, the product was ultimately delivered for use in
Nebraska? What does the defendant's knowledge of ultimate use
anywhere at any point in time have to do with due process? That is like
saying that if the Robinsons told Seaway they were driving the Audi
through Oklahoma then Seaway would have been amenable to jurisdiction
318

ld

319

1d. at 947.
948.
1d. at 949.
322
1d
32
.Id.at
321

323

1d
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in Oklahoma because it knew the car was destined for use there. Does
Asahi support that proposition?
B. Critics
Despite its followers, Gray was not without its detractors. Of the
approximately six hundred twenty-one cases that cite to Gray,324 only
seven cases (four federal and three state) 325 actually reject its analysis.
Few though they are, these cases are worthy of comment because they
articulate Gray's defects and offer insights into the relationship between
stream of commerce jurisdiction and the minimum contacts doctrine.
1. Attacks on Gray's Statutory Construction: The New York
Court of Appeals
In 1965, three years after Gray was decided, the New York Court of
Appeals issued Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke,326 a
consolidation of three cases that construed that state's newly enacted
long-arm statute. 327 Of the three cases under review, only one, Feathers v.
McLucas,32 8 expressly criticized
329 Gray while the other two incorporated
those criticisms by reference.
324See supranote 15.
325

See, e.g., In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972);
Tomashevsky v. Komori Printing Mach. Co., 715 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1989); Beaty v. M.S.
Steel Co., 276 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1965).
126209 N.E.2d 68, 84 (N.Y. 1965). The three cases under review were
Longines-Wittnauerv.
Barnes & Reinecke Inc., 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), Feathers v. McLucas, 251
N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1964), and Singer v. Walker, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div.
1964).
327N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2002). New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules §
302 is
modeled
after Illinois's long-arm statute.
328
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., 209 N.E.2d at 78-80.
329Id. In Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., a New York corporation sued Barnes, a Delaware
corporation having its principal place of business in Illinois, for breach of warranty. Id. at
74. Barnes manufactured and sold specially designed machines to plaintiff. Id. Barnes mailed
contract proposals to Longines in New York and later sent key officers to Illinois. Id. The terms
of the contract recited that it was "made in the State of New York and governed by the laws
thereof." Id. When performance problems arose, meetings between the plaintiff and defendant
took place in both New York and Illinois. Id. A supplemental contract followed, executed in
both states. Id. The defendant eventually shipped the machines to the plaintiffs New York plant
where it performed installation and testing. Id. When Longines discovered defects in the
machines, it brought suit pursuant to the "transaction of business" section of New York's
long-arm statute and served Barnes in Illinois. Id. Barnes challenged New York's jurisdiction,
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In Feathers, the plaintiffs were seriously injured in New York when a
truck hauling flammable liquid propane gas exploded. 330 The propane tank
was manufactured by Darby Co., a Kansas corporation, under a contract
with Butler Manufacturing Co., the Missouri corporation that mounted the
tank onto a wheelbase and sold it to Matlack, a33Pennsylvania corporation.
All three companies were named as defendants. 1

arguing that its activities in New York before and after the execution of the contract did not
amount to the "transaction of business." Id. In reviewing Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., the
court upheld jurisdiction for the following reasons: First, the court pointed out that the New York
legislature chose to follow Illinois's long-arm example by providing broad, inclusive language
for the "transaction of any business within the state" provision. Id. at 75. Second, according to
InternationalShoe, so long as a nonresident defendant engaged in some purposeful activity in the
state in connection with the suit, both due process and the statutory test would be satisfied. Id.
Third, the parties' contract provided a "substantial connection" with New York and the
defendant's contacts with New York were such that "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" were not offended. Id. Fourth, the defendant "purposefully availed itself of
the benefits and protections of New York's laws." Id.
In the third case of the trilogy, Singer v. Walker, 209 N.E.2d at 80, the court's treatment of
New York's "tortious act" provision was similar to Feathers and, hence, the outcome identical.
The plaintiff, then ten years old and a New York resident, was injured in Connecticut when a
hammer he was using broke and a chip penetrated his right eye. Id. The hammer was
manufactured by defendant Estwing Manufacturing Co., an Illinois corporation that did not
conduct business in New York. Id. The defendant originally had shipped the hammer to a New
York dealer where it was purchased by the plaintiff's aunt. Id. Estwing was served in Illinois
and subsequently brought a motion to dismiss, arguing that New York had no jurisdiction over it
because (i) the allegedly tortious act of faulty design and manufacture took place in Illinois, and
(ii) the allegedly tortious act did not arise from the transaction of any business by defendant in
New York. Id. The court agreed with the second argument: "The mere fact that a product
defectively manufactured and misleadingly labeled in one state is marketed and sold in another
cannot serve to change the place where the original tortious acts were committed or to create a
new tortious act." Id. at 81. Here, the defendant's tortious conduct consisted solely of
manufacturing a defective hammer and attaching a misleading label, both of which
"unquestioningly took place in Illinois." Id. Thus, jurisdiction could not be sustained under New
York's "tortious act" provision. Id. Furthermore, the court reiterated that "liability has nothing
to do with the problem ofjurisdiction." Id. The court, however, did find jurisdiction under New
York's "transacting business within the state" provision because the defendant's voluntary
actions of marketing and selling the hammer to a New York dealer provided sufficient minimum
contacts to meet that statutory requirement. Id.
33
d. at 76.
33 1

Id. at 68. The complaint alleged that Darby was subject to the court's personal jurisdiction
under the "doing business" and "tortious act" provisions of New York's long-arm statute.
Id. Darby argued that it did not do business in New York because all of its operations took place
in Kansas. Id. Once the court agreed, the issue shifted to whether Darby had "committed a
tortious act within" New York. Id. at 76.
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The complaint charged Darby with improper design and assembly of
the propane tank.332 Darby responded that no tort had been committed in
New York because it designed and manufactured the tank in Kansas.333
The trial court disagreed, finding that Darby had committed a tortious act
in New York because its out-of-state conduct had foreseeable in-state
consequences, the combination of which satisfied both the long-arm statute
and due process.334
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the plain language and
legislative intent of New York's long-arm statute clearly required the
commission of a "tortious act within the state. 335 According to the court,
the "tortious act within the state" language was too precise to be construed
"as if it were synonymous with . . . 'a tortious act without the state which
causes injury within the state.' The mere occurrence of the injury in this
State certainly cannot serve to transmute an out-of-state tortious act into
one committed here within the sense of the statutory wording. 3 36
The Court of Appeals expressly rejected the plaintiffs' argument to
adopt Gray's statutory analysis because the New York legislature had
relied heavily on Illinois's long-arm statute when drafting New York's
statute.337 The court's criticism of Gray was specific: Gray's statutory
construction was defective because its reliance on the antiquated lex loci
choice of law rule 338 confused conflicts principles with jurisdictional
principles. Such construction of Illinois's long-arm statute "disregard[ed]
its plain language and exceed[ed] the bounds of sound statutory
339
construction.,
3 32

1d

3 33

1d

334

1d. at 76.
1d at 77 (emphasis in original).

335
3 36

1d.

337

1d. at 79.
1d. The lex loci choice of law rule holds that "the place of a wrong is where the last event
takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable." Id. When Gray was decided, lex loci
was part of the prevailing conflicts doctrine in Illinois. It was not, however, part of the prevailing
jurisdictional doctrine in Illinois. The Second Restatement replaced the lex loci rule in 1963 with
Section 145 that provides that the state which has the "most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties" will determine the applicable law. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Second Restatement
in Ingersoll v. Klein, 262 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. 1970). See Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the
United
States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1172-74 (1987).
339
Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., 209 N.E.2d at 79. Interestingly, the court pointed out that
prior to Gray, the Illinois federal courts had given a contrary construction to Illinois's long-arm
statute, which, in accordance with its plain language, "was not meant to sanction jurisdiction over
338
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It certainly does not follow that, if the "place of [the]
wrong" for purposes of conflict of laws is a particular
state, the "place of the commission of a tortious act" is
also that same state for purposes of interpreting a statute
conferring jurisdiction, on that basis, over nonresidents.
Not only are these separate and distinct problems but the
rules formulated to govern their resolution embody
different concepts expressed in different language.340
Consequently, the Court of Appeals dismissed Darby from the suit, finding
that it had not committed a tortious act within New York.34 '
2. Attacks on Gray's Due Process Analysis
a.

The NorthernDistrict ofIllinois

Gray has never been repudiated expressly under Illinois law. Although
several Illinois cases have distinguished Gray,342 only one, Keckler v.
Brookwood Country Club,343 has criticized it. Yet, in keeping with the
constraints of Erie,344 even these criticisms were cloaked in a ubiquitous
display of respect and deference.
Keckler was written by Judge Bernard Decker four years after Gray was
issued.345 The plaintiff had been injured by a motorized golf cart that was
manufactured by Versal, Inc., an Indiana corporation, and then sold in
a nonresident manufacturer whose wrongful act outside the state caused an injury within the
state."
34 0 Id. at 78 n.14 (emphasis added).
d. at 76 (citations omitted).
341
1d. at 80. See generally also Harvey v. Chemie Grunenthal, 354 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1965).
Based on the New York Court of Appeal's rejection of Gray's statutory analysis in LonginesWittnauer, 209 N.E.2d 68, 79 (N.Y.1965), cert. denied, Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 382 U.S. 905
(1965), the Harvey court rejected jurisdiction over a West German pharmaceutical company,
finding that its alleged failure to warn of the dangerous effects of thalidomide was not "a tortious
act within the state" under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 302(a)(2). Id at 431; Allen
v. Toshiba Corp., 599 F. Supp. 381, 389 (D.N.M. 1984) (limiting Gray's stream of commerce
rationale
to tort claims for personal injuries).
34 2
See Wiles v. Morita Iron Works Co., Ltd., 530 N.E.2d 1382 (Ill. 1988); Wimmer v.
Koenigseder, 484 N.E.2d 1088 (Ill. 1985); Green v. Advance Ross Elec., 427 N.E.2d 431 (Ill.
1981); McLeod v. Harmon, 500 N.E.2d 724 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Stephens v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv.
Co., 409 N.E.2d 423 (I11.
App. Ct. 1980); Sears Bank & Trust Co. v. Luckman, 377 N.E.2d 1156
(I11.
App. Ct. 1978). See also discussion infra notes 204-261.
143248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Il1. 1965).
344Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 87 (1938).
34 5
The Honorable Bernard Decker became a judge on the Northern District of Illinois in
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Indiana to Motorized Golf Co., which sold the cart to Brookwood Country
Club in Illinois, where it caused the plaintiffs injury.346 Jurisdiction over
Versal was sought under the same "tortious act" provision of
Illinois's long-arm statute that had been construed in Gray.3 47 Judge
Decker set out his game plan at the beginning of the opinion:
There are two questions to be answered in determining
whether Versal may be served as to Count IV under the
Illinois statute. The first is whether the "long-arm" statute
was intended to reach defendants such as Versal under the
circumstances of the case-a question of state law. If
Illinois does purport to exercise jurisdiction over Versal,
then the question arises whether such an attempt violates
the due process clause of the federal constitution. This is a
question of 348
federal law, and state authorities are not

binding on it.

As to the statutory question, the court deferred to Gray's instruction
"that negligent manufacture of a product constitutes the doing of a 'tortious
act' in Illinois, where the resulting injury occurs in Illinois, 349 and
concluded that statutory jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.35 0 As
to the constitutional question, the court stated that jurisdictionally
significant conduct had to be "directly aimed at the forum state.", 35' Like
352
the camel under the tent, Decker praised "[t]he learned opinion in Gray,"
quoted it at length, and applauded the utmost reasonableness of its stream
of commerce theory.353 Then, in three terse paragraphs, Decker lowered
the boom. First, he criticized the inadequate record on which Gray had
based its due process analyses:
When the plaintiff seeks to bring a defendant into court
under the 'long-arm' statute, he must state sufficient facts
in the complaint to support a reasonable inference that the
defendant has done the required act. In Gray, the Illinois
346Keckler, 248 F.Supp. at 646.
347
Id.(citing Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110 para. 17 (1959) (current version at 735 ILL. COM. STAT.
5/2-209 (2003))).
348Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
349
1d. at 647.
350d
351

1d. at 648.
1d

352
35 3

1d. at 649.
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court explicitly disclaimed reliance on the existence of
such facts in the record, and stated its willingness to
presume that the defendant was engaged in a business of
the kind necessaryforjurisdiction.
I think that jurisdiction must rest on a firmer foundation
if the 4requirements of the due process clause are to be
met.

35

Second, Decker criticized Gray's characterization of jurisdictionally
sufficient conduct: "Entry into the manufacturing business is not enough.
Rather, the complaint must affirmatively show that defendant's distribution
volume or pattern is of the kind from which a reasonable inference may be
355
drawn that the national channels of commerce have been chosen."
Finally, Decker dismissed the complaint, finding that it failed to allege
which the court reasonably could infer jurisdictionally
sufficient facts from
356
sufficient conduct.

The Supreme Court of Vermont

b.

In O 'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc.357 a Vermont plaintiff was injured
when she swallowed glass contained in a can of beans that had been
prepared and packed by Comstock of New York.358 The complaint alleged
only that the product had been "placed in the stream of commerce" in New
York state. 35 9 The Supreme Court of Vermont found this "bare
allegation" 360 insufficient to satisfy due process and that the insufficiency
was not cured because the injury had occurred in Vermont. The court
stated:
Unlike the Supreme Court of Illinois in Gray... we
cannot infer that the defendant's products have substantial
use and consumption

in Vermont.... Our inquiry is

confined to those facts which are established by the
record ....

354

1d. at 650 (emphasis added).
1d. (emphasis added).

355

356

1d

"'7194 A.2d 568 (Vt. 1963).
358
Id. at
359

569.

1d

36Id. at 571.
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... Without any presentation in the record of these
basic requirements due process is not achieved and
personal jurisdiction fails.361

Accordingly, the Vermont court dismissed Comstock for lack of
jurisdiction.36 2
3. Total Repudiation of Gray
Courts called upon to construe their state's newly enacted long-arm
statutes were not bound by Gray's due process analysis. Federal courts
sitting in Maryland, Ohio and Florida, and the Colorado Supreme Court
voiced strong objections to Gray's constitutional analysis.
a. The District of Maryland
In Beaty v. MS. Steel Co.,363 two iron workers were injured when
fabricated bar joists collapsed. Defendant M.S. Steel insisted that it was
not subject to Maryland's long-arm statute because all of its conduct took
place outside of Maryland. 36 It argued that the bar joists had been
manufactured in Alabama, ordered in Massachusetts, and consigned to a
Maryland corporation before they reached the plaintiffs. 365 The plaintiffs
urged the court to follow Gray.3 6 6 The court, however, rejected Gray as
"unconvincing ' 367 and arrived at a different result. It observed that
Maryland's legislature had acknowledged Gray's stature in the
jurisdictional scheme but purposefully had drafted its long-arm statute to
avoid Gray's result.368 Consequently, Maryland's long-arm statute
contained two "tortious act" provisions, unlike Illinois's, which contained
only one. 369 Maryland's section 96(a)(3) authorized jurisdiction when both
the tortious act and the plaintiffs injury occurred in Maryland.3 7 °
Maryland's section 96(a)(4) authorized jurisdiction when an injury
occurring within Maryland was caused by conduct occurring outside of
36

Id.(emphasis added).

3621d. at 572.

363276 F. Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967).
3641d at 260.
365

1d
3661d.
367

1d. at 262 n.5.
262-63.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, § 96 (1965) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD.
PROC.
§ 6-103 (2002)).
370
Beaty, 276 F. Supp. at 262.
368
369 1d. at
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Maryland if the defendant regularly conducted business, solicited business,
engaged in any persistent course of conduct or derived substantial revenue
in Maryland. 371 The court also noted that Maryland's long-arm statute was
based on section 1.03(a)(3) of the Uniform Intrastate and International
Procedure Act, which in its commentary stated that its "rule [was] more
restrictive than the Illinois statute, as interpreted in Gray. .. ,,372
Consequently, the court found that reliance on Gray was not appropriate.3 73
Before concluding, however, the Beaty court stated that application of
Gray's due process analysis "would offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice 3 74 because the result subjected a nonresident
corporation to jurisdiction "merely because on one occasion its product
manufactured in another state was shipped into and used within this
state. 375 Citing Hanson v. Denckla376 and ErlangerMills, Inc. v. Cohoes
establish a
Fibre Mills, Inc., 3 77 the court found such activity inadequate to
378
jurisdictional relationship between the defendant and the state:
We cannot shut our eyes to the disorder and unfairness
likely to follow from sustaining jurisdiction in a case like
this. It might require corporations from coast to coast
having the most indirect, casual and tenuous connection
with a State to answer frivolous law suits in its courts. To
permit this could seriously impair the guarantees which
due process seeks to secure. 379
b. The Sixth Circuit
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided In-Flight
Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc. in 1972.380 Plaintiff In-Flight, a
manufacturer of airplane parts, was incorporated and solely operated in
371id.
372

1d. at 263 (citing UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROCEDURES ACT § 1.03 commissioners'

note,3739B U.L.A. 312 (1966)).

1d. at 262.
1d at 263.
375
1d. See Christian Book Distribs., Inc. v. Great Christian Books, Inc., 768 A.2d 719, 730
374

(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001) (reiterating Maryland's deliberate effort to distinguish its long-arm
jurisprudence from that of Illinois).
376357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
377239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
378 Beaty, 276 F. Supp at 263-64.
3791d. at 264 (quoting Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th

Cir. 1956)).
380466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
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Ohio. 38 ' Defendant Van Dusen, a distributor of airplane parts, was
incorporated and had its principal place of business in Minnesota.3 82 It also
had a purchasing operation in Missouri and a network of wholly owned
subsidiaries that sold parts throughout the country.383 One wholly owned
subsidiary, Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies, Inc., purchased parts from Van
Dusen and resold them to retailers.384
The parties entered into a contract for the sale of airplane parts that was
negotiated in Minnesota, Missouri, and Ohio. 385 Parts were shipped from
In-Flight's Ohio factory to Van Dusen's Missouri purchasing center.386
Van Dusen made payment by a check drawn upon its Minnesota bank but
stopped payment three days later alleging that the merchandise was
unsatisfactory.38 7 In-Flight, however, already had cashed the check.3 88
When the check bounced, In-Flight sued Van Dusen in Ohio for breach of
contract and damage to business reputation. 389 Van Dusen was served with
390
Ohio summons at its Minnesota headquarters.
Arguing a Gray-type analysis, In-Flight argued that Van Dusen was
subject to Ohio's long-arm statute, which provided:
(A)
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of
action arising from the person's:
(3)
Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in
this state;
(4)
Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or
omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of

38

Id. at 222.

3821d
38

31da

38

41d
38"Id. at 222-23.

3861d
387
1d.
38

at 223.
ld. at 222.

389
39

1d. at 224.
Id. at 223-24.
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conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
39 1
consumed or services rendered in this state.
Like Beaty, the Sixth Circuit noted the Ohio legislature's intent, when
enacting its long-arm statute, to repudiate a Gray-type construction of its
tortious injury provisions.39 2 Like Beaty, the Sixth Circuit noted that in
rejecting Gray the Ohio legislature had adopted the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act 393 which expressed "reluctance to follow Gray
in the products liability field. 3 94 Unlike Beaty, the Sixth Circuit was quite
forthcoming with its criticisms of Gray. It charged that Gray's analysis
was based on two partial premises, neither of which completed the other
nor made sense by itself:395 First, Gray assumed that a nonresident

defendant subjected itself to out-of-state jurisdiction when it engaged in
conduct that might bring its product into the forum state; 396 Second, Gray
assumed that the acts of manufacture and placement of a product into a
stream of commerce were dispositive jurisdictional acts. 397 The Sixth
Circuit deemed the first premise so broad as to be meaningless, especially
in the product liability field where a defendant's expectations were difficult
to gauge.39 8 The Sixth Circuit deemed the second premise so narrow that it
contradicted the first, because mere placement of a product into a stream of
commerce did not necessarily constitute jurisdictionally foreseeable
conduct or consequences. 399 The combination of the two premises, said the
court, generated a "gap between fiction and reality" that had been
by
misunderstood
and
misused
considerably
4
00
had
progeny
The court concluded that Gray's
Gray-inspired courts.
freely found jurisdiction "in situations where the defendant could not
realistically have anticipated that his product would wind up in the
particular forum state. In many instances, the defendant's expectations

391. at 224 n.84 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.382 (1970)).
392
1d. at 230.
393
1d. at 224 (citing UNIF. INTERSTATE & INT'L PROC. ACT § 1.03 commissioners' note, 9B
U.L.A. 312 (1966)).
'94.
at 230.
39
5

See id.

396

,d.

397
1d.
398

ld.

399

4

1d

0OId.
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have become a construction of the judicial imagination, more fictional than
real. ,,40
c. The Southern District ofFlorida
Tomashevsky v. Komori PrintingMachinery Co.,4 02 was the first postWorld-Wide Volkswagen,40340post-Asahi4°4 case to criticize Gray.4 °5 The
plaintiff was injured by a printing press that had been manufactured by
defendant Komori, a Japanese company.4 °6 Komori sold the press to
Imperial Equipment, Inc., in California, which sold the press to Blue Ridge
Printing Co. in North Carolina, which sold the press to Delta Printing, the
47
Florida company that employed the plaintiff.
The plaintiff sought jurisdiction over Komori based on a Gray-type
argument that the court distinguished, criticized, and ultimately rejected.40 8
As in Gray, the plaintiff developed no record facts of the defendant's
purposeful conduct directed toward Florida.40 9 Instead, the plaintiff argued
that because Komori had placed its product into a stream of commerce the
court could infer that it had knowledge of the product's ultimate
destination.4 10 Relying heavily on World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, the
Tomashevsky court did not take the bait.
First, the court found that mere placement of a product into a stream of
commerce, without more, did not justify the inference that the defendant
knew of the product's ultimate destination.4 1 Second, the court refused to
treat the distributor's sale of the press as the purposeful act of the
defendant Komori. The court noted that absent record facts it could not
infer the latter from the former.412 Finally, the court observed that after

401

1d. The court ultimately upheld jurisdiction under the "doing business" section of Ohio's
long-arm statute. Id. at 236.
402715 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla.
1989).
403World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
4°4Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.102 (1987).
40 5

Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).

406Tomashevsky, 715 F. Supp.
at 1563.
4
07

40

1d

81d. at 1565.

Gray had previously been adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in Ford
Motor Co. v. Atwood Vacuum Mach. Co., 392 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1981).
409
Tomashevsky, 715 F. Supp. at 1564.
41
°Id. at 1563-64.
41 'd. at 1565.
4 12
Id
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World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, Gray's status as good law was
doubtful. 13
The Tomashevsky opinion was the first, and perhaps the only,
post-Asahi case to both criticize Gray's inference-based analysis and
refuse to apply its stream of commerce theory of jurisdiction to a chain of
distribution case. Citing World-Wide Volkswagen, the court said, "The
mere fact that Komori could foresee that a purchaser, after the initial sale
of the press by the distributor, would resell the product to plaintiffs'
employer in Florida is not a sufficient basis for haling them into court
here. 414 Tomashevsky's effect on Gray was clear: If Tomashevsky was
correct, then Gray was incorrect. After World-Wide Volkswagen and
Tomashevsky, the mere fact that Titan could foresee the eventual entry of
its valve into Illinois, without more, would not be a sufficient basis for
subjecting it to Illinois's jurisdiction.
d

The Supreme Court of Colorado

In 1992, twenty-four years after Gray was decided, the Supreme Court
of Colorado issued an en banc personal jurisdiction decision in Classic
Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket.4 15 The plaintiff allegedly purchased an
automobile that the defendants advertised as a 1968 Porsche 911S Targa,
but which did not contain a 911S Targa engine.41 6 Plaintiff sued the
defendants for fraud, concealment, negligent misrepresentation and
deceptive trade practices. 7 Once served, the defendants filed a joint
motion to dismiss the complaint under the "tortious act" section of
Colorado's long-arm statute.4 I8 The district court ruled in favor of the
defendants, but the court of appeals reversed.4 19
The issue before the Colorado Supreme Court was whether a nationally
circulated advertisement that originated outside of Colorado but caused
injury within Colorado constituted a tortious act within Colorado. 42' The
defendants argued that the situs of the last act necessary to complete the
tort was Nebraska because the plaintiff wrote the check there to pay for the

41"Id. at 1566.

414id

41'832
4 16

P.2d 233 (Colo. 1992).

1d. at 234-35.
40Id. at 235.
4 18

1d. (COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-1-124(1)(b) (1987)).

4191d
4201d
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Porsche. 421 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected this last act argument as
both outdated and irrelevant to the jurisdictional analysis. 422 Instead, the
court found that the last act doctrine imposed on the jurisdictional analysis
a level of inflexibility that was inconsistent with the "ad hoc analysis of the
facts" required by the minimum contacts doctrine.4 23 The court also found
that the last act doctrine, which located the situs of the tort at the place of
injury, produced results that were more restrictive than those allowed
under Colorado's long-arm statute, which had been construed to be
co-extensive with due process.424 By articulating the relationship between
the last act and minimum contacts doctrines, the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized that the two doctrines could not co-exist within the same due
process framework.
4. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was not oblivious to Gray's distortions of the
minimum contacts doctrine. Although no opinion ever expressly
repudiated Gray's constitutional analysis, over time virtually every one of
Gray's doctrinal premises has been rejected, restricted or transformed by
subsequent Supreme Court case law.
Hanson425 and Kulko 42 6 rejected application of the "center of gravity
test" of jurisdiction; Shaffer 427 and Keeton428 rejected
application of the
"choice of law doctrine" to jurisdiction; Shaffer429 and Burger King430
delimited the convenience analysis in light of advances in transportation
421

1d. at 238.

12'1d at 238-39.
423
1d. (quoting Fleet Leasing Inc. v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1074, 1079 (Colo. 1982)).
424Id. at 239-40.
425
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958) (stating "[The state] does not acquire that
jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the controversy, or the most convenient location
for litigation. The issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law.").
426Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal. ex rel. S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 98 (1978) (rejecting plaintiffs
argument that California's jurisdiction was proper because its laws were applicable and,
therefore, it was the "center of gravity" of the dispute).
427
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977) (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254).
428Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 (1984) (stating
that New
Hampshire's statute of limitations should become an issue only after jurisdiction is determined
because "we do not think that such choice-of-law concerns should complicate or distort the
jurisdictional inquiry.").
429Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 254).
43
°Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)(stating that distant litigation is
not necessarily burdensome due to advances in transportation and communication).
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and communication that reduced litigation burdens; Kulko431 and
World-Wide Volkswagen 432 declined to apply the "effects test" to
non-purposeful activity; Calder4 33 and Keeton 434 narrowly applied the
"effects test" to jurisdictional issues involving publication of defamation;
a
Keeton 435 and Burger King436 converted the "forum's interest" from 437
Volkswagen
World-Wide
and
factor;
contact to a reasonable/fairness
specifically revived the call for record proof of jurisdictional facts.
Finally, Asahi's plurality opinion poignantly exposed the Court's
inability to resolve the relationship between stream of commerce
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts doctrine.438 Brennan's position that
mere placement of a product into a stream of commerce satisfied minimum
contact 439 requirements came directly from Gray. It treated the
relationship among the transaction, the forum, and the litigation as
jurisdictionally significant. O'Connor's position that minimum contacts
were satisfied only by placing a product into a stream plus additional
purposeful activity directed toward the forum 440 was contrary to Gray. It
treated the relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation
as jurisdictionally significant. The competing theories left unresolved the
most critical questions: What kind of relationships and what level of
431

Kulko, 436 U.S. at 96 (rejecting plaintiff's reliance on the "effects test" because its

was properly limited to wrongful out-of-state conduct).
application
432
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (declining
jurisdiction over an automobile wholesaler and retailer even though the car they sold to plaintiff
in Oklahoma).
exploded
433
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984) (upholding "effects" jurisdiction in California
over Florida defendants who researched and wrote an allegedly defamatory story about plaintiff

Shirley Jones because California was "the focal point both of the story and of the harm
suffered.").
434
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (upholding jurisdiction in
New Hampshire over an Ohio company that published allegedly defamatory material nationwide
such publication had an effect in New Hampshire).
because
435
d. (upholding jurisdiction in New Hampshire over an Ohio publication in part because of
New Hampshire's strong state interest in adjudicating the dispute).
436Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (stating that once minimum
contacts are established, the court may consider the forum's interest to determine if its exercise of
would be reasonable).
jurisdiction
437
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (stating, "[tlhere is
no evidence of record" that World-Wide sold automobiles outside of New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut).
438
See Asahi discussion supra note 160.

439

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 117 (1987).

"I1d. at 112.
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individual participation in a stream of commerce satisfied minimum
contacts requirements?
5. Summary
But for these handful of cases, Gray's status as "good law" has not been
seriously challenged. Taken in toto, this small body of case law raises the
following criticisms of Gray:
First, due process requires that a finding of jurisdictionally sufficient
conduct be based on record facts not inferences; 44' Second, Gray's reliance
on the last act doctrine resulted in the inappropriate confusion of conflict of
laws and jurisdictional principles; 442 Third, Gray's statutory construction
failed to distinguish between acts committed within and without Illinois,
thereby straining the literal meaning of the "tortious act" language of the
long-arm statute; 443 Fourth, after World-Wide Volkswagen and Asahi, it
was doubtful that Gray's version of stream of commerce jurisdiction
satisfied due process because neither the act of manufacture nor the act of
placing a product into a stream of commerce were regarded as
jurisdictionally dispositive conduct. 4"
V. WHAT Is REALLY WRONG WITH GRAY?
A. Methodology
1. Inference
Since Pennoyer v. Neff,445 and probably long before," 6 jurisdictional
discretion has been constrained by the same rules of record proof that bind
all other aspects of judicial power. The Gray record, however, lacked the
threshold factual information necessary to sustain a finding of personal
44'See Tomashevsky v. Komori Printing Mach. Co., 715 F. Supp 1562, 1565-66 (S.D. Fla.
1989); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 650 (N.D. Ill. 1965); O'Brien v.
Comstock Foods, Inc., 194 A.2d 568, 571 (Vt. 1963).
442See Classic Auto Sales, Inc. v. Schocket, 832 P.2d 233, 238 (Colo. 1992);
Longines-Wittnaver Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 209 N.E.2d 68, 79 (N.Y. 1965).
443See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 230-31 (6th Cir. 1972);
Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 276 F. Supp. 259, 261-63 (D. Md. 1967); Longines-Wittnaver, 209

N.E.2d at 79.
4
44 See In-Flight, 466 F.2d at 230-31; Tomashevsky, 715 F. Supp. at 1565-66; Keckler, 248 F.
Supp. at 650.
44595 U.S. 714, 719 (1877) ("It appears from the record .
.
446See, e.g., Neff v. Pennoyer, 17 F. Cas. 1279, 1288 (D. Ore. 1875) (No. 10,083) ("Every

fact necessary to sustain the jurisdiction, must appear from the record or the judgment is void.").
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jurisdiction.44 7 It was not that the opinion failed to ask the right questions;
to the contrary, many of the issues it raised were prescient. The problem,
instead, was that when there was no factual support for the right answers,
the court made them up.
For example, Titan argued that it had no jurisdictionally significant
contacts with Illinois because it had no agents or offices there, solicited no
business there, and had no physical presence there.448 The court conceded
that "[t]he record fail[ed] to disclose whether defendant ha[d] done any
other business in Illinois, either directly or indirectly" 449 and that "the
record [did] not disclose the volume of Titan's business or the territory 45in
0
which appliances incorporating its valves [were] marketed.,
Nonetheless, the court assumed that because one valve had entered Illinois,
a "reasonable inference" could be drawn that Titan's commercial
transactions, "like those of other manufacturers, result[ed] in substantial
use and consumption in this State."4 51 The court evidently bore some
discomfort with this inference-based analysis since its entire discussion
as "may be," "undoubtedly," "to a
was hedged with such modifiers
452
"presumably.,
and
degree,"
On this basis alone it would be easy to dismiss Gray. However, since
inferences do serve a legitimate function in the jurisdictional analysis, it is
appropriate to inquire as to the nature of that function and then determine if
it was properly applied in Gray.
447See Sorg, supra note 51 (stating that Gray's inference of substantial contacts was
"unsupported by the record").
" 8Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (Ill. 1961).
9
4 1d. at 764.
450
1d. at 766.
451

1d

452

1d"

While the record does not disclose the volume of Titan's business or the territory
in which appliances incorporating its valves are marketed, it is a reasonable inference

that its commercial transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial
use and consumption in this State. To the extent that its business may be directly
affected by transactions occurring here it enjoys benefits from the laws of this State,
and it has undoubtedly benefited, to a degree, from the protection which our law has
given to the marketing of hot water heaters containing its valves. Where the alleged
liability arises, as in this case, from the manufacture of products presumably sold in
contemplation of use here, it should not matter that the purchase was made from an
independent middleman or that someone other than the defendant shipped the product
into this State.
Id (emphasis added).
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What function, then, do inferences serve in the jurisdictional analysis?
In the best case scenario, the defendants will concede that they engaged in
conduct purposefully directed toward the forum whose benefits and
protections they received. These defendants, however, will not be
contesting jurisdiction. In a more realistic scenario, the defendant's
forum-related activities will be extracted during discovery and may give
rise to inferences of jurisdictionally significant contacts. Therefore,
because the minimum contacts analysis arises only in the context of a
dispute, and because a disputing defendant will surely never concede such
contacts, a finding of jurisdictionally sufficient conduct necessarily must
be based on inferences. The question then becomes, when is the drawing
of inferences reasonable?
The United States Supreme Court has addressed this issue in several
personal jurisdiction cases. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
made recurring references to the need for record proof of jurisdictional
facts.453 It rejected the plaintiffs effort "to base jurisdiction on one,
' 54
isolated occurrence and whatever inferences can be drawn therefrom. A
The Court criticized "the inference that because one automobile sold by
petitioners had been used in Oklahoma, others might have been used there
455
also" as less than compelling on the facts.
Similarly, Shaffer v. Heitner referred to the lack of record facts when it
rejected Heitner's argument that the acceptance of board and executive
positions with a Delaware corporation were jurisdictionally significant
45 8
acts.456 Both Calder v. Jones457 and Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
relied on statistical analyses of the volume of the defendants' market
activity to support inferences of targeting and intent to cause effects within
the forum. For example, the Calder opinion stated that the disputed issue
of the National Enquirer had international and national circulation of
5,292,200 copies, 604,431 of which had been sold in California. 45 9 The
4"444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (declining jurisdiction over the retailer and wholesaler because it
found "in the record before us a total absence of those affiliating circumstances that are a
necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court jurisdiction.") (emphasis added). Later in the
opinion the Court reiterated that "[tihere is no evidence of record that any automobiles
distributed by World-Wide are sold to retail customers outside this tristate area." Id. at 298
(emphasis
added).
454
1d. at 295 (emphasis added).
455
1d. at 298 (emphasis added).
456433 U.S. 186, 215-16 (1977).
457465 U.S. 783, 785 n.2 (1984).
4"465 U.S. 770, 772 (1984).
419465 U.S. at 785 n.2.
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Keeton opinion upheld New Hampshire's jurisdiction over an Ohio
corporation because it regularly sold between 10,000 and 15,000 copies of
its magazine in New Hampshire every month. 460 Even the Asahi opinions
recounted the record facts that "Cheng Shin bought and incorporated into
its tire tubes 150,000 Asahi valve assemblies in 1978; 500,000 in
1979; 500,000 in 1980; 100,000 in 1981; and 100,000 in 1982. Sales to
Cheng Shin accounted for 1.24 percent of Asahi's income in 1981 and 0.44
percent in 1982. '' 461

These Supreme Court cases uniformly instruct that the correct use of
inferences in the jurisdictional analysis requires a critical threshold of
record facts. Gray inverted this principle. Based on the presence of
Titan's single valve in Illinois, Gray inferred that Titan had engaged in
substantial commercial activity in Illinois that satisfied minimum contacts.
In short, Gray inferred facts from which it then inferred their jurisdictional
significance. However, without evidence of a more substantial connection
between Titan and the forum, a contemporary inference-based analysis will
not support jurisdiction resting on even the acknowledged presence of a
single valve within the forum.462
2. Burden of Proof
Gray's inference-based analysis also altered the burden of proof that is
required to establish minimum contacts. In a typical minimum contacts
analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving the defendant's
jurisdictionally sufficient contacts with the forum.463 If met, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to rebut the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction. 464 Gray's inference-based analysis, however, created a virtual
presumption of jurisdictionally sufficient contacts once the plaintiff
460465

U.S. at 772.

461Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987).

Dayton, supra note 3, at 263 (raising the possibility that the stream of commerce
theory evolved from the "single act doctrine" of jurisdiction). The "single act doctrine" upheld
jurisdiction on the basis of a defendant's single contact that had a substantial connection to the
forum. As applied to the instant case, would Titan's single contact with Illinois by virtue of the
presence of its one valve there have satisfied the "single act doctrine?" The answer to this
question may be found in Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 650 (N.D. Ill.
1965), which stated that to satisfy due process the record must contain sufficient facts to support
a reasonable inference. Keckler was decided two years after Gray by a federal district court
sitting in the Northern District of Illinois. See also supra notes 344-357.
463See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,469 (1985) (explaining that the initial
burden is on the plaintiff to establish the defendant's minimum contacts with the forum).
46Id.at 477.
462See
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established a connection between the injury and the product.465 At that
point, the burden shifted to the defendant to rebut the significance of the
presumed contacts.466 The only way Titan could have rebutted that
presumption was to disprove inferences of jurisdictional facts that did not
exist in the record. The burden of proving a double negative was
compounded by the fact that as a bit player in the chain of distribution,
Titan was perhaps the least likely of defendants to have control over the
destination of its valve. Hence, Gray's inference-based analysis posed a
heads-I-win-tails-you-lose proposition, leaving no way for Titan to oust the
Illinois court of jurisdiction.
B. Statutory Construction
467

Gray found that Titan had committed a "tortious act" in Illinois
notwithstanding Titan's argument that there was an important distinction
between the commission of "a tortious act" and the commission of a "tort":
a "tort" was the series of occurrences that became cognizable only after
every element of the prima facie case was complete, whereas a "tortious
act" was the breach of duty element of the prima facie case.468 Titan
argued that by specifying a "tortious act" rather than a "tort,"
section 17(1)(b) required the breach of duty element to occur in
Illinois. Because Titan's duty could have been breached only in Ohio, it
could not be subject to Illinois's statutory jurisdiction. 469 The court,
''7
however, dismissed Titan's distinctions as "technicalities of definition A 0
because its wrongful conduct resulted in an injury in Illinois.47'
In retrospect, it is easy to find fault with this conclusion. From a literal
point of view, there clearly is a difference between "in"and "out," and
465See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1978) (denying jurisdiction,
and

criticizing Gray for the proposition that "jurisdiction is presumed unless the defendant can prove
that the presence of the product in the forum state was an unforeseeable event.") (emphasis
omitted).
466See supra note 51
467

Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (111.1961).
1d. at 763. For support of this argument see, e.g., E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Construction
and Application of State Statutes or Rules of Court PredicatingIn Personam Jurisdictionover
Nonresidents or Foreign Corporationson the Commission of a Tort Within the State, 24 A.L.R.
3d. 532, 577 (1969). See also Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last
Vestige, 74 MtNN. L. REv. 37, 55 n.85 (1989) (characterizing Gray's statutory construction of
"tortious act" as "tortuous").
469Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
470
1d. at 763.
47 1
1d. at 762.
468
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"tort" and "tortious act." Section 17(l)(b) called for the commission of a
tortious act in Illinois by the defendant.4 72 Since Titan had no activities in
Illinois, the court connected Titan's Ohio conduct to Illinois via the last act
doctrine to make the place of injury the jurisdictionally dispositive fact.
By giving "place of injury" jurisdictional significance, the court confused
the cognizability of the claim with the jurisdictional amenability of the
defendant. However, even assuming that injury in Illinois renders a claim
cognizable there, it is not inevitable that jurisdiction will exist wherever
cognizability arises. That is why the jurisdictional analysis is separate
from the cognizability analysis. However, once the cognizability and
amenability analyses are collapsed into each other, all subsequent
jurisdictional analysis becomes meaningless.
Even assuming that a "tortious act" did occur in Illinois,
section 17(1)(b) required the act to be committed by the defendant.473
Gray's statutory analysis would have been plausible had section 17(l)(b)
called for the commission of a tortious act by the defendant outside of
Illinois having effects in Illinois. 474 Section 17(1)(b), however, did not
base jurisdiction on the consequences of conduct in Illinois, but rather on
conduct in Illinois. 475 The effect of imputing jurisdictional significance to
plaintiffs place of injury was that the defendant's conduct became both
jurisdictionally irrelevant yet actionable anywhere the plaintiff suffered the
47 6
injury.

In sum, the confusion of cognizability with amenability, conduct with
consequences, tort with tortious act, and plaintiff with defendant combined
to create the proposition that tortious conduct committed anywhere is
actionable wherever its effects are felt. This analysis permits a construct of
472ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, para. 17(1)(b) (1959) (current version at 735
ILL. COMP. STAT.

5/2-209
(2003)).
473
1d.
474See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3(d) (2003) (allowing personal
jurisdiction over a
person "causing tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this commonwealth."); see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-103(b)(4) (2002)
(empowering courts to assert jurisdiction over a defendant causing "tortious injury in the
State... by an act or omission outside the State if he regularly does or solicits business, engages
in any other persistent course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from goods,
food, services, or manufactured products used or consumed in the State.") (emphasis added).
4 75
ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 110, para. 17(l)(b) (1959) (current version at 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT.
5/2-209
(2003)).
476
See Brilrmayer, supra note 52, at 95 (discussing legal causation and responsibility).
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"strict jurisdiction" that is analogous to the construct of "strict liability": It
creates jurisdictional amenability wherever the plaintiff suffers injury, not
where the defendant engages in misconduct. 477 As applied to the stream of
commerce, strict jurisdiction yields a principle without limitation since it
permits jurisdictional amenability to travel with the product. In 1980, the
World-Wide Volkswagen Court expressly repudiated this concept lest
"[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for
service of process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel...
• [W]e ...
are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in the present
478
case."
C. ConstitutionalAnalysis
Gray's due process analysis profoundly distorted the relationship
between the minimum contacts doctrine and stream of commerce
jurisdiction. The discordance was based on two false assumptions. First,
Gray assumed that stream of commerce jurisdiction had to satisfy the
minimum contacts doctrine in order to satisfy procedural due process.
Second, Gray assumed that stream of commerce jurisdiction was tort-based
rather than contract-based. Both of these assumptions were consistent with
the prevailing jurisdictional norms of the 1950s. However, both
assumptions have proven to be false in light of subsequent jurisdictional
developments.
1. How Gray Distorted the Relationship Among Procedural Due
Process, the Minimum Contacts Doctrine and Stream of
Commerce Jurisdiction
a. ProceduralDue Process
Procedural
individual and
state's power
property. 479 In

due process is rooted in the relationship between the
the state as constrained by constitutional limitations on the
to take action against such person's life, liberty, or
the civil context, jurisdictional due process 480 seeks to

477See Brilmayer, supra note 52. But see Currie, supra note 68, at 533 (agreeing with Gray's
statutory construction of § 17(1)(b)).
478World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980).
4 79
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (holding that due
process protects the individual's liberty interest); Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 89 (stating that
due process places limitations on a state's ability to deprive an individual of property and
requires justification for a state's imposition of legal burdens); ERWIN CHEMERiNSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 419 (Aspen Law & Business (1997)) ("The
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balance a defendant's liberty interest in protecting property against the
state's interest in compelling the defendant to submit to judicial
proceedings that place such property at risk.48 1 The defendant's liberty
interest has been characterized as freedom from inconvenient 48 2 or
distant483 or extraterritorial litigation 484 that is so burdensome 485 as to

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . provide that neither the United States nor [any] state
governments shall deprive any person 'of life, liberty or property without due process of law."').
480
Richman, supra note 3, at 609-10 (proposing that jurisdictional theory may be rooted in
either substantive or procedural due process or may be an independent third category of due
process, "jurisdictional due process").
48lMathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (setting
forth a three part
proportionality test by which the adequacy of procedural safeguards are balanced against the
importance of the individual's interest and the burden imposed on the government in providing
the additional safeguards).
482World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that minimum
contacts protect a
"defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum"); Richman, supra
note 3, at 610 (stating that one of the limitations on jurisdiction is protecting a defendant from
inconvenience); Currie, supra note 71, at 535 (explaining that due process protects a defendant
from inconvenience).
483World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that minimum contacts protect
a
defendant from "the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum"); Brilmayer, supra
note 52, at 84-85 (implying that due process protects a defendant from distant travel). But see
Currie, supra note 71 (stating that due process protects a defendant not from distant litigation but

from submission to a foreign sovereign since a courthouse within the forum state could be further
away from the defendant than a neighboring state's courthouse).
484The distinction between "burdensome" and "extraterritorial" litigation was first raised
by
Currie, supra note 71, at 534 (stating that due process would permit a resident of Texarkana,
Texas to be sued 900 miles away in El Paso but not across town in Texarkana, Arkansas if
minimum contacts did not otherwise exist between the defendant and Arkansas). The distinction
was also raised by Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 80-87; see also Phillips Pet. Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (stating that travel to another forum is a litigation burden entitled to
protection in the context of personal jurisdiction over absent plaintiff class members).
485See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92 (stating that minimum contacts
protect a
defendant from burdensome litigation); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.20 (1977)
(implying that due process protects a defendant from burdensome litigation); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) ("To require the corporation... to defend the suit away
from its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been
thought to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process."). But see McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) ("[M]odern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."). See also Murphy, supra note 4, at
291 ("When a state asserts jurisdiction over a nonresident in excess of its sovereign power it acts
without authority and, thus, in violation of defendant's due process interests."); Richman, supra
note 3, at 609 (stating that the assertion of personal jurisdiction may violate due process "if the
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impair or destroy the defendant's ability to defend in a "meaningful
way. 486 The defendant's due process interest has been described as
freedom from the jurisdictional surprise 4 87 of being haled into a forum with
which it lacks the requisite constitutional relationship.4 88

forum is so distant and the defendant's witnesses and evidence so difficult to transport that, as a
practical matter, trial at the forum amounts to no process at all").
4S6Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 ("The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' (quoting Armstrong
380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
v. Monzo,
487
3ee World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297 ("The Due Process Clause, by ensuring
the
'orderly administration of the laws,' gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that
allows potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.") (internal citation omitted);
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating due process requires that individuals
have "fair warning that a particular activity may subject [them] to the jurisdiction of a foreign
sovereign"). See also Currie, supra note 71, at 535 (stating that due process protects against
unfair surprise); Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New Worldfor PersonalJurisdiction: Flexible
Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984) (explaining that one function of
the minimum contacts test is to determine "whether a reasonable person in the defendant's
position should be surprised by having to defend ... in the plaintiffs chosen forum"). But see
Richman, supra note 3, at 610 ("Sometimes protecting the defendant from jurisdictional surprise
...is
an important consideration; other times not.").
488
See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-72 (1985) (stating that due
process protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to jurisdiction in a forum
where he lacks minimum contacts); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295 (refusing to
exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the record presented "a total absence of
those affiliating circumstances that are a necessary predicate to any exercise of state-court
jurisdiction"); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 204 (stating that personal jurisdiction requires a "relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation"). Other relationships between the defendant
and the state traditionally have been held to satisfy jurisdiction. For example, the doctrine of
general jurisdiction allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who has
engaged in substantial activities over time within the forum even if the lawsuit is not related to
such activities. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-49 (1952)
(holding that substantial business activities within the forum justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction); Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdictionand Constitutional Theory-A Comment on
Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 698 (1991) (asserting that jurisdictional due
process is based on a reciprocal relationship between the defendant and the forum state); Lewis,
supra note 487, at 4 (implying that jurisdiction requires a reciprocal relationship between the
defendant and the forum state); Currie, supra note 71, at 533-42 (stating that due process
constrains a state from compelling a defendant to litigate in a forum with which he has no
relevant connection). See also Richman, supra note 3, at 635-37 (noting that appearance, waiver,
consent, physical presence in a forum when served, domicile, waiver by sanction, failure of
absent class plaintiff to opt out of class, and plaintiffs constructive consent to be served with a
counterclaim have been upheld as permissible justifications for personal jurisdiction).
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As against the defendant's interests, the state must protect two
fundamental interests. The state has an interest in protecting the integrity
of its political 489 and geographic sovereignty from both internal and
external threats, e.g., a nonresident who enters the state, violates its law,
harms a state citizen, and then absconds without accountability for either
the injury or the violation. 490 The state also has an interest in maintaining
the respect of other sovereigns that may be called upon to recognize and
enforce that state's judicial authority over the absconding defendant.
Procedural due process balances the competing interests of ' the
4 91
defendant and the state against the standard of "fundamental fairness.
4 t9

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the minimum contacts doctrine
"acts . . . to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits
See

imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system"); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
204 n.20 (asserting that due process protects defendants from burdensome litigation and the
states from each other); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (holding that one of the
principal purposes of due process is to preserve the territorial sovereignty of the several states).
See generally Bruce N. Morton, Contacts, Fairness and State Interests: Personal Jurisdiction

After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 9 PACE L. REv 451, 459 (1989)
(observing that limitations on state sovereignty have traditionally served as limitations on state
jurisdiction).
49
.See Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (stating that restrictions on state
jurisdiction are in part "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective
States"); Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722 ("[Elvery State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory ....[N]o State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory."). See also Linda S.
Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual

Personal Jurisdiction, 27 TEX. INT'L L.J. 323, 363 (1992) (stating that territoriality has
historically justified the exercise of personal jurisdiction). The function of geographic borders in
the jurisdictional context was addressed by Terry S. Kogan, Geography And Due Process: The
Social Meaning of Adjudicative Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 627-53 (1991). Critical

human geography theorists contend that human perceptions of "geographic space" have changed
dramatically since Pennoyer v. Neff due to developments in transportation, communication, etc.,
thus rendering state geographic borders less important today than in the past. This proposition is
clearly correct, especially when viewed in the context of cyberspace jurisdiction. The second
half of the proposition, however, assumes that because communication and transportation have
changed so has human nature. While there may be some validity to this proposition, it is
probably still reasonable to expect that state elected judges and local jurors will tend to favor the
familiar
local plaintiff over the unfamiliar, non-local defendant.
49 1
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987) (stating that
jurisdiction must not be unfair); Philips Pet. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985) (explaining
that due process requires that forum-imposed litigation burdens be fair); Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 487 (explaining that jurisdiction must be fundamentally fair); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (stating that due process is satisfied when the
defendant's relationship with the forum does not offend "fair play and substantial justice")
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Fundamental fairness requires the existence of a constitutionally sufficient
relationship between the defendant and the state to justify the state's
exercise of jurisdictional authority over the defendant. Historically, the
justifications for this relationship have been based on the doctrines of
presence and consent and their various conceptual permutations.492 For
example, a state's jurisdictional authority will be justified by a defendant's
presence in the state when served,493 or consent to suit before the tribunals
of that state.4 94
When there is no actual presence or consent, the minimum contacts
doctrine permits jurisdiction over a defendant who has developed a
(internal citation omitted); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 ("The protection against
inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of. . . 'fairness'."); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at
207 (holding that the standards of fairness and substantial justice set forth in InternationalShoe
apply to in rem as well as inpersonam actions); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (stating that the exercise of personal jurisdiction must not offend "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))). See
also Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and
Constitutional Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 682 (1991)
("InternationalShoe ... attempted to introduce into jurisdictional analysis the traditional due
process concern with fundamental procedural fairness."); Currie, supra note 71, at 535 (stating
that "due process embodies a test of fundamental fairness").
492See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) ("Domicile in the state
is alone
sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction."). See also
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: a Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569,
578-84 (1958) (presenting a history of the consent and presence doctrines in the jurisdictional
context which sets forth as traditional justifications for the exercise of jurisdiction domicile,
physical power, voluntary submission, express consent, coerced implied consent, appearance and
engaging in business activities within the state that give rise to the claim); Mullenix, supra note
490, at 363 (stating that historically personal jurisdiction looked to territoriality, presence,
domicile
or consent to validate personal jurisdiction).
493
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 612 (1990). The Court agreed to this
proposition but split four-four over whether service in the forum on a physically present
defendant satisfied due process because it satisfied minimum contacts requirements or because
such service has historically always been acceptable. See also Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp.
442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (upholding Arkansas's jurisdiction over a defendant who was served
with Arkansas process while on an airplane flying over Arkansas); SHREVE AND
RAVEN-HANSEN, supranote 53, at 30-34 ("Amenability to suit can be seen as a fair exchange for
the benefits and protection which the defendant enjoys from state citizenship.").
49 4
1n addition to express consent and the filing of a general appearance, courts have also
based "consent" on contractual provisions, Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311,
316 (1964); waiver, Lewis, supra note 487, at 3; discovery sanctions, Ins. Corp. of Ir., v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 705 (1982); and statutory presumptions, Hess

v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
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constitutionally sufficient relationship with the forum. The justification for
minimum contacts jurisdiction is the implied consent of the defendant to be
sued in a state for claims arising from activities it purposefully directed
there and from which it derived benefits.49 5 The exchange of forum
benefits for forum obligations creates the constitutional relationship that
satisfies procedural due process. In this sense, the minimum contacts
doctrine is a means, but not the sole means, of satisfying procedural due
process.
b. Minimum Contacts
(i)

Quid Pro Quo

According to the minimum contacts doctrine,4 96 if by the "quality and
nature" 497 of the defendant's acts in the forum, or acts outside of the forum
having effects in the forum, the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
benefits and protections of the forum, then the exercise of personal
jurisdiction will comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" because litigation in the forum related to those acts will
be reasonably foreseeable by that defendant. 498 To be jurisdictionally
significant, the defendant's acts must be purposeful, 499 the possibility of
49 5

See Int 'lShoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power of the defendant's person.... But now...
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
496
See id
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. (quoting
Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463).
497
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The application of that rule will vary with
the quality and nature of the defendant's activity .... ");see Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319
("Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity.
...1').
498

8ee supra note

496.
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) ("The 'substantial
connection,' between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of minimum
contacts must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum
499
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suit in the forum foreseeable, 500 and all must arise from the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation. 50 1 Activities occurring
outside of that relationship are not jurisdictionally significant. 50 2 Thus, the
unilateral acts of others are not jurisdictionally significant,50 3 nor are the
fortuitous, isolated, or casual acts of the defendant that are unrelated to the
claim. 5 4 Jurisdictional significance is achieved only when the defendant
purposefully engages in forum directed activities that give rise to the
lawsuit and from which it derives forum benefits. 5 Case law and custom
State.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
474 (1985) ("[T]he constitutional touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully
established 'minimum contacts' in the forum State.") (emphasis added); Hanson, 357 U.S. at
253 ("[lIt is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits
and protections of its laws.") (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319) (emphasis added).
5
°°See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("But the
foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . .is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.").
50 1
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 327 (1980) ("In determining whether a particular
exercise of state-court jurisdiction is consistent with due process, the inquiry must focus on 'the
relationship among the defendant, the forum and the litigation."' (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 204 (1977))); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 ("The relationship between
the defendant and the forum must be such that it is 'reasonable ...to require the corporation to
defend
the particular suit which is brought there."') (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
502
See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296 (rejecting the jurisdictional significance of
the defendant's out of state commercial sales activities that were not directed to the forum lest
"[e]very seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of process. His
amenability to suit would travel with the chattel."); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 (rejecting the
jurisdictional significance of the defendant's ownership of stock located in Delaware and the
assumption of board and executive positions with a Delaware corporation because neither had
anything "to do with the State of Delaware"); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 (stating that a
corporation's "single or isolated ...activities in a state ... are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes
of action unconnected with the activities there").
503
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("The unilateralactivity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.")
(emphasis added).
5
°4See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480 (stating that minimum contacts were satisfied because
defendant's relationship with a forum company could "in no sense be viewed as 'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated"'). See also supra note 502.
5
.SeeInt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and,
so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a
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have come to characterize this relationship among the defendant, the
50 6
forum, and the litigation as "the purposeful acts doctrine."
However, it is more accurate to say that minimum contacts jurisdiction
is based on a reciprocal relationship of mutual obligations and benefits as
between the defendant and the forum; in essence, a quid pro quo of
constitutional significance. 0 7 The defendant's receipt of benefits from its
purposeful forum-related activities justifies the state's authority to
50 8
adjudicate claims against that defendant based on those activities.
Hence, minimum contacts theory gives the defendant a choice: It can
engage in conduct that gives rise to the quid pro quo or it can avoid the
quid pro quo by refraining from such conduct. 0 9
Courts have given broad rein to the manner in which the quid pro quo
relationship can be established. Conduct satisfying this relationship has
"deliberate," 5''I
"purposeful,"51
as
described
variously
been

suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be
undue.
Id.
5
°6See Hanson, 357
507

U.S. at 253. See also supra note 499.

ee Maltz, supra note 488, at 698 (providing the following explanation for the quid pro

quo:
The individuals are entitled to invoke the protection of the government for
themselves and their property; in return, they are required to submit to the
laws and institutional controls of that government. This view of the
relationship between individuals and government was central to nineteenth
century jurisprudence.
Moreover, it remains intact and unchallenged

[today].
508

See supra note 505.

509See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

When a corporation "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum State," it has clear notice that it is subject
to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of burdensome litigation by
procuring insurance,passing the expected costs onto customers, or, if the
risks are too great, severing its connection with the State.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
51°See supra note 499.
5"See generally W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc., 337 N.W.2d 676 (Minn. 1983) (denying
jurisdiction because the record lacked evidence of the defendant's deliberate contact with
Minnesota); Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 91 (stating that finding jurisdiction is easy "when the
defendant has a 'deliberate impact' in the forum"); Moe, supra note 134, at 212, 212 n.66 and
cases cited therein.
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"intentional,' 51 2 or "voluntary '5 1 3 with respect to either the acts themselves
or their consequences.51 4 The quid pro quo establishes the defendant's
knowledge

si

1

awareness,51 6 expectation, 5 17 or control 515 of its conduct. By

requiring some level of volition on the defendant's part, the minimum
contacts doctrine strives to satisfy procedural due process concerns with
the fair and fore warning that allows "potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit.

' 51 9

To this end, the quid pro

quo protects an unsuspecting defendant from being haled into a foreign
forum to defend against litigation arising from circumstances about which
the defendant lacked knowledge, awareness, or control. It is at this
juncture of the analysis, however, where the harmony among the minimum
contacts doctrine, procedural due process and stream of commerce
jurisdiction breaks down.
There are significant behavioral and legal differences between
"intentional," "purposeful," "knowledgeable" and "merely aware" states of
mind. Each implicates a different degree of volition and control.
512See Moe, supra note 134, at 213, 213 n.67 and cases cited therein.
5 13
See JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 4 (2d ed.,

Little, Brown & Co. 1992) ("[B]ecause the court's power to exercise jurisdiction derives from the
defendant's voluntary relation to the state, the power should be limited to cases arising out of that
relation.").
5 14
See Comments, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of
Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300, 308 (1970) (arguing that the purposeful act doctrine does not
require the defendant to "voluntarily" or "knowingly" associate with the forum, but rather, that
the defendant purposefully engage in conduct that results in an association with the state).
"Purposefulness," by this definition modifies the defendant's conduct, not the defendant's
association with the state. Other cases and commentators have held the opposite to be true: that
the defendant must "directly or indirectly" involve the forum state for its actions to satisfy the
purposeful availment requirement. See also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987) ("The 'substantial connection,' between the defendant and the forum State
necessary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defendant
purposefully
directed toward the forum state.") (internal citation omitted) (emphasis omitted).
5 15
See Moe, supra note 134, at 212, 212 n.63 and cases cited therein.
516See Moe, supra note 134, at 212, 212 n.63 and cases cited therein. See also World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (stating that the defendant must be
aware that its product will enter a consumer market in a foreign state in order to take measures to
itself).
protect
5 17
See Moe, supra note 134, at 219, 223 (discussing expectation theory).
5 18
See Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 95 (discussing the reasons for limiting jurisdiction to
cases where the defendant has control over the location of the product).
519World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. See also Brilmayer, supra note 52 (discussing
Professor Brilmayer's analysis of why such jurisdictional exercises are unconstitutional).
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Intentional conduct implies intended consequences. The same inference
cannot be drawn from conduct arising from a "merely aware" state of
mind. Similarly, differences exist between "deliberate" and "voluntary"
conduct. Nonetheless, the "purposeful act doctrine" has been loosely
drawn to encompass forum-related activities that are not otherwise
isolated, singular, fortuitous, unrelated to the claim, 520 or committed
unilaterally by others. 21
Pursuant to the minimum contacts doctrine, a component part
manufacturer could "purposefully" sell its widget to an ultimate
manufacturer with "knowledge" that the final product will course its way
to destinations "unknown" and beyond the defendant's "control." The
vagaries of these states of mind raise many questions: Which of these
states of mind is jurisdictionally significant? Will .the purposefulness of
the sale of the widget trump the lack of knowledge of the product's
destination, or vice versa? If the claim is for personal injuries arising from
a defective widget rather than for economic injuries arising from the sale of
the widget between manufacturers and merchants, will the
"purposefulness" of the sale be relevant when the court is exercising
specific jurisdiction? Similarly, when jurisdiction is specific, will the lack
of control or knowledge of the product's ultimate destination cancel out the
component manufacturer's purposeful placement of the widget into the
stream of commerce? Consider also, that the conduct that connects the
component manufacturer to the forum requires the commercial transactions
of numerous stream participants. Will the unilateral act/purposeful act
doctrines cancel out these direct and indirect forum connections as well?
These questions are raised simply to illustrate the rift between stream of
commerce jurisdiction and the minimum contacts doctrine.
(ii) Fairness
The second level of the minimum contacts doctrine requires the
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant to be "fair" notwithstanding the
existence of the quid pro quo.5 22 The "fairness" analysis examines factors

520See supra note 504.
52 1

See supra note 503.
See World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the evaluation of the litigation
burdens imposed on the defendant "is typically described in terms of 'reasonableness' or
'fairness'); Kulko v. Superior Court of Cal. ex rel. S.F., 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (stating that
jurisdiction will be fair if there is "a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum
State . . . to require defense of the action in the forum"); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 206
5 22
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that are extrinsic to the quid pro quo, such as the plaintiffs interest in
convenient and effective relief in an available forum,523 the forum state's
interest in adjudicating the dispute,524 and the judiciary's interest in the
efficient administration of justice. 2 5
The relationship between the quid pro quo and the fairness factors is
unclear. Although fairness factors extrinsic to the relationship between the
defendant and the forum may be considered "in an appropriate case,"
theoretically such factors should not displace the quid pro quo.526 For
example, the fairness analysis may weigh in favor of personal jurisdiction
when minimum contacts are weak.527 Or, the fairness analysis may inveigh
against personal jurisdiction when minimum contacts are strong. But the
fairness analysis should not unilaterally create jurisdiction in the absence
of the quid pro quo. In other words, the fairness analysis may strengthen a
weak case of minimum contacts to enable personal jurisdiction to comply
with procedural due process; or, the fairness analysis may weaken a strong
case of minimum contacts when personal jurisdiction would offend due
process; but there should be no case for exercising personal jurisdiction
when there is no quid pro quo relationship between the defendant and the
forum, notwithstanding the strength of the fairness factors.
The fairness analysis, like the quid pro quo requirement, is a means to
the end of linking the minimum contacts doctrine to procedural due
(1977) ("[T]he standard of fairness.., set forth in InternationalShoe should be held to govern
actions
in rem as well as in personam.") (emphasis omitted).
52 3
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (finding that the
plaintiff had only a slight interest in California's assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi);
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the evaluation of the litigation burdens
imposed on the defendant can take into account "the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient
and effective
relief").
524
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 (finding that the forum state's interest in exercising jurisdiction
over Asahi was slight); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the
reasonableness of imposing litigation burdens on a defendant may be evaluated in terms of "the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute"). See also Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 105-06
(discussing the redundancy of including the forum state's interest in the fairness analysis).
125World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292 (stating that the
reasonableness of imposing
litigation burdens on a defendant may take into account "the interstate judicial system's interest
in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies").
526
1d. (stating that the reasonableness of imposing litigation burdens on a defendant "will in
an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors").
527Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (upholding
jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant whose forum contacts were weak but over whom the exercise of
jurisdiction satisfied the fairness factors, which "sometimes serve to establish the reasonableness
ofjurisdiction upon a lesser showing of minimum contacts than would otherwise be required").
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process. The fairness analysis serves as an additional check on the state's
imposition of litigation burdeits on the defendant. However, fairness
alone, without the quid pro quo, can never be constitutionally sufficient to
satisfy due process. Thus, jurisdictional due process can never
fundamentally be about fairness.

c. Stream of Commerce Jurisdiction
Stream of commerce jurisdiction renders a participant in a chain of
distribution subject to the personal jurisdiction of a distant forum if, in
placing a product into a manufacturing or distribution network for ultimate
purchase by a consumer, the defendant engages in purposeful
forum-directed activity from which it derives forum benefits.52 8 The
imposition of litigation burdens on a stream participant is based on the
assumption that the entry of a product into a distant forum renders
52

Stream of Commerce jurisdiction has been variously defined as follows:
The stream-of-commerce theory developed as a means of sustaining
jurisdiction in products liability cases in which the product had traveled
through an extensive chain of distribution before reaching the ultimate
consumer. Under this theory, a manufacturer may be held amenable to
process in a forum in which its products are sold, even if the products were
sold indirectly through importers or distributors with independent sales and
marketing schemes. Courts have found the assumption of jurisdiction in
these cases to be consistent with the due process requirements identified
above: by increasing the distribution of its products through indirect sales
within the forum, a manufacturer benefits legally from the protection
provided by the laws of the forum state for its products, as well as
economically from indirect sales to forum residents. Underlying the
assumption of jurisdiction in these cases is the belief that the fairness
requirements of due process do not extend so far as to permit a
manufacturer to insulate itself from the reach of the forum state's long-arm
rule by using an intermediary or by professing ignorance of the ultimate
destination of its products.

DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 285 (3rd Cir. 1981). See also Richman,
supra note 3, at 624 (stating that the stream of commerce theory allows jurisdiction to be asserted
over a manufacturer, distributor or retailer of defective goods wherever these goods are
distributed, directly or indirectly, through a chain of distribution); Dayton, supra note 3, at 241
(stating that the stream of commerce doctrine permits jurisdiction to be asserted over a defendant
who markets its products to be carried by a stream into a remote jurisdiction); Moe, supra note
134, at 204 and n.9 (stating that the stream of commerce theory "permits the exercise of
jurisdiction over a manufacturer in a forum in which its products are sold indirectly through
importers or distributors with independent marketing schemes" and that its purpose is to subject
component part manufacturers to jurisdictional amenability notwithstanding their lack of direct
contact with the plaintiff, ignorance of the product's ultimate destination or control over the
distribution scheme).
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jurisdiction there foreseeable if the claim is related to the product's use in
that forum.
Thus, it is participation in the chain of distribution
accompanied by the expectation of consumer use in the forum that creates
the quid pro quo relationship between the defendant and the state. 529 For
example, Gray upheld personal jurisdiction over Titan because it placed its
valve into the chain of distribution in Ohio, presumably for use by a
consumer elsewhere.5 30 Conversely, World-Wide Volkswagen rejected
personal jurisdiction over the Audi wholesaler and retailer who
participated in a chain of distribution1 but had not directed their commercial
53
endeavors in or toward the forum.
After World- Wide Volkswagen, the idea of directing one's activities to a
particular forum gave rise, in the commercial context, to the concept of
"targeting a market." 532 If a defendant targeted a market by directing its
commercial activities there, and if the defendant derived benefits and
protections from that market, then jurisdiction over the defendant in that
forum for claims related to those activities satisfied minimum contacts.
What happens, however, when a defendant does not "target a market,"
but rather, is only one participant among many in a succession of sales of a
product that causes injury in a forum from which that defendant received
only indirect or intangible benefits?

533

Asahi's plurality opinions exposed

U.S. at 297-98 ("The forum State does not exceed its
powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that
delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased
by consumers in the forum State.").
53°Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. 1961).
531
444 U.S. at 298.
53
2Two of the earliest post-World-Wide Volkswagen cases to coin this phrase were: Stoutco,
Inc. v. Amma, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (stating that when a foreign
corporation "carr[ies] on conscious and deliberate activities within the state of Indiana with the
529World-Wide Volkswagen, 444

purpose of targeting the Indianamarket," due process is satisfied and the corporation's activities

thereby provide it with "notice that it is subject to suit in Indiana.") (emphasis added); and Strick
Corp. v. A.J.F. Warehouse Distribs., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 951, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding that a
Pennsylvania court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over an Illinois corporation under 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301(a)(2) (West 1981), which required that a defendant maintain
"continuous and systematic" business within the state, unless the plaintiff demonstrated that the

defendant "solicit[ed] business regularly and advertise[d] in a way specifically targeted at the
forum market") (emphasis added).

Glannon, supra note 513, at 9 (stating that the component part manufacturer does not
bring the product into the forum or initiate contact with the forum. Rather, it participates in a
succession of sales to others who eventually sell the finished product within the forum.);
Murphy, supra note 4, at 307 (stating that stream participants receive economic and legal benefits
from the efforts of other stream participants to market the product in the forum).
533See
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the confusion underlying this issue.534 The Asahi Court was unable to
agree on the nature or extent of the conduct that was jurisdictionally
significant in the stream of commerce context. The Court agreed, in
principle, on minimum contacts as a jurisdictional doctrine.535 It agreed, in
principle, on the relationship between minimum contacts and due
process. 536 However, it could not agree, in principle or in fact, on how a
stream participant demonstrated purposeful availment of forum benefits.5 37
Justice Brennan argued that mere placement of a product into a
commercial stream satisfied the purposeful availment requirement.5 38
Justice O'Connor argued that purposeful availment required conduct in
addition to mere awareness of the stream's course, such as advertising,
marketing, or developing customer relations in the forum.5 39 Legal
commentators quickly noted that Brennan's theory was so broad that it
lacked limiting principles,5 40 while O'Connor's theory was so narrow that
it excluded many stream participants who did not engage
in the kind of
54 1
significant.
jurisdictionally
deemed
she
that
activities
534

See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-12 (1987) (The
Asahi Court rendered three opinions on the issue of whether placing goods into a stream of
commerce was constitutionally sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the minimum contacts
doctrine.). Justice 0' Connor, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Scalia, argued
that a defendant's mere awareness that a product would follow a stream's course was insufficient
to satisfy minimum contacts if it was not attended by additional purposeful activity directed

toward the forum. Id. at 112. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, argued that mere placement of the product into a commercial stream was, itself,
sufficiently purposeful to satisfy minimum contacts. Id. at 116-21 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens argued that the jurisdictional significance of stream activity had to include an
evaluation of the volume, value and hazardous character of the product. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
535
See id. at 109. "'The constitutional touchstone' of ... due process [is] 'whether the
defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum State."' Id. at 108 (quoting
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
536
1d. at
537

108.
See Glannon, supra note 533; Dayton, supra note 3, at 251-55 (stating that the Court's

disagreements in Asahi over the stream of commerce theory stem from fundamental differences
concerning
the meaning of purposeful availment).
538
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17 (Brennan, J., concurring).
5391d. at 112.
540
See Murphy, supra note 4, at 301-11 (stating that Brennan's theory permits jurisdiction
whenever a purchaser brings the product into the forum); Moe, supra note 134, at 224 (stating
that Brennan's stream of commerce theory in Asahi requires proof of the defendant's knowledge
of forum
sales which may be difficult to obtain)..
54 1

See Sean K. Hornbeck, TransnationalLitigation and Personal JurisdictionOver Foreign

Defendants, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1389, 1414 (1996) (stating that O'Connor's opinion would
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Not surprisingly, post-Asahi case law became suffused with confusion,
controversy, and unresolved issues: Where does a stream begin? Where
does a stream end? Who are stream participants? What stream conduct
constitutes purposeful availment of forum benefits? Must a stream
defendant "know" of a product's destination, "intend" its destination, or
only be "aware" that the product is entering a stream somewhere and going
somewhere else? How much "control" if any, must a stream participant
exercise,
or
be
capable
of
exercising,
over
the
manufacture/distribution/economic network or its participants/the final
product and/or the product's destination to satisfy the purposeful availment
requirement? 542 Is the mass and geographically diffused marketing of
eliminate jurisdiction over component parts manufacturers because they do not or only rarely
engage in consumer-oriented activities in the forum state such as advertising or
marketing); Richman, supra note 3, at 625 (characterizing O'Connor's limitations on the stream
of commerce theory as "ominous" because they would insulate some stream participants from
suit); Leslie W. Abramson, Clarifying "FairPlay and SubstantialJustice": How the Courts
Apply the Supreme Court Standardfor Personal Jurisdiction, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441,
446, 446 n.31 (1991) (noting that stream of commerce jurisdiction provides no guidelines to
persons seeking to avoid jurisdiction); Murphy, supra note 4, at 311-14 n.274 (stating that
O'Connor's theory may exclude component part manufacturers because a stream participant may
lack intent to target a specific market); Stravitz, supra note 134, at 790 (stating that component
part manufacturers do not engage in the "designing," "advertising," or "marketing" activities that
O'Connor argues would demonstrate their purposeful targeting of the forum's market. Rather,
these are the activities of the manufacturer of the final products or their replacement
parts.); Moe, supra note 134, at 222-23 (stating that O'Connor's position "endangers" the stream
of commerce theory by imposing artificial barriers and failing "to comport with the realities of
international commerce"); Seidelson, supra note 134, at 578-79 (stating that component part
manufacturers do not do the things characterized by O'Connor as "additional purposeful
activity").
542
See Ruckstuhl v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 731 So. 2d 881, 887 n.5, 888-89
n.7
(La. 1999) (setting forth a detailed account of lower state court, as well as federal court responses
to the split Asahi decisions); Hornbeck, supra note 541, at 1420-23 (discussing lower court
confusion in applying the stream of commerce theory and citing specific case examples of postAsahi inconsistencies); Robert C. Casad, PersonalJurisdiction in Federal Question Cases, 70
TEX. L. REv. 1589, 1593 (1992) (stating that the lack of clear guidelines in stream of commerce
theory has caused confusion, inconsistent holdings and unpredictable results); Moe, supra note
134, at 213-15 (setting forth two "polar extreme" stream of commerce cases that reach opposite
holdings on similar facts: Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippen GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 511 (Alaska
1980), in which the Alaska Supreme Court permitted stream of commerce jurisdiction over a
German seat belt manufacturer because the defendant designed, manufactured and sold the seat
belts to a company that it knew would market the product throughout the U.S., and, in contrast,
Humble v. Toyota Motor Co., 727 F.2d 709, 710 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), which rejected
stream of commerce jurisdiction over a Japanese car seat manufacturer because, while use of the
product in the forum was foreseeable, suit there was not); Quesenberry, supra note 134, at 197
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voluminous quantities of product the constitutional equivalent of a single
instance of targeted marketing of
a product specifically designed and
543
designated for a particular forum?
In addition to these unanswered questions, stream of commerce
jurisdiction also suffers from the ubiquity of its scope. Stream of
commerce jurisdiction encompasses local, regional, national, panAmerican, and inter-global component part manufacturers, final
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, designers, and advertisers. 544
Consequently, it is difficult for a stream participant to know in advance
either what or where stream conduct will be jurisdictionally significant.
For example, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen declined to exercise
jurisdiction over World-Wide Volkswagen and Seaway because they had
conducted their primary commercial activities in New York and New
Jersey.545 Contrarily, the court in Gray upheld jurisdiction over Titan even
though it had conducted its primary commercial activities in Ohio.546 In
Asahi, Justice O'Connor refused to impute jurisdictional significance to
Cheng Shin's placement of a valve assembly into an international
economic network, 547 while Justice Brennan found jurisdictional
significance in the placement of the same valve into the same international
network.54 8
n.59 (noting that seven circuits follow Brennnan's approach while no more than three follow
O'Connor's approach). After Asahi, the application of the stream of commerce theory in product
liability
cases has yielded unpredictable results. Quesenberry, supra note 134, at 197 n.58.
543
Rockwell Int'l. Corp. v. Costruzioni Aeronautiche Giovanni Agusta S.p.A. and S.N.F.A.,
553 F. Supp. 328, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (upholding stream of commerce jurisdiction where the
product was "uniquely designed for incorporation" into the forum state's product).
"4 Hombeck, supra note 541, at 1447 (stating that in the international context,
Until the Supreme Court decidedly defines the role of minimum contacts
and the stream of commerce theory, litigants must gather a wide range of
evidence concerning a foreign manufacturer's design processes, marketing,
advertising, distribution system, customer support services, numerical sales,
and any other activity which proves or disproves that the manufacturer is
directly or indirectly servicing the forum's consumer market.
5

54 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980) (rejecting
jurisdiction in Oklahoma over New York and New Jersey defendants who confined their primary
commercial
activities to those states).
546
Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (I11.1961) (holding
that jurisdiction is proper in a distant forum when a manufacturer has contemplated that its
product will be used there).
547See supranote 534.
8
5 See supranote 534.
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Is it possible that one procedural construct can provide constitutional
justification for such diametrically opposed applications? The various and
inconsistent applications of the stream of commerce doctrine create
expensive and inefficient litigation burdens for defendants who cannot
predict the jurisdictional consequences of their actions and therefore
cannot protect themselves from jurisdictional amenability. Is this problem
itself a violation of due process?
The answer to this question is both "yes" and "no." The doctrinal flaws
of the stream of commerce theory are not a result of its economic network
premise, or the ubiquity of its scope. Rather, the problem with the stream
of commerce doctrine is that it has been presumed to be a subset of the
minimum contacts doctrine since its inception in Gray. Stream of
commerce jurisdiction was rooted in the assumption that it could satisfy
procedural due process only if it "fit" within the minimum contacts rubric.
Like the square peg that is pounded into the round hole, the stream of
commerce theory has been retrofitted into the minimum contacts doctrine.
The result is a jurisdictional doctrine that is forced and distorted. Thus, the
determination of whether stream of commerce jurisdiction satisfies due
process must begin with a challenge to the assumption that it must also
satisfy the minimum contacts doctrine. To do so we must return to Gray.
VI. WHY STREAM OF COMMERCE JURISDICTION Is NOT PART OF

THE MINIMUM CONTACTS DOCTRINE
It was important to the Illinois Supreme Court to frame the controlling
issue in Gray as constitutional rather than statutory. 549 However, by
framing the constitutional analysis in terms of "contacts," the Gray
decision imputed jurisdictional significance to conduct in which Titan did
not engage and overlooked conduct in which Titan did engage that also
satisfied procedural due process.
A. The Stream Of Commerce Bargain
What, then, did Titan do to justify jurisdictional amenability in Illinois?
Titan volitionally and voluntarily, albeit implicitly, entered into a bargain
with other stream participants to relinquish control over its product in order
to realize profit along the stream's course. 550 In effect, Titan consensually
549

See supra note 41.
°Gray, 176 N.E.2d at 765-66; see Dayton, supra note 3, at 270 (stating that a
manufacturer's contacts may be purposeful even though they are not direct). Asahi's contacts
55
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participated in a stream of commerce in order to benefit from the stream's
markets. By so doing, Titan entered into a relationship of reciprocal
benefits and obligations with a transactional network, not a forum. Titan's
role in that network both enabled and required it to forego specific contacts
with any particular forum in order to benefit from the network's access to
multiple forums.
If this characterization of Titan's conduct is true, then stream of
commerce jurisdiction is a very different construct than minimum contacts
jurisdiction. The following examples illustrate this proposition.
1. Forums vs. Markets
The minimum contacts model ofjurisdiction is forum-based. It requires
a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. 551 The
stream of commerce model of jurisdiction is market-based. It requires the
defendant to relinquish a direct relationship with any particular forum in
order to benefit from all the forums along the stream's path. 52 Similarly,
minimum contacts jurisdiction requires the defendant to avail itself
purposefully of a specific forum,553 whereas stream of commerce
jurisdiction requires its participants to relinquish control over their
products in order to benefit from the transactional networks that course

with California were the result of its own decision to sell its parts to a manufacturer who sold on
an international basis. Dayton, supra note 3, at 265.
551
See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977) ("[T]he relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation" has become "the central concern of the inquiry into
personal
jurisdiction.").
552
See Hutson v. Fehr Bros., 584 F.2d 833, 836-37 (8th Cir. 1978). The dissent argued that
due process does not insulate a stream participant from personal jurisdiction in a product liability
case because it used an intermediary in the sale and distribution of its product. Id. at 837-38
(Stephenson, J., dissenting). See also Dayton, supra note 3, at 270 (stating that stream
participants profit from the sales of their products by intermediaries); Murphy, supra note 4, at
307 (stating that although a stream defendant has no intent to market its product in a specific
forum it still receives substantial economic and legal benefits from the distribution efforts of
others in the forum); Stuart M. Riback, The Long Arm and Multiple Defendants: The Conspiracy
Theory of In Personarn Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 506, 518-19 (1984) (stating that a
stream defendant's contacts can be purposeful even though indirect).
553See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("[I]t is essential in each case that there
be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.") (citing
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 316, 319 (1945); Dayton supra note 3, at 256-58
(discussing the role of the "purposeful availment" requirement in the minimum contacts
doctrine); Currie, supra note 71, at 536 (discussing Hanson 's purposeful act doctrine);.
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through the markets of many forums.554 As a result, participation in a
stream of commerce often precludes a stream participant from dealing
directly with any particular forum and, consequently, from satisfying the
purposeful availment requirement of the minimum contacts doctrine. 555

2. Time and Space Barriers vs. Stream of Cosmos
The minimum contact doctrine is bounded by Pennoyeresquenotions of
time and space. 556 The defendant, or its conduct, or the consequences of its
conduct, must be placed in a specific place within a specific time frame.
Specific jurisdiction requires the claim to be based on the defendant's
activities occurring within those space-time boundaries. These time and
space requirements, however, are antithetical to stream of commerce
jurisdiction which, by definition, can be interstate, interglobal, and
indeterminate in destination and duration. 7 Indeed, with the increasing
globalization of commerce 558 a component part manufacturer can come
from one place 559 and do great harm in another place without ever
"purposefully" directing its conduct or its product anywhere. 560
3. Consent vs. Control
Under the minimum contacts doctrine, a defendant must have some
degree of control, knowledge, or awareness of its conduct, or the
consequences of its conduct, in order to satisfy the "purposeful availment"

554See Riback, supranote 552, at 519 (stating that a defendant who avails itself
of a channel

of distribution reaching into several states benefits from the privilege of delivering its product
into 555
each state and therefore should be subject to jurisdiction in those states).
See supra note 552; Trautman, supra note 55, at 162 (stating that the unilateral and
purposeful
act doctrines are difficult to apply in stream of commerce cases).
6
11 Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants,
69 VA. L. REv. 85,
108 (1983) (stating that because of Pennoyer's influence, "state boundaries continue to be
artificial
barriers to the exercise ofjurisdiction").
557
See Seidelson, supra note 134, at 583 (questioning Justice O'Connor's reluctance
to
impose jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when commerce is becoming increasingly
globalized).
558See Quesenbeny, supra note 134, at 206 (suggesting that the increasing
internationalization of trade is decreasing the importance of national borders).
559
See Seidelson, supra note 134, at 583 (suggesting that with the increasing
internationalization of trade, a component manufacturer could come from anywhere).
56°See Hombeck, supra note 541, at 1440 n.312 (stating that a defendant
can inflict great
harm within a forum without ever actively engaging in commerce there).
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requirement. 561 "Control," "knowledge," and "awareness," however, are
misnomers in the stream of commerce context since many stream
participants neither know nor care where a stream routes their product. 62
Nor may such information be market-knowable since a product can remain
in a stream years after it has been manufactured, discontinued, or its
manufacturer, itself, has relocated or gone out of business. This lack of
knowledge, control, or concern over a product's route renders the issue of
"foreseeable suit" in a particular forum, so important to the minimum
participants with no
contacts analysis, meaningless as applied to stream
563
ability independently to access specific forums.
Lack of control, knowledge, or awareness of a product's route does not
mean, however, that the stream participant's conduct is jurisdictionally
insignificant. To the contrary, component part manufacturers purposefully
participate in networks that connect to other networks in order to access
distant markets.564 In fact, a component manufacturer without a network of
other manufacturers, sellers, and distributors would be a jurisdictional
nonstarter since it has no independent access to consumer markets. Absent
a stream, the only "control" a component manufacturer could exercise over
its jurisdictional amenability would be to withdraw its product from the
stream and confine its distribution to its immediate locale.5 65 Such
56 1

See Murphy, supra note 4, at 298-99 (discussing the function of "control" when the
minimum contacts doctrine is applied to a stream participant); Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 96
(discussing the function of "control" in the minimum contacts doctrine)..
562
See Glannon, supra note 513 (stating that a stream participant may neither know nor care
where a stream takes its product); Murphy supra note 4, at 308 (stating that as a practical matter
a stream
defendant may not have knowledge of a stream's markets).
563
See Murphy, supra note 4, at 308 (explaining why a stream participant's position in a

distribution chain may eliminate its control over and knowledge of its product's route and
destination); Harry B. Cummins, In PersonamJurisdiction Over Nonresident Manufacturers in

Product Liability Actions, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028, 1031 (1965) (stating that a manufacturer's
lack of control over the process by which its product reaches the forum makes the requirement of
purposeful availment less meaningful).
564See Dayton, supra note 3, at 270 (stating that stream participants purposefully place their
products into a stream with the expectation of profit); Cummins, supra note 563, at 1033-34
(stating that a manufacturer's economic objectives are achieved wherever its product is
consumed).
565
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("When a
corporation 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,' it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate the risk of
burdensome litigation by... severing its connection with the State.") (citing Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Dayton, supra note 3, at 278 (stating that a stream participant can
control its jurisdictional amenability by contracting to limit its product's distribution or by
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"control," however, could significantly reduce the product's profitability
and possibly put the manufacturer out of business-an ironic perversion of a
jurisdictional theory that must accommodate, not frustrate, a capitalist
economy.
More importantly, minimum contacts' concern with "control" masks
the real issue of consent. Even though the jurisdictional consequences of
stream participation may be beyond a defendant's control, they are not
beyond its consent. 566 More likely, the commercial conduct that enables a
defendant to participate in, and benefit from, a stream's transactional
networks is both voluntary and consensual, not constructive or coerced. It
is indisputable that a defendant's voluntary and consensual conduct that
creates a cognizable relationship with a forum has a jurisdictional pedigree
that satisfies procedural due process.567
Although the Court has not directly addressed the issue of consent in
the stream of commerce context, two cases come close to illustrating this
point. International Shoe addressed the jurisdictional significance of
transacting business in the forum state by a defendant who had no physical
presence there.56 8 It upheld Washington's jurisdiction over a Missouri
corporation that had volitionally and consensually exploited business
opportunities in that forum. 56 9 Similarly, Burger King took within its
jurisdictional ambit the entire transaction that gave rise to a contract and its
breach-the pre-contract negotiations, contract terms, and post-contract
performance-and concluded that the defendant's volitional and consensual
bargain with the plaintiff satisfied procedural due process. 570 Like
International Shoe and Burger King, the stream of commerce theory
attaches jurisdictional significance to the bargain made between a stream
participant and a transactional network for the mutual benefit of each.57 1
By recognizing the jurisdictional significance of the transactional network,

dealing with distributors who limit the geographical distribution of their sales); Murphy, supra
note 4, at 308, 308 n.262 (stating that a defendant can avoid jurisdiction by limiting the
distribution
of its product). See also supra notes 561 and 563.
566
See Philip B. Kurland, supra note 492, at 578-82 (discussing the historical development of

consent in jurisdictional theory).
567See infra note 610.
568
1nt'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 313-14 (1945).
569
1d. at 320-21.

57

°Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-85 (1985).
57'See Hornbeck, supra note 541, at 1415-16 (discussing Brennan's theory of stream of
commerce jurisdiction).
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amenability
stream of commerce jurisdiction also recognizes jurisdictional
57 2
to suit wherever the defendant's bargain takes its product.
4. Tort vs. Transaction
The minimum contacts doctrine casts stream of commerce jurisdiction
as tort-based because it arises in the product liability context. However,
573
product liability claims are fundamentally non-waivable contract claims.
The failure of the stream of commerce doctrine to recognize this point has
resulted in considerable doctrinal confusion. For example, under the tort
model, the acts of design, manufacture, and distribution are jurisdictionally
significant but the commercial transactions that deliver the product to the
plaintiff are not. 574 Furthermore, specific jurisdiction renders the
commercial transactions of the component part manufacturer irrelevant
because the claim arises from the commission of a tort, not from a failed
business transaction. This distinction is important for several reasons.
First, a network of commercial transactions can span multiple forums
whereas a tort is generally localized to the place of manufacture, design, or
distribution. Consequently, jurisdictional amenability will expand under
the transactional model and contract under the tort model. Second, under
the unilateral acts doctrine, the commercial transactions of other stream
participants must be disregarded.575 In the stream of commerce context,
however, each participant's commercial success is dependent upon the
competence and success of the other stream participants.576 These
networks not only connect the product to the plaintiff, but also, are
volitionally and consensually entered into by stream participants in order to

572See

Dayton, supra note 3, at 278 (stating that due process is not offended when a forum

exercises jurisdiction over a stream participant who enjoys economic benefits flowing from the
sale 573
of its product within the state); Seidelson, supra note 134, at 573.
William A. Klein et al., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS TEACHERS MANUAL 154 (Foundation
Press5742000).
See Glannon, supra note 513, at 35 (explaining that tort claims require tort-based

jurisdiction and business claims require transacting business or contract-based jurisdiction).
575
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) ("The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.").
576See Dayton, supra note 3, at 271 (stating that the unilateral act doctrine does not render
irrelevant contacts created with the help of third parties); Murphy, supra note 4, at 308
(discussing the relationship among stream participants); Blauvelt, supra note 134, at 865 (stating
that stream participants are often "at the mercy of another").
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pursue their economic goals. 57 Accordingly, these transactional networks
are as significant to stream of commerce jurisdiction as the relationship
among the defendant, the forum and the litigation is to minimum contacts
jurisdiction. 78
a.

There is No Specific Jurisdictionin Stream of Commerce
Jurisdiction

The minimum contacts doctrine permits a court to exercise specific
jurisdiction over a defendant who has engaged in forum-related activities
that give rise to the claim. 579 The defendant's acceptance of forum benefits
in exchange for forum activities justifies the inference that the defendant
constructively consented to be sued in that forum, but only for conduct
related to the claim. In the stream of commerce context, specific
jurisdiction requires a direct causal link between a plaintiffs injury and a
specific widget.580 However, too few widgets may be too isolated or
fortuitous to justify specific jurisdiction, while too many widgets may be
jurisdictional surplusage if one of them does not give rise to the claim. 581
When this happens, specific jurisdiction does not easily apply and,
consequently, some stream participants may avoid jurisdictional
amenability.
The applicability of specific jurisdiction to the stream of commerce
theory is based on the assumption that procedural due process requires
compliance with the minimum contacts doctrine and, hence, with its
attendant specific jurisdiction construct. This assumption, however, is
based largely on a misconception about the role that specific jurisdiction
plays in framing the jurisdictional discussion in product liability cases.

577

Dayton, supra note 3, at 239 (stating that a product enters into a chain of distribution
because a defendant chooses to put it there for the purpose of deriving economic benefit from its
sale by intermediaries within the forum); Cummins, supra note 563, at 1034 (stating that the
manufacturer's economic purposes are effectuated wherever its product is consumed).
578
See supra note 551.
579
See SHREVE AND RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 53, at 73, 73 n.2 ("Specific jurisdiction
proceeds from a relationship between the forum and the noncitizen defendant funneled through
the facts of the controversy.").
58°See Morton, supra note 489, at 465 (observing that World-Wide Volkswagen requires a
causal connection between the sale of the specific product that caused the injury and the
defendant's
effort to serve the market).
581
See Velandra v. Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292, 297-98 (6th Cir.
1964) (refusing to exercise jurisdiction based on the presence of only a few products in the
See

forum).
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For example, specific jurisdiction requires the facts giving rise to the
claim to be related to the facts giving rise to jurisdiction. 582 Presumably, if
the claim sounds in tort, the court's jurisdictional authority must be
tort-based as well, i.e., jurisdiction will be sanctioned by a long-arm
provision that authorizes jurisdiction over "torts" or "tortious acts." As
applied to product liability, specific jurisdiction bases a court's
jurisdictional authority on the activities of the defendant that create the
product defect that causes the injury that gives rise to the claim.
Consequently, the commercial transactions that bring the product to the
plaintiff will not support specific jurisdiction because they do not give rise
to the claim. In sum, stream of commerce jurisdiction has been cast in the
tort model to create the specific jurisdiction that satisfies minimum
contacts.
If, however, the assumption that procedural due process requires
compliance with the minimum contacts doctrine is false, then specific
jurisdiction is irrelevant to stream of commerce jurisdiction since specific
jurisdiction has no independent significance outside of the minmum
contacts doctrine. 83 Once specific jurisdiction has been eliminated from
the stream of commerce analysis, the tort model of stream of commerce
jurisdiction becomes irrelevant as well. Shorn of this doctrinal
misconception, the real relationship between stream of commerce
jurisdiction and procedural due process can be reevaluated.
b. TransactionalJurisdiction
The construct of specific jurisdiction is inapplicable to stream of
commerce jurisdiction which imputes jurisdictional significance, not to one
widget or one million widgets, but to the transactional network that brings
the widget to the plaintiff. The concept of transaction-based jurisdiction is
not a new idea. Several renowned scholars have offered compelling
arguments for recharacterizing some aspects of minimum contacts
jurisdiction as "transactional" rather than "tortious." For example, in 1957,
Chief Justice Traynor theorized that minimum contacts should be based on
the relationship between the forum and the transaction. 584 In 1965,
Professor Hazard proposed that minimum contacts between the transaction
and the forum could justify personal jurisdiction in foreign attachment
582

See supra note 579.

583

See LANDERS, MARTIN & YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 88 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co.
1988) (explaining the differences between general and specific jurisdiction and stating that

minimum contacts do not apply to general jurisdiction).
5

S4Atkinson v. Superior Court, 316 P.2d 960, 965-66 (Cal. 1957).
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proceedings.58 5 In 1983, Professor Seidelson wrote in a footnote that "a
manufacturer's vulnerability to jurisdiction should be as broad as the
market enjoyed by the manufacturer's product. 5 86 In 1984, Professor
Trautman proposed "that courts should apply a market analysis to all
'stream of commerce' cases ' 587 because a stream participant's receipt of
significant benefits from a specific forum satisfies minimum contacts.588
Professor Trautman added that Gray represented a good example of the
market analysis approach to jurisdiction.58 9
These commentators recognized the discord between stream of
commerce jurisdiction and minimum contacts jurisdiction but offered the
transactional or market models as alternative means of satisfying the
minimum contacts doctrine. 590 This article proposes a different solution. It
proposes that the absorption of stream of commerce jurisdiction into
minimum contacts jurisdiction was a doctrinal error that arose in Gray and
has yet to be sorted out. 591 When evaluated independently, it becomes
clear that both jurisdictional constructs are distinct and separate, yet each
distinctively and separately satisfies procedural due process.

585

Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT.
REV.586241, 285 (1965).
Seidelson, supra note 134, at 20, 20 n.79 ("[T]o the extent ..
that the manufacturer's
vulnerability to jurisdiction should be as broad as the markets enjoyed by the manufacturer's
product,
I would concur.").
587
Trautman, supra note 55, at 156.
588
Trautman, supra note 55, at 171.
589
Trautman, supra note 55, at 171-72. "Transactional jurisdiction" was also discussed in
Lilly, supra note 556, at 113. See also Cummins, supra note 563, at 1031 (arguing that the
minimum contacts inquiry asks the wrong questions when applied to stream of commerce
jurisdiction since the "how" and the "where" of a stream's course is not a significant concern of
many stream participants).
59°The proposition that stream of commerce jurisdiction satisfies the minimum contacts
doctrine was also consistent with the overwhelming majority of cases that addressed the issue.
See Dayton, supra note 3, at 267-68 ("By the time the Court rendered its Asahi decision early in
1987, courts in at least sixteen states, and most federal appellate courts had ruled that the stream
of commerce theory comported with the principles articulated in International Shoe and its
progeny.").
591Murphy, supra note 4, at 316 (stating that the confusion about stream of commerce
jurisdiction is partly due to the ambiguities in Gray).
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B. ProceduralDue Process and the QuidPro Quo
All exercises of personal jurisdiction must satisfy procedural due
process. 592 According to World-Wide Volkswagen, procedural due process
is satisfied when "the orderly administration of the laws gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where
that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit." 593 Accordingly, a
forum's exercise of personal jurisdiction will satisfy due process when its
laws are administered with sufficient regularity and order to forewarn a
defendant of the jurisdictional consequences of its conduct.5 94 Once
forewarned, the defendant can invite or avoid jurisdiction by structuring its
conduct according to the forum's legal requirements.5 95 If the defendant
refrains from such conduct, it will not be subject to the forum's
jurisdictional authority. If the defendant engages in such conduct, it may
be subject to the forum's jurisdictional authority. The difference between
the two possibilities is that in the latter the defendant enters into a
relationship of reciprocal benefits and obligations with the forum, whereas
in the former no such relationship arises. The receipt of forum benefits
forewarns the defendant that it may be obligated to account for the
consequences of its conduct in that forum. 5 96 Hence, the essence of
procedural due process is a relationship of reciprocal benefits and
obligations between the defendant and the forum: a quid pro quo of
constitutional significance.597
592Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877) ("Since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the validity of . . . judgments may be directly
questioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground that proceedings in a court
of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction
do not constitute due process of law.").
593
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (citation omitted).
594
See Quesenberry, supra note 134, at 196 (discussing how World-Wide Volkswagen's
"predictability" requirement applies to the stream of commerce).
"9World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297; see Quesenberry, supra note 134, at 196.
596

8ee Greenstein, supra note 134, at 868 (theorizing that under the communitarian approach
jurisdiction
is justified when society, through a forum, has conferred benefits on a defendant).
597
See Greenstein, supra note 134, at 868 (theorizing that InternationalShoe 's requirements
amount to a quid pro quo of forum benefits for jurisdictional obligations); id.
at 867 (theorizing
that the concept of purposeful availment is based on a quid pro quo by which the individual
becomes indebted to society for the benefits it has bestowed on him); see also Russell J.
Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the PersonalJurisdictionof State Courts: Time For A

Change, 63 OR. L. REv. 485, 520 (1984) (describing jurisdiction as the quid pro quo for
choosing to deal with a nonresident supplier or buyer).
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The quid pro quo theory of procedural due process applies easily to
both stream of commerce and minimum contacts jurisdiction. Stream of
commerce jurisdiction looks to the nature of the bargain the defendant
made in order to participate in a stream's transactional network, and asks:
What obligations did the defendant incur? What benefits did the defendant
receive? Does this bargain forewarn the defendant of the jurisdictional
consequences of its conduct? 598 Bargains made in which obligations
incurred are exchanged for benefits received from a transactional network
suggest a straightforward constitutional proposition: The defendant will be
amenable to jurisdiction wherever its bargain yields benefits.599
The minimum contacts doctrine utilizes a quid pro quo when it permits
a state to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who received benefits from
its forum-related activities that gave rise to the lawsuit. Minimum contacts
jurisdiction, however, is not the only way to satisfy the quid pro
quo. Despite Shaffer's admonition that "all assertions of state-court
jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
International Shoe and its progeny,, 600 personal jurisdiction can be
exercised absent contacts. 60 The defendant's presence in the forum when
served 60 2 and consent to the forum's jurisdiction have long been

5988ee Hombeck, supra note 541, at 1403 (stating that to determine a stream defendant's

amenability to jurisdiction courts ask: "Did the defendant plan, assist, or promote activities
within the forum?"); Murphy, supra note 4, at 260 ("[C]ourts [identify] the following factors as
relevant to stream of commerce analysis: the defendant's role in the distribution system, the
defendant's receipt of substantial benefits from the forum, and the defendant's ability to foresee
that its products would reach the forum.").
599See supranote 585.

60 0

Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
6°'See Richman, supra note 3, at 636-37 (discussing non-contact bases of jurisdiction);
Mullenix, supra note 490, at 363 n.207-10 (discussing non-contact bases of personal
jurisdiction); Greenstein supra note 134, at 866 (stating that due process is not limited to
contacts); Lewis, supranote 487, at 3-6 (discussing why contacts are not the exclusive measure
ofjurisdictional justification); Kurland supra note 492, at 578-89 (discussing the development of
"presence" and "consent" as bases for jurisdiction).
6°2See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
722 (1877) ("[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory."). The issue in Burnham was whether the minimum contacts
requirements applied when a defendant was served while physically present in the forum. Joined
by three justices, Justice Scalia stated in Section II. B: "Among the most firmly established
principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have
jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State." Id. at 610. Four justices
disagreed, arguing that absent minimum contacts, jurisdiction over a defendant merely because it
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absence of minimum
jurisdictionally
sufficient despite
the
contacts.6 °3 Jurisdiction also can be validly exercised when a defendant
60 5
60 4
is subject to implied consent,
waives a jurisdictional objection,

consents to jurisdiction by contract, 60 6 is estopped to deny consent to
jurisdiction as a discovery sanction,60 7 or is domiciled °s or incorporated6 9
in a forum. The sin qua non of procedural due process is not contacts, but
the quid pro quo relationship between the defendant and the forum that
provides fair and forewarning of the jurisdictional consequences of the
defendant's conduct.6 1°
These non-contact bases of jurisdiction satisfy procedural due process
because each arises from a relationship of obligations and benefits between
the defendant and the forum. If the defendant does not want to be sued in
State X, it should not be present there, domiciled there, consent to be sued
there, or waive consent to suit there by mistake or misbehavior. According
to World-Wide Volkswagen, these non-contact bases of jurisdiction can
satisfy procedural due process only if they give "a degree of predictability
to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct
will and will not render them liable to suit."' 61t

Historically, domicile,

incorporation, presence, and consent have met that test because the
consistent manner in which they have been applied over time satisfies the
forewarning function of due process.61 2 Whether jurisdiction is contact or
was physically present in the forum when served violates due process. Id. at 628-40 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
603See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-20 (1972); Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd.
v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1964). See also supra note 601 this section.
6°4FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1) (a jurisdictional objection is waived if it is not timely asserted).
See supra note 600.
605

See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927).
See Nat'l Equip. Rental, 375 U.S. at 314-16. See also supra note 601.
607
See Ins. Corp. of r. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704-09 (1982).
606

See also
supra note 601.
608
See generally Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See also supra note 601.
609

see supra note 601. See also Landers, Martin & Yeazell, supra note 583, at 89 (stating
that it is "generally accepted that a corporation may be sued in its state of incorporation for all
claims");
Lewis, supra note 487, at 3.
61 0
See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); Seidelson,
supra note 134, at 18 (stating that World-Wide Volkswagen's primary rationale was that the due
process
clause is entitled to protect the nonresident from jurisdictional surprise).
6 11
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
612
See Brilmayer, supra note 52, at 87-88, 88 n.56 (stating that domicile, incorporation, doing
business and other bases of jurisdiction that are unrelated to the claim satisfy procedural due
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non-contact based, the function of procedural due process remains the
same: If a forum sufficiently forewarns a defendant of the jurisdictional
consequences of its conduct, and the defendant accepts the benefits of the
forum to pursue such conduct, then the forum can hold the defendant
accountable for that conduct: Quid pro quo.6 13
Applying the minimum contacts doctrine to stream of commerce
conduct cannot satisfy procedural due process. As many commentators
have recognized, stream of commerce jurisdiction qua minimum contacts
has yielded a highly inconsistent, confused, and unpredictable body of
law. 614 The stream of commerce theory has been applied so broadly and
inconsistently for the last forty years that it is conceivably impossible for a
defendant to "structure" its behavior to avoid jurisdictional amenability.
Consequently, the forewarning function of procedural due process cannot
be fulfilled.
The stream of commerce theory and the minimum contacts doctrine are
distinct and separate theories of jurisdiction. Although both serve the same
purpose, each attaches jurisdictional significance to conduct in which only
one or the other, but not both, can engage. Like an emotionally estranged
couple who share the same bed but compete for its comforts by pulling the
blankets off of each other, stream of commerce jurisdiction and the
minimum contacts doctrine need to be disentangled
from each other so that
615
each can fulfill its constitutional function.
VII. CONCLUSION
The purpose of the minimum contacts doctrine is to prevent the
unpredictable ensnaring of a defendant whose relationship with a state is
process because the defendant "is enough of an 'insider' that he may safely be relegated to the
State's
political processes").
6 13
See supra note 610.

6 14

See Hornbeck, supra note 541, at 1404 (asserting that courts apply stream of commerce
jurisdiction in four distinct ways); Hombeck, supra note 541, at 1421-1432 (stating that stream
of commerce jurisdiction has been applied inconsistently); Murphy, supra note 4, at 282 (stating
that application of stream of commerce jurisdiction is confusing and unpredictable); Dayton,
supra note 3, at 245 (arguing that post-Asahi stream of commerce jurisdiction has been applied

broadly and inconsistently); Quesenberry, supra note 134, at 203-205 (arguing that post-Asahi
courts have applied stream of commerce jurisdiction in such conflicting and inconsistent ways
that jurisdictional amenability is unpredictable); Louis, supra note 53, at 432 (stating that stream
of commerce cases "have only limited precedential value" because they are intensely fact
specific).
615
This metaphor is attributed to Prof Wendy Gordon, Boston University School of Law.
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insufficient to exact the quid pro quo of forum benefits for litigation
burdens. The purpose of the stream of commerce doctrine is to provide
jurisdictional justification for the joinder of related claims against multiple
participants in an economic network. To satisfy its joinder function,
stream of commerce jurisdiction must provide litigation efficiencies that
permit entire controversies against transactionally related defendants to be
resolved in one lawsuit in one forum. To accomplish its jurisdictional
function, stream of commerce jurisdiction must satisfy procedural due
process. Procedural due process requires a system that is sufficiently
regular, consistent, and predictable to provide fair and forewarning to a
potential defendant of the possibility of suit in one place and the
opportunity to avoid suit in another. Absent predictability, neither the state
nor the defendant can satisfy the quid pro quo because neither can assess
ex ante the consequences of the other's conduct.
Stream of commerce jurisdiction, when viewed through the minimum
contacts lens, has never satisfied the regularity and predictability
requirements of procedural due process. Gray's distortion of the
relationship between stream of commerce and minimum contacts
jurisdiction and Asahi's resulting plurality opinions have rendered the
stream of commerce construct more metaphorical than meaningful. Stream
of commerce jurisdiction, however, satisfies procedural due process, not
because of its adherence to the minimum contacts doctrine, but because
participation in transactional networks satisfies the relationship of
reciprocal benefits and obligations that is the sin qua non of jurisdictional
due process. Ironically, while stream of commerce jurisdiction has gained
stature as "good law," the case from which it emerged, Gray v. American
Radiator, has devolved into "bad law" when evaluated in light of
contemporary jurisdictional jurisprudence.
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